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Abstract: The Presumption of Innocence 
By: Michelle A Coleman 
Despite its inclusion in most, if not all, criminal justice systems, there is no 
general consensus as to what constitutes the presumption of innocence. This study 
answers the question: What is the presumption of innocence? The study contributes to 
knowledge by providing a comprehensive definition of the presumption of innocence 
from both a theoretical and practical perspective. 
The substantive chapters are thematic. Chapter two examines how the 
presumption of innocence fits within the existing legal framework. Chapters three and 
four discuss the two aspects of the presumption of innocence. The procedural aspect 
is a legal presumption that is applicable at trial, while the non-procedural aspect 
extends the presumption of innocence outside of trial to protect non-convicted 
individuals from being treated as if they have been convicted. Chapter five argues that 
everyone can benefit from the presumption of innocence, but the right only attaches 
once someone is ‘charged’. Chapter six examines the duty to uphold the presumption 
of innocence concluding that the strongest duty falls to the fact-finder but the majority 
of the burden falls to public authorities. Finally, the seventh chapter attempts to 
reconcile the presumption of innocence with pre-determination detention. 
The thesis concludes that the presumption of innocence is a human right with 
two aspects. These aspects keep innocent people from being treated as if they have 
been convicted of a crime. While the procedural aspect is operative at trial, the non-
procedural aspect extends the presumption of innocence beyond trial. The outcome of 
the particular criminal case determines when the right to the presumption of 
innocence ends. Finally, the presumption of innocence may be reconciled with pre-
determination detention only if the reason justifying the detention is not based within 
the criminal process.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The presumption of innocence presents a paradox. It is an ancient idea in 
criminal law and one that is deemed important enough to include in the modern 
human rights and international criminal law statutes. An overwhelming number of 
national, regional and international jurisdictions recognize the presumption of 
innocence in their criminal codes and statutes. However, while the presumption of 
innocence seems essential to criminal justice, its purpose, scope and the practicalities 
of how it achieves its purpose are largely undefined. This study answers the question: 
What is the presumption of innocence? This question will be answered by exploring 
where the presumption of innocence can be found in the law, what its purpose is, who 
the right-holders and duty-holders are, and the presumption’s relationship to other 
rights. Answering these questions will determine a comprehensive definition of the 
presumption of innocence. 
Statutes and criminal codes do not define the presumption and the theorists are 
widely divided. As a result, many different roles have been ascribed to the 
presumption of innocence. Some commentators take a narrow idea of the presumption 
of innocence and argue that it is a restatement of the burden of proof, limited only to 
defendants at trial. Others argue that the presumption of innocence has some purpose 
within the pre-trial process but not outside of the courtroom. Those with perhaps the 
widest view argue it is a right that encompasses and guides all of our interactions. 
Practical guidance through statutes and rules provide little help. The presumption of 
innocence is not defined and it is included in case law without discussion of why or 
how it is meant to operate. 
This study looks at the presumption of innocence from both a practical and 
theoretical point of view to determine what the presumption of innocence is and how 
it operates within law. It approaches the right from an international criminal law and 
international and regional human rights perspective in an effort to develop a common 
and widely applicable definition of the presumption of innocence. From the 
theoretical standpoint, this study examines normative theorists and other legal 
scholars to determine whether theory and practice can come together to determine 
what the presumption is and how it works. 
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A. Research Question and Original Contribution to Knowledge 
The goal of this study is to develop a working definition of the presumption of 
innocence and to understand its scope and purpose. The main research question of this 
project is: What is the presumption of innocence? There should be an easy answer. 
The presumption of innocence is contained in countless national, regional, and 
international documents, and by some accounts has existed for thousands of years. 
Surely there should be a definition that is well developed, clear, and useful. The 
presumption of innocence should have been developed over time through the various 
legal systems to result in a test, or a series of principles that can help guide anyone 
interested in determining what the presumption of innocence is, when it applies, and 
how it works. Unfortunately, it is not this straightforward. 
Digging below the surface starts to tease out the many issues surrounding the 
definition of the presumption of innocence. One quickly becomes concerned with not 
only what ‘presumption of innocence’ means but also what is meant by the words 
‘innocence’ and ‘presumption’. Further, is the presumption of innocence a human 
right or is it something else? Is it merely a presumption? What is the purpose of the 
presumption of innocence? Is it limited to a particular area of the law? Who must 
apply the presumption of innocence and to whom must it apply? Under what 
circumstances is it applicable? What is the relationship of the presumption with other 
rights? How can the presumption of innocence and pre-determination detention co-
exist within the same legal system? 
The present study contributes to knowledge in both its topic and its breadth. 
By taking into account more jurisdictions and combining theory with practice, the 
definition developed within this study will be more comprehensive than previous 
works. Within academic literature, the presumption of innocence is usually discussed 
in one of two ways; either in a limited way with a focus on one or two jurisdictions or 
cases, or in a sweeping way that focuses on what the presumption should be but not 
how it is used in practice.1 This study will bridge that gap and determine a definition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  For examples of sources limited to specific jurisdictions see: Andrew Stumer The 
Presumption of Innocence: Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Hart 2010) (mainly 
limited to the United Kingdom with some discussion of the United States, South Africa and 
Canada); Schwikkard, PJ, Presumption of Innocence (Juta & Co 1999) (Mostly limited to 
South African and Canada); Richard L Lippke, Taming the Presumption of Innocence (OUP 
2016) (limited to the United States). For examples of general normative arguments see, for 
example, Antony Duff, ‘Presumptions Broad and Narrow’ (2013) 42(3) NJLP 268, 268-269. 
But see Thomas Weigend, ‘There is Only One Presumption of Innocence’ (2013) 42(3) NJLP 
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by examining a wide range of international and regional jurisdictions and testing that 
practice against the normative theories. By examining the presumption of innocence 
in practice at the international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals and 
the regional human rights courts this analysis will be able to see common themes 
across jurisdictions, which should result in a definition of wider application. This will 
develop a new, comprehensive definition of the presumption of innocence based on 
both theory and practice that will hopefully be of use to practitioners and academics. 
Examining theory and practice, this study uses a human rights and criminal 
law perspective to answer these questions and determine what is meant by 
‘presumption of innocence’. Defining the presumption of innocence is important 
because it is only through understanding the scope, definition, and use of the 
presumption that a determination can be reached as to whether it is being used 
properly by judges, defendants, prosecutors and academics. Further, and perhaps 
more importantly, defining the presumption’s scope and application can help 
determine when the presumption of innocence is being infringed upon, eroded, or 
violated, enabling remedy to be gained and ensuring that the presumption of 
innocence may be protected. Without knowing the boundaries of the presumption of 
innocence it impossible to know whether the presumption of innocence is being 
protected, in what circumstances it is being deviated from and how the presumption 
works with the other fair trial rights. As a result, this lack of definition may allow the 
presumption of innocence to be applied or ignored in an almost arbitrary manner. This 
research aims to correct this and develop a working definition of the presumption so 
that it can be correctly applied and protected. Further, identifying what the 
presumption of innocence is now will help guide how it may change in the future. 
The chapters are designed to answer the research questions thematically. 
Chapter 2 examines where the presumption of innocence fits within the existing legal 
framework concluding that while it is present win many areas of the law it is only 
relevant within the general context of criminal proceedings. The chapter also defines 
‘innocence’ and ‘presumption’ within the context of the presumption of innocence 
and discusses the presumption of innocence’s purpose. It argues that the presumption 
of innocence is meant to prevent people who have not been convicted of a crime from 
being treated as if they have. Thus, the presumption of innocence prevents 
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punishment and sanction without a conviction. Against that backdrop, Chapters 3 and 
4 discuss the two aspects of the presumption of innocence. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
procedural aspect, discussing the presumption of innocence as a mandatory rebuttable 
legal presumption that is an instruction to the fact-finder at trial. As a corollary to this, 
the chapter explores the relationships between the presumption of innocence and the 
burden and standard of proof. The non-procedural aspect is examined in Chapter 4. 
Relying on the presumption of innocence’s purpose, this chapter argues that the 
presumption extends outside of the courtroom and trial settings to protect non-
convicted individuals from being treated as if they are guilty of a crime. This chapter 
specifically discusses ways in which treatment of individuals may affect their right to 
the procedural presumption of innocence during trial. The study then turns to who is 
benefited and burdened by the presumption of innocence. Chapter 5 argues that 
everyone has the right to benefit from the presumption of innocence’s protections, but 
that the right is limited by when it attaches. The right is only operable when an 
individual is ‘charged’ with a criminal offence. While the right is relatively expansive 
in who it applies to, the duty to uphold the presumption of innocence may be more 
limited. Chapter 6 concludes that the strongest duty falls to the fact-finder. Public 
authorities have a duty but that duty’s strength depends on how close they are to the 
investigation or case. Private entities however, have a much more limited duty 
because this duty must be weighed against their own rights, including the right to 
freedom of expression. Chapter 7 examines the contradictory concepts of the 
presumption of innocence and pre-determination detention. Both are included within 
criminal justice systems, but they appear to be irreconcilable. This chapter looks at 
whether and when these two concepts can be reconciled by considering the 
justifications for pre-determination detention in light of the presumption of 
innocence’s purpose. The chapter concludes that it may be possible to reconcile pre-
determination detention with the presumption of innocence but only in instances when 
the decision to hold someone in pre-determination detention can be removed from the 
criminal process. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this study by drawing together the 
various chapters and discussing some themes that developed through the work. 
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B. The Presumption of Innocence in Practice 
In this study, the practical application of the presumption of innocence is 
mainly found in the conventions, rules and case law of the International Criminal 
Court; the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; 
the European Court of Human Rights; the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; and the Human Rights Committee. 
These jurisdictions were chosen because of their international or regional reach and 
the amount of available case law. The criminal tribunals and courts were selected 
specifically because they encompass cases from a variety of regions and thus may 
give a understanding of how the presumption of innocence is used within those 
regions and internationally. The human rights courts were studied because they 
specifically include the presumption of innocence within their conventions and have 
provided some interpretation of this concept for their regions. As a result, the human 
rights courts can give some understanding of how the presumption of innocence is 
understood both regionally and on a national level within the participating states. 
Further, there is some reliance on the regional human rights bodies by the 
International Criminal Court in the area of the presumption of innocence.2  
In an effort to develop as comprehensive a definition as possible, several other 
jurisdictions were examined but were found to lack sufficient case law or analysis 
about the presumption of innocence to materially add to this study. Examples include 
the International Military Tribunal; the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East; the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia; the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon; the Special Court for Sierra Leone; and several national jurisdictions. While 
not as fully discussed as the other courts, these jurisdictions are used as examples 
when there is something specifically interesting about them with regard to the 
presumption of innocence. 
Each of the studied jurisdictions provides some insight as to how the 
presumption of innocence is to be used and its scope, however none of these courts 
provide a full picture. The European Court of Human Rights has the most developed 
case law on this issue, however, even this case law is lacking. Often an accused 
person will complain of both a violation of their right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See eg: Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Decisions on Defence Request for an Order to 
Preserve the Impartiality of the Proceedings) ICC-01/04-01/10-51, PT Ch I (31 January 2011) 
para 9 
	   6	  
and a violation of their right to the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.3 If the European Court finds that there has 
been a violation under Article 6(1) they are unlikely to move on to the Article 6(2) 
determination because they argue that this issue has been ‘absorbed’ by the Article 
6(1) finding and, thus, no further analysis is needed.4 The only practicable way to 
determine how the presumption of innocence is used in practice is to look at the 
written materials. These documents however, are often disappointing because the 
rules, statutes, agreements and statements often refer to the presumption of innocence 
without defining what it means, what it is meant to protect against, or what kind of 
behaviour would cause a violation. The case law should fill in the gaps, but this too is 
not complete. Courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights will stop their 
enquiry once one violation of the accused’s rights has been found, often without 
considering the presumption of innocence issue. 
The presumption of innocence has its roots in history. The first recorded use 
of a law similar to the modern presumption of innocence is found in Hammurabi’s 
Code, which is believed to have been enacted circa 1750 BCE.5 Since that time the 
presumption of innocence has developed through the statutes and case laws of 
domestic jurisdictions. Now the presumption of innocence is present in most, if not 
all, national criminal codes and statutes, many international human rights treaties, the 
statutes of the regional human rights courts, and the international and 
internationalised criminal courts.6 Despite its inclusion in so many jurisdictions, there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Stefan Trechsel ‘The Right to be Presumed Innocent’ in Stefan Trechsel and Sarah Summers 
(eds) Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (OUP 2006) 164 
4 See e.g.: Deweer v. Belgium (1980) Series A no 35; Demicoli v Malta (1991) Series A no 
210, para 34; Funke v France (1993) Series A no 256-A , para 45; Trechsel (n 3) 165. For a 
comprehensive look at how the Eurpean Court of Human Rights decides cases where more 
than one part of Article 6 is at issue see Ryan Goss, Criminal Fair Trial Rights (Hart 2014). 
5 Code of Hammurabi, as translated at Yale Avalon Project <avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/ 
hamframe.asp> accessed 16 April 2018, see Code of Laws 1-3 for examples of crimes, 
required proofs, and of consequences for accuser if their accusations are not proved. 
6 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 Dec 1948, 217 A (III) 
art 11(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art 14(2); European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 
(ECHR), art 6(2); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) art 66; 
American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 
July 1978) (ACHR) art 8(2) Law On The Establishment Of Extraordinary Chambers In The 
Courts Of Cambodia For The Prosecution Of Crimes Committed During The Period Of 
Democratic Kampuchea (27 October 2004) art 35 new; UN Security Council, Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (16 January 2002) art 17(3); UN Security Council, Statute of 
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is no general consensus as to what the presumption of innocence means or how it is to 
be applied.  
Recently this lack of consensus was exemplified at the regional level by the 
European Directive on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of 
innocence and the right to be present in criminal proceedings, which is part of the 
Stockholm Programme. 7  This directive stresses ‘strengthening of the rights of 
individuals in criminal proceedings.’8 The Directive itself is meant to ‘enhance the 
right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings by laying down minimum rules concerning 
certain aspects of the presumption of innocence….’9 and increase ‘mutual trust and 
confidence between the different judicial systems and the perception that the rights of 
suspects or accused persons are not respected in every instance’.10 While this signals a 
general recognition of the right to the presumption of innocence amongst citizens of 
European Union Member States, the need to set out minimum standards and require 
all Member States to come into compliance with these standards implies some lack of 
consensus as to how the presumption of innocence is to be implemented. 
One of the challenges involved in defining the presumption of innocence from 
its use in practice is that it is found in so many areas of the law. National, regional and 
international jurisdictions all recognize the presumption of innocence. Examining the 
international and internationalised courts and tribunals and the regional human rights 
courts should give a good overview of what the presumption of innocence is and 
where it diverges and converges between jurisdictions. It should provide a good 
survey of where and what the presumption of innocence is and allow for development 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (25 May 1993) art 21(3); UN 
Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (8 November 
1994) art 20(3); UN Security Council, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (30 May 
2007) art 16(3)(a); African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (published on 27 June 
1981, entry into force 21 August 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 (African Charter) art 7(1)(b). 
7 European Council, Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and 
Protecting Citizens OJ, 2010, C, 115/1; European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of certain aspects of the 
presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings’, 
COM (2014) 397 final (EU Road Map); European Commission, ‘Green Paper, The 
Presumption of Innocence’, COM(2006) 174 final.  
8 European Council (n 7); EU Road Map (n 7); European Commission (n 7). 
9 European Commission (n 7) 11. 
10 Ibid 1; European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document Executive Summary 
of the Impact Assessment’, SWD(2013) 479 final, 19; María Luisa Villamarín López, ‘The 
Presumption of Innocence in Directive 2016/343/EU of 9 March 2016’ (2017) 18(3) ERA 
Forum 335. 
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of a definition of the right, particularly when considering that it is a human right 
which must be respected in all jurisdictions. However, this necessarily limits the 
information studied and will leave out the minutiae between different national 
jurisdictions. Because the goal is to determine whether there is an overarching 
definition of the presumption of innocence and if there is, what that definition might 
be, the special rules that particular national jurisdictions may have are more 
exceptions than the rule.  
Another challenge in looking at the presumption of innocence in practice is 
that the relevant cases not be the best examples of the presumption of innocence being 
used. It is conceivable that the cases that might uphold the presumption of innocence 
best do not get to trial, because of issues identified by investigators or the prosecutor, 
which make trial not realistic, practicable or fair. Thus, there is potentially a wide 
range of cases that cannot be examined because they were dismissed or discontinued 
and thus records of how the presumption of innocence was used, or not used, in these 
cases do not exist. In national jurisdictions there are frequently no, or limited, written 
decisions in cases at the trial court level. This is particularly true in cases of acquittal 
or discontinuation within common law jurisdictions however, cases that end in either 
acquittal or discontinuation could offer some meaningful analysis about the 
presumption of innocence. It would seem that there is a good argument that those 
cases are upholding the presumption of innocence and could be examined to see 
whether the presumption of innocence means the same thing in those cases as in cases 
that are appealed.  
There is also an issue with the regional human rights court decisions because 
regional human rights courts have limited jurisdiction and frequently can only be used 
after the appeals process within the national jurisdiction has been exhausted.11 This 
limits the cases that the regional courts hear either because cases end somewhere in 
the appeals process or the potential applicant does not have the desire or resources to 
raise the issue at the regional court. Thus, regional human rights courts are only able 
to provide a small sample of the potential decisions that could develop regarding the 
right to the presumption of innocence within their jurisdiction. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 ECHR art 35; ACHR art 46; African Charter art 56. 
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C. The Presumption of Innocence in Theory 
The theoretical work regarding the presumption of innocence tends to be 
normative in nature, that is, defining what the presumption of innocence should be 
rather than what it is in practice. These sources rarely cite to case law or the 
presumption’s actual use, but rather discuss ideas of how the presumption should 
work and its theoretical scope. Theorists tend to see the presumption of innocence as 
either narrow or broad. Whether the presumption of innocence is narrow or broad 
determines when it applies and how it can be used. 
The narrow interpretations argue that the presumption of innocence is limited 
in scope to the trial setting. Magnus Ulväng, Thomas Weigend, Larry Laudan, 
Richard Lippke, and Andrew Ashworth all argue for a narrow approach.12 These 
interpretations range from the presumption of innocence being a rule of thumb for the 
fact-finder, to the presumption of innocence being a legal presumption at trial, to 
extending to the presumption of innocence to the pre-trial stage but still confined to 
the courtroom. 
The narrowest of these views, held by Ulväng, is that the presumption of 
innocence is a ‘rule of thumb.’13 This means that the presumption of innocence is 
merely a guiding principle that can be applied or not applied depending on whether 
the fact-finder considers it applicable. This theory argues that the presumption of 
innocence in legislative texts lacks the specificity to make it a required rule.14 
Therefore, the person to whom the rule is directed is free to use the rule based on 
whether or not they generally have good reasons to follow the rule.15 The effect of 
this interpretation is that the presumption of innocence becomes almost meaningless. 
In contrast, the most common narrow theories confine the presumption of innocence 
to the trial context and limit the implementation to the fact-finder.16 Ashworth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Magnus Ulväng, ‘Presumption of Innocence Versus a Principle of Fairness’ (2013) 42(3) 
NJLP 205; Weigend (n 1); Larry Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal 
Epistemology (CUP 2006); Larry Laudan, ‘The Presumption of Innocence: Material or 
Probatory?’ (2005) 11(4) Legal Theory 333; Lippke (n 1) (OUP 2016); Andrew Ashworth 
‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10(4) Int’l J Evid & Proof 241 241; 
Andrew Ashworth ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 123(1) South 
African L J 63. 
13 Ulväng (n 12).  
14 Ibid 209-210. 
15 Ibid. 
16  See Laudan, Truth, Error and Criminal Law (n 12); Laudan ‘The Presumption of 
Innocence’ (n 12); Lippke (n 1); Weigend (n 1). 
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expands on these theories to argue that the presumption of innocence could be 
extended to pre-trial procedures and not necessarily limited to trial itself.17  
Broad views of the presumption of innocence, such as those of Hock Lai Ho 
and Alwin van Dijk, argue that the presumption of innocence applies either in a wider 
context than merely the trial setting and/or should be exercised by more people than 
just the fact-finder. 18  Theorists who favour a more expansive view see the 
presumption of innocence as encompassing more than criminal trials, that is, 
extending into other aspects of the criminal process. Hock Lai Ho, for example, 
argues that the presumption of innocence, as a human right ‘is the general right to due 
process’ and thus encompasses all of the rights that make up a fair trial and that it has 
no independent meaning.19  He asserts that this means that the presumption of 
innocence has an extensive role to play in ensuring a fair trial.20 This however, 
renders the presumption meaningless by itself, as it can only be understood within the 
context of other due process rights.  
Antony Duff would rather eliminate the narrow or broad debate by creating 
multiple presumptions of innocence that would work differently in each context.21 By 
focusing on the normative roles that individuals play in their daily lives, this theory 
argues that there are different presumptions of innocence that operate in each 
normative context. 22  This theory acknowledges that there is a presumption of 
innocence at work in the pretrial context and a separate presumption of innocence in 
the trial context. There is however, yet another, different presumption of innocence, 
that is relevant to carrying on with daily life based on an idea of civic trust owed and 
enjoyed between individual citizens. 23  By defining different presumptions of 
innocence for different normative contexts, the concept of the presumption of 
innocence is specifically defined for each possible setting. Rather than providing one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ashworth, Int’l J Evid & Proof (n 12); Ashworth, South African L J (n 12). 
18 Hock Lai Ho, ‘The Presumption of Innocence as a Human Right’ in Paul Roberts and Jill 
Hunter (eds), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights (Hart 2012) 266; Alwin van Dijk 
‘Retributivist Arguments against Presuming Innocence: Answering to Duff’ (2013) 42(3) 
NJLP 249. 
19 Ho (n 18) 266. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Duff, ‘Presumptions Broad and Narrow’ (n 1) 
22 Ibid 268-269; Geert Knigge, ‘On Presuming Innocence: Is Duff’s Civic Trust Principle in 
Line with Current Law, particularly the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2013) 
42(3) NJLP 225. 
23 Duff, ‘Presumptions Broad and Narrow’ (n 1) 268-269. 
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blanket definition of the presumption, this theory allows for individually tailored 
definitions relating to many diverse and potentially unrelated contexts.24  
D. Conclusion 
This study’s goal is to define the presumption of innocence. It does so by 
analysing the theoretical debates in light of the practice. Ultimately, the study 
concludes that the presumption of innocence is a human right with two aspects: a 
procedural aspect and a non-procedural aspect. Defining the presumption of 
innocence in this way should provide explanation of when the presumption is being 
upheld and when it is infringed upon. It should more clearly delineate who has a role 
with respect to the presumption and what that role entails. This should provide 
guidance on how the presumption of innocence may be used and where the 
presumption of innocence can be strengthened or develop in the future. 
The present study examines these normative theories through the lens of the 
practical application of the presumption of innocence. This helps reconcile the 
seemingly diverse theories and bridges the gap between the theories and the practice. 
The purpose of the presumption of innocence is to prevent people who have not been 
convicted from being treated as if they are guilty of a crime. The resulting definition 
is that the presumption of innocence has two aspects: the procedural aspect and the 
non-procedural aspect. Thus, the presumption of innocence is both broad and narrow. 
The procedural aspect works within the courtroom as an instruction to the fact-finder: 
requiring proof, directing who must provide evidence, and dictating the specific 
circumstances under which a person may be convicted. The non-procedural aspect is 
less specific and generally prevents people from being treated as if they are guilty 
without a conviction. This aspect operates both inside and outside the courtroom. 
Thus, the presumption of innocence is both broad and narrow. The procedural aspect 
is narrowly applied in the courtroom where it has very specific application while the 
non-procedural aspect is more broadly applied. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid. But see Weigend (n 1) who argues that there is one wide presumption of innocence 
that is broadly construed. 
	   12	  
Chapter 2. The Presumption of Innocence in Context 
Determining the purpose of the presumption of innocence helps frame and 
contextualise the presumption of innocence as discussed in the subsequent chapters.  
This requires the consideration of several preliminary matters: the definitions of 
‘innocence’ and ‘guilt’, consideration of what a presumption is, and where the 
presumption of innocence fits within law. Examining these issues will help identify 
the purpose of the presumption because they help contextualise the presumption in the 
wider field of law and start to define the presumption’s boundaries and limitations. 
The purpose that is developed in this chapter supports and is supported by the rest of 
the chapters which provide a critical examination of how the presumption of 
innocence functions.  
A. What is ‘Innocence’? 
The term ‘innocence’ as used in the phrase ‘the presumption of innocence’, 
must be defined to enable a complete understanding of this inquiry. Innocence is a 
deceptively simple word because while many believe they know what it means, it has 
many meanings that depend on whether the term is used colloquially or within a 
particular discipline. While the general idea of innocence connotes ideas of both 
naivety and/or blamelessness, the definition of innocence (and guilt) in relation to the 
presumption of innocence requires a specific definition. Without some context, 
innocence could be related to any number of ideas including, morality, religion, law, 
psychology, philosophy and fact, each of which would result in a different meaning of 
the term innocence.1 Different disciplines have other meanings of innocence, but they 
are not of concern here. 
There are several challenges in developing a working definition of innocence 
so that one may begin to understand the presumption of innocence. Perhaps most 
significantly, innocence is a concept that cannot be understood without also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For discussions of ’innocence’ and ‘guilt’ within different disciplines see for example 
Herbert Morris, On Innocence and Guilt (U California P 1976); Lois Oppenheim, ‘Guilt’ 
(2008) 56(3) JA Psychoanalytic Association 967; Rajen A Anderson, EJ Masicampo 
‘Protecting the Innocence of Youth: Moral Sanctity Values Underlie Censorship’ (2017) 
43(11) Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin 1503; Sharon Todd, ‘Guilt, Suffering and 
Responsibility’ (2001) 35(4) J of Philosophy of Education 18. 
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understanding guilt.2 These terms are opposites and where guilt describes something, 
innocence describes its absence. Thus, they must be defined together. Another 
significant issue is that the words ‘guilt’ and ‘innocence’ are both frequently laden 
with moral value, which is relative to particular settings, conditions or persons.3 When 
instilling guilt with this moral value, guilt is not simply doing something, it is doing 
something that is bad or wrong. In everyday terms, people often speak of ‘feeling 
guilty’ or feeling as if one has done something ‘wrong’. As guilt’s opposite, 
innocence is also endowed with moral value and thus is inherently ‘good’ because it 
is the state of being free from guilt. This is problematic however, because what is 
considered ‘good’ or ‘bad’, or ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, is necessarily dependent on the 
context and culture in which the action is done.4 What might be considered ‘bad’ in 
one setting may be perfectly fine or even ‘good’ in another. This issue of adding 
moral value is not particularly relevant to the terms ‘guilt’ and ‘innocence’ in the 
context of the presumption of innocence. In this study guilt and innocence should be 
understood in a manner that does not attach subjective moral value to the terms.  
Being grounded in criminal law and procedure, the presumption of innocence 
is concerned with two kinds of innocence: factual and legal.5 The ideas encompassed 
by the terms factual innocence (or guilt) and legal innocence (or guilt) have different 
names depending on which scholar is describing them. For example, some scholars, 
including Larry Laudan, refer to the idea of factual innocence as ‘material 
innocence’.6 Likewise, the concept of legal innocence is also sometimes referred to as 
‘probatory innocence’.7 The present study has chosen to use ‘factual’ and ‘legal’ in an 
effort to be as clear as possible and stress that factual innocence is not directly related 
to the law. Factual innocence is based on whether someone did something in a 
general, non-legal sense. It asks the question: Did someone do something? Legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Stefan Trechsel, ‘The Right to be Presumed Innocent’ in Stefan Trechsel and Sarah 
Summers (eds) Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (OUP 2006) 156; Andrew Stumer, 
The Presumption of Innocence (Hart 2010) 52. 
3 RA Duff, ‘Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law’ in RA Duff and Stuart Green 
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 127 
4 For discussion of this issue see, for example, Jarrett Zigon, Morality An Anthropological 
Perspective (Berg 2008) 
5 For example: factual innocence and legal innocence are used by HL Packer ,‘Two Models of 
the Criminal Process’ (1964) 113 U Pennsylvania LR 1; Larry Laudan uses the terms 
‘material innocence’ and ‘probatory innocence’ in Larry Laudan, ‘The Presumption of 
Innocence: Material or Probatory?’ (2005) 11(4) Legal Theory 333. 
6 Laudan ‘Material or Probatory?’ (n 5) 
7 ibid. 
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innocence however, depends on whether the elements of a crime are satisfied. The 
relevant question for legal innocence is: Can all of the elements of a particular crime 
be proven against a particular person? These types of innocence are related, but can 
be mutually exclusive. Both play a particular and specialised role in criminal law. 
 1. Factual Innocence (and Guilt) 
	  
Perhaps the most straightforward conception of innocence and guilt is factual 
innocence and factual guilt. These terms describe whether an individual is responsible 
for actions and whether an event actually happened in a general sense.  Factual guilt 
and innocence are based in fact, rather than law. Simply stated, someone is factually 
guilty if they did something and factually innocent if he or she did not do that thing.8 
Factual innocence is not based on law and merely means that it is factually true that 
the individual did not do any particular action. A person can be factually innocent or 
factually guilty of any action. Thus, if a person took a sip of water they would be 
factually guilty of taking a sip of water. If they did not sip water they would be 
factually innocent. 
When this idea is considered in the context of criminal law the action that the 
person did or did not do is a criminal act. A person is factually innocent of a crime if 
they did not actually engage in the behaviour that has been determined to be criminal. 
A person is factually guilty of a crime if they did engage in behaviour that is 
classified as criminal. Because factual innocence and guilt are based on what has 
happened in reality, a person’s status of factually innocent or factually guilty of 
criminal behaviour is true regardless of whether they are ever suspected, accused, or 
prosecuted for the act.  
 2. Legal Innocence (and Guilt) 
	  
 While factual innocence and guilt are general, legal innocence and legal guilt 
are terms specific to criminal law and procedure. Legal guilt means that there is 
enough evidence demonstrated to provide sufficient proof against the defendant to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Larry Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law (CUP 2006) 12. Laudan ‘Material or 
Probatory?’ (n 5) 340; Pamela R Ferguson, ‘The Presumption of Innocence and Its Role in the 
Criminal Process’ (2016) 21(2) Crim L F 131, 137-140; Hareema, Mark, ‘Uncovering the 
Presumption of Factual Innocence in Canadian Law: A Theoretical Model for the ‘Pre-
Charging Presumption of Innocence’’ (2005) 28 Dalhousie L J 443 
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fulfil each of the elements of the alleged crime in the mind of the fact-finder.9 Thus, 
legal innocence means sufficient proof was not obtained to make a finding of legal 
guilt. That is, legal guilt and legal innocence are concerned with the question of 
whether an individual can be legally held criminally responsible for an alleged crime. 
Legal guilt results in a conviction, legal innocence does not. 
 The first consideration of whether there can be legal guilt or legal innocence is 
whether there is a criminal law that applies to the particular action under 
consideration. The nullem crimen sine lege principle prevents criminal liability for 
behaviour that is not proscribed by law.10 If behaviour is not illegal, then neither legal 
guilt nor legal innocence is relevant with regard to that behaviour. If the alleged 
behaviour is proscribed, then legal guilt and legal innocence are applicable ideas and 
the inquiry turns to what evidence is available and whether the fact-finder is 
sufficiently convinced of the evidence to sustain a conviction. When someone is 
accused of something that is morally wrong, but is not a crime legal guilt is not 
implicated.11 For example, if an individual is publically accused of committing 
adultery, and he or she in fact committed adultery, but adultery is not a crime in the 
particular jurisdiction where the adultery and accusation occurred, then the accused 
person cannot be found legally guilty of adultery. This highlights the difference 
between factual and legal guilt. If they in fact were adulterous they are factually guilty 
of adultery, however, they will not be legally guilty as the action is not proscribed by 
criminal law.  
 Legal innocence and guilt are particularly germane to the outcomes of the 
criminal process. Aside from some limited jurisdictions, which permit more nuanced 
verdicts, most criminal legal systems can result in one of two main determinative 
outcomes, either guilty or not guilty.12 Legal guilt usually results in a finding of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Laudan ‘Material or Probatory?’ (n 5) 340. Laudan refers to this concept as “Probatory 
Guilt”. ibid.; Stefan Trechsel, ‘The Right to be Presumed Innocent’ (n 2) 156-7; Ferry de Jong 
and Leonie van Lent, ‘The Presumption of Innocence as a Counterfactual Principle’ (2016) 
12(1) Utrecht L Rev 32, 41; Ferguson (n 8) 137-140. 
10  See for example International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 15; European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 
1950, 213 UNTS 221 (ECHR) art 7; UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 10 Dec 1948, 217 A (III) (UDHR) art 11(2) 
11 Stefan Trechsel, ‘The Right to be Presumed Innocent’ (n 2) 160. 
12 For example see Scotland’s verdict of guilty but not proven or the plea of no contest (or no 
lo contendre) available in some American jurisdictions. 
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‘guilty’ because all of the elements of a crime are proven against an individual. This 
finding of legal guilt results in the individual being punished for the actions that were 
proven against them. Legal innocence, however, generally produces a finding of ‘not 
guilty’ and does not result in punishment. A not guilty verdict is not the same as 
finding someone factually innocent of the alleged crime.  Because of the way the 
standard of proof works in criminal law, a not guilty verdict necessarily includes 
some factual ambiguity.13 A finding of not guilty, or legal innocence, only means that 
one or more elements of the alleged crime was not proven to the appropriate standard, 
regardless of what actually happened during the incident in question.14 Thus, a not 
guilty finding necessarily encompasses both factually innocent individuals and 
factually guilty individuals against whom there was not enough proof for conviction.  
The fact-finder’s role vis-à-vis the standard of proof at trial explains why a 
‘not guilty’ verdict is not equivalent to factual innocence. The fact-finder is meant to 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to find that each element of the crime 
has been proven to the appropriate legal standard. 15  However, the fact-finder 
necessarily lacks personal knowledge of the situation that is the subject of trial, 
meaning their understanding of it has to be supplied by the trial participants.16 Further 
complicating the matter is that rules of criminal procedure may control the type of 
evidence that is introduced during trial and the manner in which it is presented.17 The 
fact-finders must do their best to reach a decision, within the rules of criminal 
procedure, using the evidence available to them. Although injustices do occur, the 
high standard of proof in criminal law is meant to ensure that those who are found 
legally guilty actually committed the alleged crime in fact.18 The same is not true 
however, for innocence. There is no minimum standard under which it can be safely 
determined that the individual is actually innocent of the alleged activity. The only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For a thorough discussion of how the standard of proof works with the presumption of 
innocence see Chapter 3. 
14 Laudan ‘Material or Probatory?’ (n 5) 340; Laudan refers to this concept as “probatory 
innocence”. Ibid. 
15 Yvonne McDermott, Fairness in International Criminal Trials (OUP 2016) 44; Prosecutor 
v Mucić et al. (Judgement) IT-96-21-T, T Ch (16 November 1998), para 600; Hock Lai Ho, 
‘The Presumption of Innocence as a Human Right’ in Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter (eds), 
Criminal Evidence and Human Rights (Hart 2012) 267-8. 
16 Andrew Ashworth ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 123(1) South 
African L J 63, 72-73. 
17 ibid., 72-73. 
18  HL Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in Search for Truth (OUP 2008) chapter 2; 
Rinat Kitai, ‘Protecting the Guilty’ (2002 - 2003) 6(2) Buffalo CLR 1163. 
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relevant finding when entering a not guilty verdict is that at least one element of the 
crime was not proven to the appropriate standard of proof. This is different from 
being actually innocent. Thus, a ‘not guilty’ verdict can be compatible with both a 
factually innocent defendant and a factually guilty defendant against whom the 
standard of proof was not met.19 
Of course, whether someone is prosecuted and punished for a crime they 
actually committed is another question. There are instances where people are not 
convicted (or even suspected) of crimes they actually committed and alternatively, 
there are other instances when people are convicted of crimes they did not, in fact, 
commit.20 Therefore, while it would be ideal, to ensure justice, for trials to determine 
factual guilt and innocence, this is not necessarily what is proven in a criminal trial. 
This is where legal innocence and legal guilt come in.  
Ideally, a criminal conviction should only result when an individual is both 
legally  (required for a conviction) and factually guilty (essential to make sure the 
right person is punished for the right crime). In a perfect world, people would only be 
convicted of things they actually did and there would be sufficient proof that they 
actually did those things. Likewise, in this ideal world, everyone not convicted would 
be both factually and legally innocent. Individuals who have not broken the law 
would not be accused of crimes and would never be convicted. However, no criminal 
justice system is perfect, and because the fact-finder’s determination is limited to the 
evidence presented during trial, sometimes individuals who are factually innocent are 
found legally guilty and individuals who are factually guilty are found legally 
innocent. 
The significance of legal guilt and legal innocence is in the treatment to which 
a person may be subjected. A determination of legal guilt however permits the person 
who has been found guilty to be treated differently form those who have not.21 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ho, ‘The Presumption of Innocence as a Human Right’  (n 15) 271. 
20 Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law (n 8) 11-12 
21 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) (ICC Statute) arts 76, 77; 
UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (25 May 1993) (ICTY Statute) art 24; UN Security Council, Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (8 November 1994) (ICTR Statute) art 23; Law 
On The Establishment Of Extraordinary Chambers In The Courts Of Cambodia For The 
Prosecution Of Crimes Committed During The Period Of Democratic Kampuchea (27 
October 2004) (ECCC Statute) Chapter XI; UN Security Council, Statute of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (30 May 2007) (STL Statute) art 24; UN Security Council, Statute of 
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treatment may include punishment, sanctions, and the limitation of certain rights. 
What type of treatment is permissible depends on the jurisdiction and the 
circumstances of the particular criminal behaviour. It suffices to say that legal guilt 
permits people to be treated differently from people who have not been found legally 
guilty.  
B. What is a presumption? 
All legal systems allow for presumptions. Presumptions can help save time 
and to assist the fact-finder in determining which facts are persuasive or what to do in 
when the evidence may be circumstantial. However, defining what constitutes a 
presumption is a somewhat controversial endeavour. The term, ‘presumption,’ itself 
has no agreed upon legal meaning.22 Rather, it is used widely and in varied contexts to 
describe several different ideas.23 This section discusses the three basic types of 
presumptions and some of the controversies surrounding each. A basic understanding 
of what a presumption is, and is not, will ultimately help focus the discussion on what 
the presumption of innocence entails. 
Generally speaking, presumptions allow the fact-finder to draw inferences 
based on facts or circumstances present in the case under consideration.24 As such, 
presumptions are tools for aiding argumentation and reasoning. 25  Further, 
presumptions help distribute risk by making rules based on circumstance rather than 
requiring specific evidence of an element or fact to be presented.26 Thus, they identify 
the party bearing the burden of proof and can provide some evidence that can be used 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (16 January 2002) (SCSL Statute) art 19.For a discussion 
on justifications and purpose of punishment see Thom Brooks, Punishment (Routledge 2012) 
22 Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (OUP 2010) 221. See also PJ 
Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (Juta & Co 1999) 22. 
23 Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 22) 22. 
24  John D Lawson, The Law of Presumptive Evidence (A.L. Bancroft & Co 1885) 555, rule 
117; see Philippe Merle, Les Presomptions en Droit Penal, Thesis, 20 December 1968, 
Universite de Nancy, Faculte de Droit et Des Sciences Economiques, Librairie Generale de 
Droit et de Jurisprudence (Paris 1970);  James C Morton and Scott C Hutchison, The 
Presumption of Innocence (Carswell 1987) 11 
25 Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 22) 22-23; Thayer, James B, ‘Presumptions and 
the Law of Evidence’ (1889) 3(4) Harv L Rev 141, 314; 9 Wigmore, Evidence §2491 
(Chadbourn rev. 1981). 
26 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 231; Gideon Boas, ‘A Code of Evidence and Procedure for 
International Criminal Law? The Rules of the ICTY’ in Gideon Boas and William A Schabas 
(eds), International Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2003) 23. 
	   19	  
to meet the standard of proof.27 Because a presumption is an inference based on 
information presented in the case it may only be used when there is an absence of 
evidence. 28   Thus, presumptions can either be triggered as a result of certain 
conditions (or facts) being present, or can exist without such triggering conditions.29 
Presumptions are generally of one of three basic types: ‘irrebuttable presumptions of 
law, rebuttable presumptions of law, and presumptions of fact’.30 
Presumptions of law are often considered evidentiary rules, created either by 
statute or judicial decision, which instruct the fact-finder to reach a particular 
conclusion based on the situation.31 They can be either permissive or mandatory.32 
The fact-finder must follow a mandatory presumption if the necessary conditions are 
present. Some have argued that these rules’ mandatory nature means that the rules are 
not evidentiary presumptions, but rather, substantive rules that are worded as 
presumptions.33 A permissive presumption allows fact-finders to use their discretion 
as to whether they should follow the presumption when the conditions give rise to the 
opportunity to follow the presumption.34 Permissive presumptions are similar to 
regular inferences, but they generally go a step further than a mere inference would 
allow.  
 Presumptions of law can also be either rebuttable or irrebuttable. 35  An 
irrebuttable presumption of law is a rule that the fact-finder must follow.36 These 
presumptions state that the presence of one fact conclusively means that another fact 
must exist. 37  The conclusion drawn by an irrebuttable presumption cannot be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 231 
28 C Collier ‘The Improper Use of Presumptions in Recent Criminal Law Adjudication’ 
(1986) 38(2) Stan L Rev 423, 423 footnote 1. 
29 An example of a presumption that exists without triggering facts is the presumption of 
sanity. 
30 Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 22) 23; see also Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 
232; See generally, Wigmore (n 25) 
31 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 239; Magnus Ulväng, ‘‘Presumption of Innocence Versus a 
Principle of Fairness’ (2013) 42(3) NJLP 205, 210; Antony Duff, ‘Presumptions Broad and 
Narrow’ (2013) 42(3) NJLP 268, 269-70. 
32 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 239; Morton and Hutchison (n 24) 13.  
33 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 239; Morton and Hutchison (n 24) 13. 
34 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 239 
35 Thomas Weigend, ‘There is Only One Presumption of Innocence’ (2013) 42(3) NJLP 193, 
193-4; Duff, ‘Presumptions Broad and Narrow’ (n 31) 269  
36 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 233 
37 John M Phillips, ‘Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusionary Analysis, (1975) 27(2) Stan L 
Rev 449, 451; Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 233; Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 
22) 24. Some argue that irrebuttable presumptions should not be called presumptions because 
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overcome by evidence to the contrary. 38  Hence, it is a mandatory legal rule. 
Therefore, the idea of an irrebuttable presumption is similar to mandatory 
presumptions. However, while all irrebuttable presumptions are mandatory, not all 
mandatory presumptions are irrebuttable. The difference lies in whether contrary 
evidence is permitted to overcome the presumption. 
 An example of an irrebuttable presumption is a rule that states that children 
under a certain age cannot possess criminal intent. This is a presumption that protects 
children from prosecution.39 It is hard and fast and cannot be overcome by other 
evidence once the specific child’s age is established. No matter what evidence is 
presented to the contrary, a child under a certain age cannot be held criminally liable 
for any behaviour they engaged in that would otherwise be proscribed because, a 
child below a particular age cannot legally form the requisite criminal intention. 
 A rebuttable presumption of law is an evidentiary rule establishing that a 
particular circumstance is true unless there is sufficient ‘evidence to the contrary’.40 
Because these presumptions are rules that must be followed in the absence of contrary 
evidence they can affect the burdens of proof and persuasion at trial.41 The result is 
that a burden develops on one party or the other to rebut, that is, to provide ‘evidence 
to the contrary’ against, the presumption.42 If sufficient contrary evidence is provided 
to fulfil that burden, the fact-finder is no longer bound by the presumption and may 
decide the issue based on whether they are convinced by the evidence provided as to 
whether to follow the presumption or the contrary evidence in their decision 
making.43  
 A presumption of fact occurs when evidence would otherwise be doubted. The 
presumed fact may be found by the fact-finder because evidence of another fact was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
they reflect public policy rather than what may actually be the case in reality. See generally 
Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 22) 24. 
38 Phillips (n 37) 451; Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 233; Schwikkard, Presumption of 
Innocence (n 22) 24. 
39 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 233; Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 22) 24. 
40 Wigmore (n 25); Lawson (n 24) 555; Collier (n 28) 423 at fn 1; Roberts and Zuckerman (n 
22) 233; Morton and Hutchison (n 24) 14; Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 22) 24; 
‘Notes: Presumptions of Law as Evidence’ (1908) 8(2) Colum L Rev 127, 128 citing Coffin v 
United States (1895) 156 US 432. 
41 Wigmore (n 25); Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 22) 24-25. 
42 Wigmore (n 25), 
43 Ibid. 
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convincingly proven.44 Presumptions of fact are permissive, rather than mandatory,45 
and do not create a legal duty on the opposing party to come forward with contrary 
evidence.46 Therefore, these presumptions do not have an effect on the burden of 
proof.47 Many scholars argue that a presumption of fact is not a presumption at all and 
may be more of a reference to common sense or inference.48 Courts may choose to 
make these inferences if it seems appropriate to do so. The use of the term 
‘presumption’ to describe these inferences is based on a historic use of 
‘presumption’.49  
 Presumptions of fact are often used during criminal trials to prove intent. In the 
absence of direct evidence showing that the accused acted with a particular intent, the 
prosecution will rely on circumstantial evidence that tends to show the intent of the 
actor.50 This creates a rebuttable presumption that the accused acted with the inferred 
intent.  Absent a sufficient rebuttal, the burden and standard of proof are met 
regarding the mental element of the crime without the presentation of any direct 
evidence of that element.51 This occurs because the mental element is subjective and 
may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove with direct evidence.52 In that 
way, it is said that presumptions of fact ‘‘bridge the gap’ between external, objective 
states of affairs and internal, subjective states of knowledge or intent that form the 
basis of all non-strict liability crimes.’53  
 As alluded to above, the foregoing discussion is a basic and general attempt to 
define presumptions based on ‘traditional’ discussions and definitions.54 There is 
debate among scholars about which presumptions are really presumptions and which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See Weigend (n 35) 193; Lawson (n 24) 555; Morton and Hutchison (n 24) 12; Andrew 
Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10(4) Int’l J. Evid & Proof 
241, 249-50; For a conversation on nuanced definitions of this type of presumption see 
Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 22) 24-25. 
45 Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 22) 26. 
46 Wigmore (n 25); Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 22) 26. 
47 Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 22) 26. 
48 Wigmore (n 25); Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (n 22) 24-25. 
49 Wigmore (n 25), Lawson (n 24) 555 et seq.; Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law (16th 
edn, Little, Brown & Co 1896) s 44. See also Morton and Hutchison (n 24) 12 arguing that 
presumptions of fact are actually just rules of common sense. Schwikkard, Presumption of 
Innocence (n 22) 24 – 25. 
50 Collier (n 28) 423 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid 424, fn 4. 
53 Ibid 423. 
54 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 232 
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are something else. This debate is complicated by the taxonomic methods of 
classifying the different types of presumptions. Attempts to classify presumptions 
have led to significant disagreement in the academic community. Some argue that the 
only true presumption is a rebuttable presumption at law.55 Another related argument 
is that presumptions of fact are not really presumptions.56 These arguments are based 
on the notion that presumptions of fact are actually inferences used to describe the 
normal process of making inferences on the part of the fact-finder.57 Further, they are 
not considered presumptions because they do not distribute risk or error in any way in 
the criminal process, but merely draw conclusions based on the evidence. 58 
Irrebuttable presumptions could be equally stated as substantive rules that determine 
criminal liability. 59 This is because they are just rules that tell the fact-finder what 
law applies based on the factual circumstances present. This is not that different from 
a rule of evidence or procedure. 
 Some scholars would change the taxonomy altogether and argue that there is 
only one true type of presumption: legal presumptions of fact. This argument defines 
presumptions as: ‘1) rules of evidence which; 2) permit the fact finder to draw 
specified factual inferences which; 3) would not otherwise be warranted by the 
information available to the fact-finder.’60 This theory asserts that presumptions are 
legal because they are created by law, but are ‘of fact’ because they allow for 
conclusions of fact to be made.  
 In a criminal trial a presumption’s effect may be difficult to determine. As they 
deal with a lack of evidence, presumptions help solve situations where there is a 
procedural impasse and thus may allow for a just result.61 However, the application of 
a presumption is an internal process on the part of the fact-finder.62 It is often only if 
the fact-finder discusses their decision-making in a written decision that one can 
evaluate how and if a presumption was used. Further, because criminal evidence is 
evaluated as a whole, there is no way for the parties to know if a presumption has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Duff, ‘Presumptions Broad and Narrow’ (n 31) 269-270 
56 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 232; Wigmore (n 25), Lawson (n 24) 555 et seq.; Greenleaf 
(n 49) s 44. See also Morton and Hutchison (n 24) 12. Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence 
(n 22) 24-25. 
57Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 232. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid 233; Duff, ‘Presumptions Broad and Narrow’ (n 31) 269-270 
60 See discussion in Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 231 
61Morton and Hutchison (n 24) 11.  
62 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 22) 238-9. 
	   23	  
been rebutted until the findings are reached at the conclusion of the trial.63 Finally, the 
triggering facts that give rise to a presumption are often challenged during trial, 
calling into question whether it is appropriate to apply the presumption at all.64 The 
courts offer little assistance in this area. The European Court of Human Rights, for 
example, considers that presumptions of law or fact are permissible provided they 
‘take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the 
defence.’65 This discussion of the effects of presumptions at trial highlights the 
uncertainties surrounding presumptions and may show that in practice they have a 
weak application. Ideally, each party should try to produce positive evidence to 
support their position, rather than relying on a presumption to work in their favour. 
However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the presumption of innocence may 
be a stronger presumption than others, as it directs the burden of proof away from the 
defence and instructs the fact-finder.  
C. The presumption of innocence exists within national and international 
law 
	  
Despite the variety amongst national legal systems most, if not all, national 
jurisdictions provide for the presumption of innocence in their criminal codes and 
procedures.66 In addition, the presumption of innocence is a part of international law. 
International law has three primary sources: treaty, custom and general principles.67 
These were identified as the sources of international law in Article 38 of the 
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64 Ibid 239. 
65 Salabiaku v France (1988) Series A no 141-A; Radio France and others v France ECHR 
2004-II 119; Janosevic v Sweden ECHR 2002-VII 1 s 104; Falk v Netherlands ECHR 2004-
XI 319; Alfredo Alluê Buiza, ‘An Extensive but not very Stringent Presumption of Innocence 
(Art 6.2 ECHR)’ in Javier García Roca, Pablo Santolaya (eds), Europe of Rights: A 
Compendium on the European Convention of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 251-
252; William A Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP 
2015) 290. 
66 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying 
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions’ 
(1993) 3 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 235, 235-236. 
67 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946 (ICJ Statute) art 
38; Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law (CUP 1993); Javaid Rehman International Human 
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Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and General Principles’ (1998-89) 12 
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International Court of Justice’s Statute.68 The presumption of innocence is part of all 
three sources of international law.  
Treaties are formal, written agreements between states.69 The law of treaties 
describes the rules that are contained within a treaty and are binding on states parties 
to the particular treaty in question.70 The presumption of innocence is included in 
many international treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, American Convention on Human 
Rights, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.71  That the presumption of innocence is included in 
treaties makes it a part of international law. 
The presumption of innocence is also a general principle of law. While there is 
some guidance on how to determine when the other sources exist within Article 38, 
for example, custom requires ‘general practice accepted as law’, regarding general 
principles the statute merely states ‘the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations’.72 General principles of law arise from conditions similar to human 
rights, that is, inclusion and recognition in an overwhelming number of national 
jurisdictions. 73 Thus, general principles of law and human rights are rules that are 
generally accepted by the world community.74 General principles of law serve a ‘gap-
filling function’ by providing legal solutions when laws and treaties are ambiguous, 
and can be used to support decisions made about other legal rules.75 Thus, general 
principles of law guide and aid governments engaged in legal interpretation to ensure 
that laws are interpreted in a manner respecting the general principles. An example is 
res judicata, which the International Court of Justice has deemed a general principle 
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November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) (ACHR) art 8(2); African Charter on 
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of law.76 Res judicata means that if a decision has been taken on a specific issue 
between two particular parties it cannot be litigated again.77 It functions as a general 
principle of law because it aids governments in deciding whether litigation can 
continue in cases that may include issues that have already been answered by a court. 
The presumption of innocence is a general principle of law because it is a right 
that has been supported over time and is currently included in most, if not all, national 
and international codes of criminal procedure. The earliest known example of the 
presumption of innocence can be found in Hammurabi’s Code, which is thought to 
have been enacted in approximately 1750 BCE.78 While the presumption of innocence 
is not explicitly named in the Code, the first three laws contained therein indicate that 
a finding of criminal responsibility required some evidentiary showing that the 
accused was guilty of the crime alleged.79 This fundamental idea of the presumption 
of innocence has undergone significant changes in the nearly four thousand years 
since it was first introduced, but its enduring existence and overwhelming inclusion in 
national, regional, and international instruments is evidence that the presumption of 
innocence is a general principle of law and is a common value accepted by the global 
community. 
The lack of discussion in international and regional documents and case law 
regarding the presumption of innocence’s meaning or scope provides additional 
support for the idea that the presumption of innocence is a general principle of law. 
While international and regional human rights and criminal law agreements contain 
the presumption of innocence, the travaux préparatoires of these instruments have 
very little commentary about what it means or why its inclusion is important. This 
supports the idea that the presumption of innocence is a general principle of law 
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(n 2) 1; François Quintard-Morénas, ‘The Presumption of Innocence in the French and Anglo-
American Traditions’ (2010) 58(1) Am J Comp. L 107, 111; de Jong and van Lent (n 9) 36. 
79Code of Hammurabi (n 78) see Code of Laws 1-3 for examples of crimes, required proofs, 
and of consequences for accuser if their accusations are not proved. 
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because it appears from a lack of discussion and explanation that it is a term that is 
universally understood and accepted amongst the drafters of those instruments. 
Further, the case law of the various international and regional courts contains very 
little discussion or explanation of what the presumption of innocence means. Most of 
the case law discusses whether or not other rights or laws are being applied within the 
bounds of human rights, rather than whether the presumption of innocence itself has 
been violated.80 This common usage, but lack of specific definition, supports the idea 
that the presumption of innocence is a general principle of law. It is intended to be a 
concept understood and used by many different courts, but it is generally, rather than 
specifically defined. 
 General principles of law are similar to customary law. The difference is in 
how they are determined. General principles are determined by whether the law is 
contained in most national and international treaties, constitutions, and systems. 
Customary law traditionally requires an additional element of opinio juris, which 
establishes whether there is uniform and consistent use across jurisdictions and legal 
systems.81 Opinio juris is generally proven through government actions, government 
statements within their own legislatures or to foreign governments, and in 
intergovernmental conferences.82 While opinio juris is technically still required for a 
rule to become customary law, it has been argued that a modern approach to 
customary law has lessened the importance of opinio juris and that customary law 
relies more on whether the law is present within the constitutions and legal systems 
rather than its consistency in use.83 This has led many scholars to use the terms 
customary law and general principles of law interchangeably.84  
The presumption of innocence is a part of customary law. It has widespread 
acceptance among national and international criminal justice systems, which is 
sufficient to show that it is a part of customary law under the modern approach. 
Further there is some indication of consistency of usage through the presumption of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 The majority of case law at the international criminal law level is in conjunction with 
decisions regarding pre-trial detention. Within these cases, is clear that the presumption of 
innocence is used to support whether or not pre-trial detention or the length of detention is 
appropriate. This is discussed in Chapter 7. 
81 Rehman (n 67) 19; Weatherall (n 74) 126-7. 
82 Rehman (n 67) 19; Simma and Alston (n 67) 89-90. 
83 Andrea Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (2008) 19(3) EJIL 491, 493; 
Simma and Alston (n 67) 88. 
84 See Klamberg (n 75) 28 ff; See also Cheng (n 67) 23, acknowledging that the line between 
these two concepts is not always clear. 
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innocence’s application in the courtroom setting. For example, it is generally agreed 
that the presumption of innocence forces the burden of proof onto someone other than 
the accused. 85  Finally, the Human Rights Committee, in General Comment 24 
recognises the presumption of innocence as a part of customary law.86 
Commentators seem to be split between these two concepts and argue that the 
presumption of innocence should be classified as either a general principle of law87 or 
as part of customary international law.88 This argument however, is irrelevant in terms 
of how the presumption of innocence is used in international law. Both general 
principles and customary law are sources of international law, and a rule’s inclusion 
in one or the other category, or both categories, means that it must be respected and 
upheld within the sphere of international law.  
The presumption of innocence is also a human right.89 Human rights arise 
from the common values of freedom, justice and peace that all nations share.90 Human 
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11(1); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Doc. OEA/SER.L./V/I.4 
(1948) art XXVI; ICCPR art 14(2); ACHRart 8(2); ECHR art 6(2); African Charter art 
7(1)(b);  Rinat Kitai, ‘Presuming Innocence’ (2002) 55(2) Okla L R 257 272; Haji N.A. Noor 
Muhammad, ‘Due Process in Law for Persons Accused of Crime’ in Louis Henkin (ed), The 
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Colum UP 1981) 
150; Liz Campbell, ‘Criminal Labels, the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Presumption of Innocence’ (2013) 76(4) MLR 681 683; McDermott (n 15) 44; Ana Aguilar 
García, ‘Presumption of Innocence and Public Safety: A Possible Dialogue’  (2014) 3(1) 
Stability: Int’l J of Sec & Dev 1, 3-4; Christoph Grabenwarter, European Convention on 
Human Rights (Beck, Hart 2014)167 para 156. John D Jackson and Sarah J Summers, The 
Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence (CUP 2012) 201; W Schabas and Y McDermott 
‘Article 66: Presumption of Innocence’ in Otto Triffterer, Kai Ambos (eds), Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (3rd edn, CH Beck 2016) 1640, para 16; Ho 
(15) 260. 
86  Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 24: General Comment on Issues 
Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the 
Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant’ 
(11 November 1994) UN Doc No CCPR/C/21/rev.1/add.6 (1994) para 8. 
87 Schabas and McDermott (n 85) 1233; Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights’ (n 66); PJ Schwikkard, 
‘The Presumption of Innocence: What is it?’ (1998) 11 South African J Crim J L Just 396, 
396. 
88 Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law  (Clarendon 
Press 1989) 96-97; Salvatore Zappalá, ‘The Rights of the Accused’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola 
Gaeta, John RWD Jones (eds) The Rome Statutes of the International Criminal Court (OUP 
2002) 1341. 
89 UDHR art 11(1), ACHR art 8(2), ECHR art 6(2); Hock Lai Ho, ‘The Presumption of 
Innocence as a Human Right’ (n 15) 259; Stefan Trechsel, ‘The Right to be Presumed 
Innocent’ (n 2). 
90 UDHR Preamble. 
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rights cannot be easily restricted because they respect the core of individual dignity.91 
As such human rights are available to everyone and limit the power that governments 
can exert over individuals and how individuals may treat each other. That the 
presumption of innocence is based on common values of freedom and justice is 
obvious even if the presumption of innocence is merely a legal presumption. 
However, as the following chapters will show the human right to the presumption of 
innocence extends further than the courtroom and is still rooted in protecting freedom, 
justice and the rule of law. 
 The inclusion of the presumption of innocence in most international and 
regional human rights instruments is evidence that the presumption is a human right. 
Most tellingly, is the presumption of innocence’s inclusion in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which begins the modern concept of human rights, and 
contains rights that were considered human rights at the time the Declaration was 
drafted.92 Additionally, the presumption of innocence is contained in the regional 
human rights agreements and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.93 Further, the presumption of innocence is considered a fundamental right to 
people who are investigated within criminal procedure, as is evidenced by its 
inclusion in all of the international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals, 
as well as most, if not all, national jurisdictions.94  
Further evidence that the presumption of innocence is a human right is that it 
is to be enjoyed by everyone.95 Because of their basis in the common values of peace 
and justice, human rights are to be enjoyed by everyone regardless of background, 
status, or other factors.96 Although the presumption of innocence is only relevant 
within the general area of criminal law and procedure, this does not limit the type of 
people who may enjoy the presumption. Other human rights also are limited in that 
they are relevant within particular contexts. For example, while there is a human right 
to vote, the right itself is not relevant outside of the general context of elections. 
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Rights’, in Gudmundur Alfredsson and Asbjørn Eide (eds), The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 1999) 14-20. 
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Similarly everyone may enjoy the presumption of innocence but it is only relevant in 
the general context of criminal law. 
 The presumption of innocence as a human right does not allow derogations in 
times of war or emergency. Support for its non-derogability in these situations can be 
found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human 
Rights Committee’s interpretation of the Covenant.  Article 14(2) of the Covenant 
unequivocally states ‘[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right 
to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.’ 97  This article does not 
include any qualifications and does not suggest any situations whereby the 
presumption of innocence can be limited.  The Human Rights Committee further 
clarified this issue in two subsequent General Comments.  General Comment 24, 
regarding reservations, states that a ‘[s]tate may not reserve the right to… presume a 
person guilty unless he proves his innocence’.98 General Comment 29 regarding 
derogation during states of emergency specifically declares that the presumption of 
innocence cannot be derogated from and ‘[t]he presumption of innocence must be 
respected.’99 Further, most of the conventions and agreements included in this study 
do not include derogations from the presumption of innocence.100   
 Despite the general disapproval against derogating from the presumption of 
innocence, not all regional rights instruments have entirely foreclosed the possibility.  
Neither the European Convention on Human Rights nor the American Convention on 
Human Rights specifically prohibits derogating from the presumption.  Article 15 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights lists those articles that cannot be 
derogated from in times of emergency but omits Article 6(2) from that list.101  Any 
derogation from the Convention justified under Article 15 is limited to the extent that 
it must be ‘strictly required’ by the situation and must also be consistent with the 
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Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) 88. 
100 Elies van Sliedregt, ‘A Contemporary Reflection on the Presumption of Innocence’ (2009) 
80(1) RIDP 247, 259; Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty International Response to the 
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other international law obligations of the state party involved.102 The American 
Convention on Human Rights contains a similar article in which it also lists the rights 
contained in the Convention that cannot be derogated from. Like Article 15 of the 
European Convention, the list contained in the American Convention also does not 
include the article containing the presumption of innocence on its list of non-
derogable rights. 103  The American Convention also sets out restrictions on the 
derogation of convention rights, including mandating that an derogation must be 
‘strictly required’ and must not violate other international law obligations.104 It also 
adds the additional requirement that derogations must not involve discrimination on 
the basis of ‘race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.’105  
There are no known examples of derogations made of the presumption of 
innocence from the European or American Conventions on Human Rights. It could be 
argued that although neither Convention specifically forbids states parties from 
derogating from the presumption of innocence, such derogation is not permissible as 
doing so would be in conflict with their other international law obligations. This 
conflict leads to the conclusion that despite the fact that not all human rights 
instruments specifically prevent states parties from derogating from the presumption, 
it is a non-derogable human right.  
One consequence of the presumption of innocence being a human right is that 
national governments must respect human rights when making and interpreting their 
own laws. Human rights are meant to be difficult to curtail and must be upheld and 
protected by governments.106 This does not only mean that lawmakers must bear the 
human right of the presumption of innocence in mind when writing the presumption 
of innocence into their criminal codes, but that it must also be a guiding principle 
when writing laws on other aspects of criminal law and procedure as well.107 For 
example, a lawmaker cannot create a crime that can result in a conviction based solely 
on an accusation, as that would clearly violate the procedural aspect of the 
presumption of innocence. As discussed in the next chapter the presumption of 
innocence at trial requires some proof against the accused, and removing that 
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requirement would impermissibly curtail the individual’s right to be presumed 
innocent. Another example is that lawmakers cannot write a law that allows for 
punishment to be enacted without a formal finding of guilt before a court. This type of 
law would violate the presumption of innocence by providing for an individual to be 
treated in the same manner as someone who has been found guilty requiring a 
conviction. Because the presumption of innocence is closely related to other fair trial 
rights such as the right to silence, the right to be present at trial, and the right to 
present a defence, if lawmakers were to change any of these other rights the 
presumption of innocence, as a human right, should also be a consideration while 
drafting that change. 
D. The presumption of innocence only applies in criminal proceedings 
 While the presumption of innocence exists in both national and international 
legal systems, the application of the presumption of innocence is limited to criminal 
proceedings. This is partially because criminal proceedings are where the 
determination of legal guilt or legal innocence occurs and thus where a presumption 
of innocence would be relevant. That the presumption of innocence only applies in 
criminal proceedings also finds support in the language of the statutes and 
conventions studied. The criminal courts limit the presumption of innocence to 
criminal proceedings because those are the legal issues that they have primary 
jurisdiction over, and thus, the issues for which the presumption of innocence is 
provided. The regional human rights conventions and international human rights 
agreements support the idea that the presumption of innocence only applies in the 
context of criminal law and procedure because these documents specifically grant the 
right to those charged or accused with criminal offences. 
While it is clear that the presumption of innocence applies to criminal 
proceedings, what constitutes criminal proceedings is more difficult to determine and 
depends on the jurisdiction in question. When a legal matter is before a specific 
criminal court or tribunal, such as the International Criminal Court or the ad hoc 
Tribunals, what is a criminal proceeding is determined by statute. This is because of 
their jurisdiction is only over very specific criminal matters. For national jurisdictions 
and courts of less limited jurisdiction, the inquiry becomes more difficult. Actions 
that may be part of criminal procedure or criminal law in one jurisdiction might be 
regulatory, disciplinary or administrative in another. In Europe, the European Court of 
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Human Rights has developed three criteria to help determine whether a law is 
properly categorised. Once an action is ‘criminal’ or part of criminal law or 
procedure, then the full due process required by criminal law must be provided to the 
accused, including the presumption of innocence.  
1.  The statutes dictate that the presumption of innocence only 
applies in criminal proceedings 
 
The language used in international and regional human rights conventions and 
international criminal statutes supports the idea that the presumption of innocence 
applies in the general context of criminal law. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights provides that ‘[e]veryone charged with a penal offence has the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law…’.108 Similarly, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights state that the presumption of innocence applies to ‘[e]veryone charged with a 
criminal offence’. 109 The American Convention on Human Rights, ad hoc Tribunals, 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia provide that it is the ‘accused’ who can benefit from the presumption of 
innocence.110 These documents all state that the presumption of innocence either 
applies to people who have been charged or accused, which necessarily implies that 
they are involved in criminal procedure.   
Only the African Charter for Human and Peoples’ Rights is less specific about 
the context in which the presumption of innocence applies. Article 7 of the African 
Charter states that ‘[e]very individual shall have the right to have his cause heard.’111  
This article then includes a number of subsections which specify what ‘the right to 
have his cause heard’ means. Subsection (b) provides ‘[t]he right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal’.112 Although it uses the 
word ‘guilty’, which is inherently a criminal law idea, this still seems not to limit the 
applicability of the presumption of innocence to any particular type of law. The 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, 
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which is an aid in interpreting and applying the African Charter and was written to 
‘further strengthen and supplement the provisions relating to fair trial in the Charter 
and to reflect international standards’, clarifies this issue.113 Section N6(e) states that 
the presumption applies to ‘[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence’ and 
elaborates on some of the protections of the presumption of innocence that apply ‘in 
any criminal case’.114 This section also makes it clear that the presumption of 
innocence applies to for statements made about ‘criminal investigations or 
charges’.115 This makes it clear that the presumption of innocence applies to criminal 
proceedings. 
Historically, there has been some debate about whether the presumption of 
innocence applies beyond criminal law. This discussion first arose during the 
negotiation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and appears to have been 
resolved during the drafting process. The discussion around the appropriate context of 
the presumption of innocence arises from the fact that a number of early drafts did not 
use the phrase ‘charged with a criminal offence’.116 However, the Commission’s third 
session rectified this by including the charging requirement.117 This had the dual 
effects of harmonizing the French and English versions and clarifying that Article 11 
of the Universal Declaration related to criminal law.118 
More recently, Antony Duff revived the argument of whether the presumption 
of innocence can apply outside criminal law. He theorizes that there are many 
presumptions of innocence that apply in different normative situations.119 This means 
that there is room for a civic presumption of innocence that applies between citizens 
in everyday interactions.120 This civic presumption of innocence, however, is separate 
and different from the presumption that applies in the criminal context. Duff’s theory 
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is that private individuals owe a ‘presumption of innocence’ to each other in everyday 
interactions.121 Based on a mutual civic trust, rather than law, this attempts to explain 
that individuals have a duty to approach each other with a general trust, unless or until 
there is a specific reason to not trust a particular person.122 Duff describes the civic 
presumption as a theoretical tool used to describe normative human interactions, 
rather than a presumption that has been proven through practice.123 While theoretical, 
if this civic presumption exists, because it is not based in law, it is a different entity 
than the presumption of innocence defined in this project. 
2. What are criminal proceedings? 
 
While the presumption of innocence only applies within the context of 
criminal law and procedure, there is no agreed upon definition of what constitutes 
‘criminal’, and what qualifies as criminal law is not always apparent. For the purposes 
of the presumption of innocence, criminal law should be understood broadly and not 
merely limited only to legitimate or formal criminal procedures. The presumption of 
innocence applies to criminal proceedings quite simply because criminal law is the 
area of law in which guilt or innocence is at issue.124 While liability or responsibility 
is determined in other legal procedures, civil liability is not the same as a legal 
determination of guilt. Thus, findings of civil responsibility do not implicate the 
presumption of innocence.125  
The types of activities that fall within ‘criminal law’ are not universally agreed 
upon. Generally speaking, individual jurisdictions determine for themselves what 
sorts of activities will be prohibited as ‘criminal’ and what activities fall under other 
categories of law. Courts of limited criminal jurisdiction, such as the International 
Criminal Court and the international and internationalized criminal courts and 
tribunals, have a clear definition of criminal law as it pertains to their particularised 
context. The jurisdiction of these courts only extends over criminal matters, and those 
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criminal matters are limited to specific crimes set out in their statutes.126 There is no 
question, within the context of these courts, as to whether the presumption of 
innocence applies to the primary matters falling under their jurisdiction because they 
are specifically categorised as criminal in nature. Therefore, the presumption of 
innocence must be upheld when one of these courts or tribunals is adjudicating a 
matter. 
In jurisdictions that hear more than one type of legal matter it is more difficult 
to determine which acts are criminal in nature and which are not. National 
jurisdictions may have specialized courts that only adjudicate particular types of cases 
or more general courts that determine a wide variety of issues falling into any area of 
the law. Moreover, national jurisdictions are free to sort or categorise their own laws 
in any way they choose.127 Actions that may be defined as criminal in one jurisdiction 
may be classified as administrative, disciplinary, or regulatory in another. This is 
especially troublesome in instances where a law labelled as administrative, 
disciplinary or regulatory can result in an outcome that resembles punishment, such as 
heavy fines or time in jail.128 Often, criminal procedure provides participants with a 
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127  At the European Court of Human Rights, for example, member states are able to 
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right contained in the Convention. Engel and others v Netherlands (1976) Series A no 22; See 
also Schabas, ECHR Commentary (n 65) 278-9. 
128 Disciplinary proceedings in military court against soldiers is within the meaning of 
criminal law Engel (n 127). Careless driving deemed criminal even though it was regulatory 
under national law in Öztürk v Turkey (1984) Series A no 73. But see: disciplinary 
proceedings involving professional misconduct are not within the meaning of criminal law 
Brown v United Kingdom App No 38644/97 (ECtHR, 24 November 1998) (solicitor); 
Wickramsinghe v United Kingdom App No 31503/96 (ECtHR, 9 December 1997) (doctor). 
For more in depth analysis and examples see Harris, David J, Michael O’Boyle, Edward P 
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greater number of rights than other types of law and contains time-consuming due 
process requirements. These extra rights and additional procedures may motivate 
some national jurisdictions to reclassify actions that would normally be categorized as 
criminal in order to streamline procedure and prevent individuals from exercising 
their rights. This is an issue because it means that how a jurisdiction classifies an 
activity has a direct bearing on the extent to which a person involved in the matter 
may exercise their rights. It is possible for the same action to be committed in two 
different countries, both with identical laws governing that action, with the exception 
that one country proscribes that activity as part of its criminal code and the other 
country classifies it as an administrative matter.  In such a situation the individuals 
prosecuted in the first country would be able to exercise their full due process and fair 
trial rights while those in the second country would not. This discrepancy is not 
necessarily negative for the person being charged in the latter country because if the 
law is viewed as administrative and not criminal there is less possibility of stigma 
arising from conviction or that he or she will be subjected to harsh punishments.  It 
does, however, highlight how the fair trial rights of the accused can be impacted 
depending on how the action is characterised in the law of the relevant country.   
A further issue arises when activities that appear criminal, and are punishable 
as if they are criminal, are classified under a different category of law. Regional 
human rights courts can help with determine whether laws are correctly categorised 
because they must reconcile member states’ diverse legal systems. The European 
Court of Human Rights has developed a method to provide some consistency between 
the various legal systems of member states by looking beyond how the activity is 
categorised within the national law to the nature of the particular behaviour under 
scrutiny and its possible punishment.129 This helps allow the regional human rights 
court to apply Convention rights more evenly and fairly between different national 
jurisdictions. It also assists in preventing countries from denying rights to individuals 
by calling activities that can be punished as severely as crimes something other than 
‘criminal’. 
In an attempt to provide some consistency as to what type of activities should 
be classified as criminal in nature, the European Court of Human Rights has 
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developed three criteria to help determine when a particular member state’s law 
should be considered ‘criminal’ within the meaning of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Rather than focusing on the severity of the prohibited behaviour, the 
Court has set out three criteria to determine whether the Convention’s autonomous 
meaning of ‘criminal’ has been met.130 The three criteria necessary to identify a law 
as criminal were first applied by the European Court in Engel and Others v 
Netherlands and are: (1) the classification given to the law by the applicable state; (2) 
the nature of the offence; and (3) the possible punishment.131  If the European Court 
determines that a law is criminal in nature, even if it classified differently, the accused 
is entitled to all of the fair trial rights listed in Article 6.132 The first consideration 
must be about how the national jurisdiction classifies the prohibited activity because 
the inquiry will end if the forbidden act is already classified as criminal.133 This is 
logical because associating the prohibited action with domestic criminal law means 
that the national jurisdiction is already committed to guaranteeing that the accused 
will enjoy all of the fair trial protections, including the benefit of the presumption of 
innocence.  
If a national jurisdiction does not identify the action being reviewed as 
criminal, the European Court of Human Rights moves onto the second and third 
criteria, which are considered alternatively and cumulatively. 134  A law can be 
considered criminal in nature if either criterion is met, however it is also possible for 
these criteria to be considered together, when neither is sufficient on its own, to 
permit a finding that the law being scrutinized is really criminal in nature. To fulfil 
the second criterion, ‘the nature of the offence’, the Court examines the purpose of the 
law to determine whether the law itself is really criminal in nature.135 Under this 
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prong, the law must apply to the general public and be designed to be punitive and 
have a deterrent effect, rather than to compensate for some loss. 136  These 
requirements help clearly define what is ‘criminal’ versus ‘civil’ in nature. For the 
third prong, involving the ‘the possible punishment’, the court examines how punitive 
the maximum possible consequence of the law could be.137 The more punitive the 
possible outcome the more likely it is to be considered punishment and criminal in 
nature. Thus, the repayment of funds or compensation for harm would be civil, while 
payment of a fine would take the law closer to being criminal.138 Of course, if the 
punishment could result in imprisonment, the law would almost necessarily be 
criminal in nature.   Imprisonment is exclusively a criminal law sanction and is the 
most severe punishment that member states of the European Convention on Human 
Rights can employ for criminal convictions.139 Thus, a law not classified as ‘criminal’ 
in a national jurisdiction must be both criminal in nature and punitive in its effect in 
order to require the Convention’s Article 6 fair trial rights provisions. 
The application of this process does not result in the reclassification of the 
domestic law but merely requires that the accused be given the full benefit of his or 
her fair trial rights during the proceedings.140 The European Court of Human Rights 
introduced this approach to stop countries from classifying laws that would normally 
be criminal or carry criminal penalties as administrative, disciplinary, or regulatory 
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violations.  The Court felt that this sort of classification is contrary to the purpose of 
the European Convention.141 Further, by establishing criteria to determine when a law 
is ‘criminal’ the European Court is able to reconcile the diverse legal systems of the 
member states in an effort to allow for consistency and fairness, at least with regard to 
the application of the European Convention on Human Rights, between the different 
countries.142  
This approach is consistent with the presumption of innocence.  The 
presumption of innocence is meant to protect individuals from being treated as if they 
are guilty without first being convicted of a crime. If the prohibited activity tends to 
be criminal in nature or if the outcome of the hearing could result in sanctions that 
resemble criminal punishment, then the presumption of innocence should be 
applicable regardless of whether the state classifies it as such.  
E. What is the presumption of innocence meant to protect? 
 The purpose of the presumption of innocence is to prevent people who have 
not been convicted of a crime from being treated as if they are legally guilty.143 As 
will be discussed in the following chapters, the presumption of innocence achieves 
this purpose through both a procedural and non-procedural aspect. These two aspects 
of the presumption of innocence protect people from being treated as if they are guilty 
both during the trial process and outside of the trial context. The non-procedural 
aspect prevents treating people as if they are guilty by preventing punishment without 
a conviction and by preventing statements or adverse media attention that publicises 
the guilt of individuals who have not been convicted.144 The procedural aspect also 
prevents people who have not been convicted from being treated as if they are guilty 
by forcing criminal procedure to determine legal guilt.145 This helps to ensure that the 
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144 See Chapter 4. 
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convictions, and the subsequent treatment that convicted people receive, are properly 
justified. 
 Often, and perhaps most obviously, the treatment that people receive post-
conviction is punishment. While the presumption of innocence is concerned with 
preventing punishment that is not justified, the presumption of innocence is not 
limited to punishment prevention. The presumption of innocence seeks to prevent all 
people who have not been convicted of crimes from being treated as if they had. What 
qualifies as punishment depends on the particular legal regime, so the treatment to be 
prevented should be understood in a broad way including punishment, punishment-
like treatment, and stigmatisation. 146  This purpose can be seen throughout the 
historical uses of the presumption of innocence and is deeply tied to controlling the 
power that government can exert over individuals. 
Even in ancient legal codes and texts the idea that the government should be 
cautious when punishing people is evident. The legal themes that evolved into the 
presumption of innocence have been traced back as far as the Code of Hammurabi.147 
Although not called a presumption of innocence, and not as developed as it is today, 
the ideas that it was wrong to punish innocent people, that guilt required some 
element of proof, and that the proof should come from someone other than the 
accused, were present in this historical legal code.148 Further, in Roman law, dating 
back to at least AD 212, the presumption of innocence was evident in the need for 
proof and the acknowledgment of the dangers of convicting the innocent.149 This 
preference against punishing innocent people, even if it meant that a guilty person 
would go free, is an idea that is echoed in the modern common law presumption of 
innocence.150  
The modern ideas of the presumption of innocence, found in both the 
inquisitorial and accusatorial systems, are based on the idea of controlling 
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government’s ability to punish.151 This principle first entered into English law in the 
fifteenth century and was most famously expressed by Blackstone in the eighteenth 
century when he wrote, ‘[i]t is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one 
innocent suffer.’ 152  This expression describes the presumption of innocence as 
ensuring that people are treated as if they are legally guilty only if they have 
committed a crime. This maxim holds that this must be the case even if it allows some 
guilty people to escape punishment. It therefore acknowledges the vast power that the 
government has and that the presumption of innocence is a limit on that power.  
Furthermore, the Declaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen arising out 
of the French Revolution in 1789, states that ‘[e]very man is presumed innocent until 
he has been declared guilty.’153 This is the first specific reference to the presumption 
of innocence found in a modern inquisitorial system. 154 The rights expressed in the 
Declaration were specifically meant to limit the power that the government had over 
individuals in an effort to prevent the overbearing type of government that lead to the 
Revolution.  
Preventing government overreach with regard to punishment is echoed in the 
early development of international criminal law. The trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
also respected the presumption of innocence’s purpose of ensuring that authority to 
punish is not overreached. It would have been easy for the governments who were 
dealing with the alleged war criminals to engage in summary punishments and show 
trials. While Churchill suggested that the summary execution of Nazi officials was the 
best way to proceed following the end of World War II, and Stalin wished to hold 
trials with pre-determined outcomes, Roosevelt and Truman both insisted that 
punishment would only be legitimate if it resulted from a trial during which the 
accused were afforded at least some fair trial rights.155 This was reinforced by Robert 
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Jackson, a United States’ Supreme Court Justice and the Chief Prosecutor from the 
United States during the Nuremberg Trial, when he stated about those trials ‘we 
accept that [the defendants] must be given a presumption of innocence’ despite the 
fact that the presumption was not included within the Nuremberg Charter. 156 
Although the presumption of innocence was not specifically included in the 
Nuremberg or Tokyo Charters, there was recognition that the accused must have some 
presumption of innocence, that convictions could not be obtained without proof, and 
that the accused did not have to prove their own innocence.157 These provisions 
provided some assurance that the governments trying the accused individuals did not 
assume their guilt and punish them too readily. 
Likewise, the inclusion of the presumption of innocence within modern human 
rights law reflects the same purpose of controlling the ability to punish and 
specifically to arbitrarily imprison people. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights were both drafted in response 
to the atrocities that occurred during World War II, and demonstrate a motivation to 
prevent governments from being able to commit similar atrocities in the future.158 
During the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the presumption of 
innocence was specifically included to help prevent the summary punishments and 
show trials seen in the Middle Ages and Nazi Germany whereby the government 
could punish individuals for mere accusations. 159 The European Convention on 
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Human Rights was similarly drafted against this backdrop, and in fact, the 
presumption of innocence provision was originally modelled after that of the 
Universal Declaration.160 The common theme throughout these historical and modern 
legal texts with regard to the presumption of innocence is to prevent innocent people 
from being treated as if they are guilty unless they are convicted. By preventing this 
kind of treatment, the presumption of innocence assists in maintaining the balance 
between criminal law and individual freedoms by limiting when the government can 
apportion punishment.161  
One way that the presumption of innocence protects the accused against the 
abuse of power is by forcing the state to conduct a careful evaluation of the evidence 
and determine whether the particular individual is legally guilty of the crime they are 
suspected of having committed.162 In a somewhat narrow approach, Thomas Weigend 
argues that through this role the presumption of innocence is necessary to help 
suspects avoid the social-psychological consequences of being stigmatized as a 
criminal and no longer treated as a ‘trustworthy citizen.’163 The consequences of 
conviction can be far reaching and result in long-term stigmatization of the individual 
being punished by communicating that the individual is not trustworthy.164 Therefore, 
punishment should only result when it can be justified, that is when the individual has 
committed a crime.165 The presumption of innocence in the trial setting helps ensure 
that those who are convicted and punished are both factually and legally guilty, and 
thus deserving of punishment. Therefore, the presumption of innocence helps protect 
people from abuses of power and oppression by preventing punishment and 
stigmatisation without a legitimate reason. 
A similar argument is that the presumption of innocence helps protect the 
innocent from being convicted because it redistributes risk in the criminal trial by 
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helping redress the imbalance of power between the government and the accused.166 
Thus, in addition to assisting an individual accused of a crime, it also helps overcome 
the idea that government is ‘inherently coercive’ and victimizing to the individual.167 
By virtue of being accused of a crime, an accused person is already at a disadvantage 
because of the structure of criminal procedure.168 The government writes criminal 
laws, decides whether and with what crimes an individual will be charged, conducts 
the investigation, has enough money and resources to investigate leads, and has 
specialist lawyers who can try the case in front of a specialist court. The accused is 
necessarily disadvantaged as he or she will rarely have access to the same tools when 
preparing his or her defence. The accused has no control over whether charges are 
brought against them, are not privy to all aspects of the government’s investigation, 
and often lack the access and resources to effectively gather evidence.  The 
presumption of innocence makes it more difficult for the government to convict 
accused individuals by establishing a fairly high standard that must be met before a 
guilty verdict can be reached.  This begins to redress the inherent imbalance in a 
system that is seemingly overwhelmingly stacked against defendants. 169  The 
presumption of innocence also helps curb restrictions on individual liberties arising 
during the investigation and trial process when trying to determine the ‘truth’ about 
what occurred in the particular situation.170 Therefore, by helping create a more level 
field for the accused in the criminal trial process, ‘the presumption of innocence [is] 
seen as [being] ‘of vital importance in the establishment and maintenance of an open 
and democratic society based on freedom and equality.’’171 
Legal scholars who take the narrowest approaches argue that the presumption 
of innocence has a more specific purpose than to prevent people from being treated as 
if they are guilty without a conviction.  The most commonly discussed purposes are 
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to: prevent conviction without proof; 172  direct the burden of proof onto the 
prosecutor;173 prevent arbitrary punishment or detention;174 and help courts discover 
the truth.175 These potential purposes seem more specific as they are tied more 
directly to procedural rights, and thus may appear more legitimate. These arguments 
however, are not describing why the presumption of innocence exists, but rather, how 
it works. As is discussed in later chapters, the presumption of innocence does most of 
these things – it prevents arbitrary detention, requires proof provided by the 
government for a conviction, and can help courts determine the truth – however, all of 
that is what the presumption does, not why it does it or why it is necessary. Further, 
by doing these things, and contributing to fair trials, the presumption of innocence 
contributes to the rule of law.176 The purpose of the presumption of innocence 
however, is to help balance government powers with individual rights and freedoms 
with respect to the ability to punish or sanction.  
Other scholars argue that the presumption of innocence has a wider and more 
general purpose. They argue that the purpose of the presumption of innocence is to 
promote fairness or act as an umbrella right for due process rights generally.177 Hock 
Lai Ho for example, argues that the presumption of innocence is not a ‘discrete 
standard of fair trial’ in itself, but instead ‘is the general right to due process’.178 This 
purpose of providing due process inextricably links the presumption of innocence to 
the formal rules of criminal procedure. Under this understanding of the presumption 
of innocence all of the necessary components of a fair trial must be included under the 
presumption of innocence because a person must be presumed innocent unless they 
are proven guilty during a fair trial.179 This argument is similar to that offered by 
Magnus Ulväng who argues that the presumption of innocence is not an individual 
right but rather a rule of thumb or general principle that goes to the deep structure of 
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criminal procedure.180 For him the presumption of innocence works similarly to the 
Rechtstaat principles or human rights, more as guidelines and deep structural norms 
than rules that create duties or prescribe conduct.181  
The purpose of the presumption of innocence however cannot be as general as 
Ho and Ulväng claim. As with the more narrow purposes, a description of the 
presumption of innocence as a general or structural right that does not carry individual 
duties or benefits describes how the presumption works rather than why it exists. That 
the presumption of innocence is a deep structural component to criminal justice or 
procedure is closer to providing a purpose, the purpose of support or structure, but 
does not quite explain why the presumption exists or what protection it offers. This is 
partially because there is no reason why the presumption of innocence could not be 
structural and have the purpose of preventing individuals from being treated as if they 
are guilty. It is possible for those two things to coexist, however the presumption of 
innocence would have to be more than merely structural to fulfil that purpose. 
Another reason that the purpose of the presumption of innocence cannot be so general 
is that these arguments almost equate the presumption to the general principle of 
fairness.182 While the presumption of innocence is a part of fairness they are not the 
same. For one, the general principle of fairness is understood to be at the root of 
criminal justice, and is not specifically mentioned within the documents that create 
and support a particular justice system.183 The presumption of innocence however, is 
specifically mentioned. Further, the presumption of innocence cannot have such a 
general purpose because when it is mentioned in a specific criminal justice statute, it 
usually conveys some specific instructions to the fact-finder and/or prosecutor. For 
example, several of the criminal law statutes examined here include that the judge 
must be convinced of guilt to a particular standard before a conviction can be 
secured.184 Finally, not all due process rights can be included in a general principle of 
the presumption of innocence because the presumption is almost always contemplated 
as a separate right within the documents conveying due process rights. It is either 
contained in a separate article from the rest of the due process rights or identified as 
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an individual right under the general due process rights afforded to accused persons. 
Thus, while the presumption of innocence might be contained within due process or 
fair trial rights, not all of those rights are contained within the presumption of 
innocence.  
F. Conclusion 
Taking into consideration the placement of the presumption of innocence 
within criminal law generally, where guilt and innocence are at issue, it is important 
to know what ‘innocence’ means. Innocence cannot be defined without also defining 
‘guilt’ as they are opposites. Criminal justice systems are concerned with two types of 
innocence and guilt, that is, factual and legal. Factual guilt is when someone does 
some action whereas factual innocence is when someone did not do an action. Factual 
guilt and innocence are based in fact, and thus, it describes any action or non-action 
even those not related to criminal law. Legal guilt and innocence however, are based 
in law. Legal guilt is when all of the elements of a crime can be proved against an 
individual, whereas legal innocence is when one or more elements cannot be proven. 
Because they are based on proof and elements of crimes, they are independent of 
factual guilt and whether or not something happened in fact. It would be ideal if 
factual guilt and legal guilt always coexisted when a person is convicted of a crime. 
Likewise, it would be ideal if factual innocence and legal innocence always coexisted. 
Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Thus, legal innocence cannot be equated 
with actual innocence. As a result, criminal law refers to legal innocence as being ‘not 
guilty’. The presumption of innocence is primarily concerned with legal innocence, 
but factual innocence has some relevance. The importance of determining what 
definitions of innocence are relevant to the presumption of innocence is that whether 
someone is considered innocent or guilty determines how he or she may be treated.  
A conviction, that is a finding of legal guilt, allows an individual to be subject 
to punishment, sanctions and limitations on their rights and privileges. These 
limitations and punishments are reserved for those who have been convicted and 
should not be inflicted on those who have not been found legally guilty. The 
presumption of innocence helps prevent people who do not have a conviction from 
being punished or otherwise treated as if they are guilty. The presumption does this 
through two different aspects. These aspects and the way the presumption of 
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innocence prevents people from being treated as if they are guilty are discussed in the 
following chapters. 
The presumption of innocence has the purpose of preventing people from 
being treated as if they are guilty without a conviction. This purpose is derived from 
the presumption’s placement within criminal law and the relevant definition of 
innocence. That the presumption is placed within criminal proceedings is evident 
because criminal law is where guilt and innocence are at issue. Further, the statutes, 
agreements and conventions place the presumption of innocence in the general realm 
of criminal law. What qualifies criminal law depends on the particular jurisdiction. 
Specific criminal courts can define criminal law and procedure for themselves, while 
the human rights courts must be more flexible to accommodate the criminal justice 
systems of their states parties. To help determine whether national laws are correctly 
categorised as criminal or non-criminal in nature, the European Court of Human 
Rights has developed three criteria to help determine whether any particular law is 
criminal and thus, whether the protections of the presumption of innocence are 
applicable. While these criteria are only applicable for states parties to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the use of these criteria does provide for some 
consistency in the due process and criminal fair trial protections that member states 
must provide and is compatible with the presumption of innocence.
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Chapter 3. The Procedural Aspect of the Presumption of Innocence 
 
In the courtroom setting, the presumption of innocence is, and acts as, a 
presumption. The purpose of this chapter is to show that the presumption of 
innocence is a mandatory rebuttable legal presumption. As a presumption it causes the 
onus of proof to be on the prosecutor and not the accused. Further, it operates by 
forcing the fact-finder to find for the accused unless the proof against the accused 
reaches a particular standard. Finally, the presumption can only be waived by a guilty 
plea, which requires specific knowledge on the part of accused persons.Within the 
literature, there is some discussion of whether the presumption of innocence is an 
actual presumption. Some argue that it does not meet the qualifications for a 
presumption while others classify it as a rule of thumb or an overarching human 
right. 1  A review of the case law however, reveals that courts are using the 
presumption of innocence as a presumption. Its role within the courtroom is to act as a 
presumption; to direct the fact-finder to make a finding of not guilty unless the 
standard of proof is met.  
A. The presumption of innocence is a mandatory rebuttable presumption 
of law 
	  
 Whether the presumption of innocence is actually a presumption is a debatable 
issue.2 Some say that it is a rebuttable presumption of law because it exists unless 
there is sufficient evidence to allow for a decision of guilt.3 Others argue that it is not 
actually a presumption. 4  For example, Roberts and Zuckerman argue that the 
presumption of innocence is better thought of as a ‘complex legal and political 
doctrine rather than simply as a rule of evidence’.5 Others have argued that the 
presumption of innocence is not a presumption but rather just another way of stating 
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and Jill Hunter (eds), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights, Hart (Oxford 2012).	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22; Thomas Weigend, ‘There is Only One Presumption of Innocence’ (2013) 42(3) NJLP 
193, 194; See Ulväng (n 1).  
3 Weigend (n 2) 193. 
4 See eg ibid. 
5 Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (OUP 2010) 231.  
	   50	  
the burden of proof and assigning that burden to a party other than the accused.6 This 
argument reflects a policy consideration of avoiding convicting innocent people of 
crimes.7 Relying on Thayer and Wigmore’s definition of presumption, these scholars 
argue that presumptions require a preliminary fact in order for the presumption to be 
triggered.8 The presumption of innocence, however, is a starting point, rather than a 
conclusion, and does not seemingly rely on any facts to become operative.9 In this 
way, scholars argue that the presumption of innocence is not actually a presumption, 
but rather, a restatement of the burden of proof that allocates the responsibility of 
meeting that burden.10   
 Accepting that presumptions exist, the presumption of innocence is a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption of law. When one considers the way the presumption of 
innocence is described in statutes, that a person must be presumed innocent unless his 
or her guilt is proven to a particular standard of proof, it is more clearly stated as a 
presumption.11 Significantly, the use of the word ‘must’ or ‘shall’ when stating the 
presumption shows it is mandatory.  That mandatory character of the presumption of 
innocence is further reinforced by its inclusion as a right in most criminal law statutes 
and human rights agreements.  
 The presumption of innocence however, is rebuttable because it is overcome 
when the proof of guilt exceeds the necessary threshold required in the jurisdiction in 
which trial is taking place. That is, the standard of proof must be met in order to make 
a finding of guilt. Before the standard of proof is reached, a fact-finder must presume 
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(30 May 2007)  art 16(3) (STL Statute); UN Security Council, Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (16 January 2002) art 17(3) (SCSL Statute). 
	   51	  
that the accused is legally innocent leaving the fact-finder with no choice but to enter 
a not-guilty verdict if the standard is not met. Once the proof reaches the required 
standard the presumption of innocence is overcome and the fact-finder is free to 
decide in a way other than that prescribed by the presumption. At this point, the fact-
finder may find the accused guilty. Thus, the presumption of innocence is a legal 
presumption as the court must accept as true that the accused is legally innocent and 
therefore must make a finding of not guilty unless the proof reaches the relevant 
standard.12  
 Some argue that the presumption of innocence is not a true presumption because 
there is no specific condition or fact that must be present for the accused to gain the 
protection of the presumption.13 They support their argument by claiming that the 
applicability of the presumption to everyone charged with a criminal offence makes 
the presumption evidentiary in nature. 14 The lack of some preliminary fact supporting 
the accused’s innocence means that an accused is being presumed innocent even in 
the absence of any evidence supporting that conclusion. The commentators espousing 
this view believe that presumptions should only become operative when some 
evidence supports the presumption and that in the absence of any evidence supporting 
the innocence of the accused he or she should not be so presumed. 15   
 This approach is flawed in a number of ways.  First, there is a condition that 
must exist before the presumption becomes operable. The presumption does not apply 
until criminal proceedings commence against a particular individual. Therefore, the 
threshold condition to the applicability of the presumption of innocence is that the 
suspect has become the target of the criminal justice process.  Second, this argument 
focuses on outcomes and assumes some guilt on the part of the suspect because that is 
the usual outcome in most criminal cases. It is precisely this attitude that the 
presumption of innocence helps protect against and why it is necessary that the 
presumption be applied in the courtroom. The argument that the presumption of 
innocence does not reflect reality confuses the type of innocence that the presumption 
is concerned with. While most accused people may be factually guilty of an offence, 
they are all legally innocent because legal guilt cannot be established without a 
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finding of guilt in court. Further, the position that the presumption does not reflect 
reality neglects to consider the fact that criminal law is particularised to the 
individual. Thus, even if most of those on trial are factually guilty, it does not mean 
that the individual before the court in any given case is factually guilty. It may be that 
they are the factually innocent person, and for them the presumption of innocence 
would reflect fact.  
 Ultimately, it does not matter whether the presumption of innocence is or is not 
a true legal presumption because its effect is the same – the fact-finder must find the 
accused not guilty unless enough evidence is present to meet the required standard of 
proof. The courts treat it as a presumption and they believe it is an idea that cannot be 
overcome without the standard of proof being met at trial.  
B. The presumption of innocence is mandatory - The relationship 
between the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof 
 
The presumption of innocence is a human right that must be upheld by the 
court to protect accused individuals. As a human right it is mandatory in nature. The 
most obvious demonstration of the mandatory nature of the presumption of innocence 
is its relationship to the burden of proof. The presumption of innocence requires that 
the crime alleged against the accused must be proven by someone other than the 
defendant.16 This reflects a general principle of law that the party bringing the action 
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to court has the burden of proof.17 For common law and international courts, this 
burden falls to the prosecutor.18 Generally, in civil law courts this onus generally falls 
to the prosecutor but there is an added responsibility on the court itself to determine 
the truth.19 Because the prosecutor retains the burden of proof in the common, civil 
and international law systems, it has been argued that the prosecutor having the 
burden of proof is a general principle of law.20 This idea is supported within the 
international law context, where the burden of proof required for conviction never 
shifts to the defence. 21 
It is the legal presumption, or procedural, aspect of the presumption of 
innocence that prevents the burden of proof from falling on the defendant for any 
inquiry that may prove or disprove their guilt. Because of the presumption of 
innocence, the defendant has nothing to prove from the case’s outset. If the prosecutor 
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Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946, 
vol 2 (1947) 102; ICC Statute art 66; STL Statute art 16(3); Muhammad (n 16) 150; Sluiter et 
al (n 17) 1139; John RWD Jones and Dr Miša Zgonec-Rožej, ‘Rights of Suspects and 
Accused’ in Amal Alamuddin, Nidal Nabil Jurdi and David Tolbert (eds), The Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (OUP 2014) 184; Salvatore Zappalà, Human Rights in International 
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19 Muhammad (n 16) 150; Zappalà (n 18) 91; Schabas and McDermott (n 16) 1641; DJ 
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William A Schabas (eds), International Criminal Law: Developments in the Case Law of the 
ICTY (Martinus Nijhoff 2003) 2 3.  
20 Schabas and McDermott (n 16) 1641. 
21 ICC Statute art 67(1)(i); Prosecutor v Ngirabatware (Judgement and Sentence) ICTR-99-
54-T, T Ch II (20 December 2012) para 49; Kanyarukiga v Prosecutor (Judgement) ICTR-02-
78-A, A Ch (8 May 2012) para 167; Prosecutor v Hategekimana (Judgement and Sentence) 
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cannot meet the standard of proof the defendant will be found not guilty even if the 
defendant provided no argument or evidence on his or her own behalf.22 Thus, even 
when the ad hoc Tribunals neglected to provide a rule in their statutes assigning the 
burden of proof to the Prosecutor, the burden of proof still necessarily fell away from 
the defendant because they have the presumption of innocence.23  
This aspect of the presumption of innocence is reflected in ‘no case to answer’ 
motions at the international and internationalised tribunals. Despite not having a rule 
allowing for a motion of ‘no case to answer’, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia heard motions on this issue in the Tadić and Čelebići Camp 
cases.24 Both were rejected on their merits, but the Tribunal’s willingness to hear 
these motions demonstrates that the presumption of innocence stands for the 
proposition that the defence has nothing to prove and if the prosecution does not meet 
their burden, the court should dismiss the case.25 These motions resulted in the 
introduction of Rule 98 bis, which allows for defendants to file motions of acquittal. 
Motions for acquittal can even be heard on a propio motu basis by the Court, if the 
Court believes that the prosecution has not successfully discharged their burden.26  
Similarly, the International Criminal Court also allows for ‘no case to answer’ 
motions, without a rule allowing for this type of motion in the Statute or Rules of 
‘Evidence. ‘No case to answer’ motions were created by Trial Chamber V(A) during 
the Ruto and Sang case in what is known as ‘Decision Number 5.’27 The Trial 
Chamber permitted this type of motion because it is ‘consistent with the statutory 
framework’ of the Court, is common in domestic jurisdictions, and was used at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.28 The Court specifically 
recognized that this motion flows from the presumption of innocence and the 
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the Prosecutor’s Case) IT-96-21-T, T Ch (18 March 1998). 
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requirement that the onus of proof is on the prosecutor.29 Ultimately, the ‘no case to 
answer’ motion in Ruto and Sang was successful, resulting in the charges against the 
accused being vacated.30 The creation of a ‘no case to answer’ motion at the 
International Criminal Court and the successful motion during the Ruto and Sang case 
underscores the presumption of innocence’s role in requiring the prosecution to bear 
the burden of proof. 
 The idea that the presumption of innocence keeps the burden of proof away 
from the accused is so strong that some scholars argue that the presumption of 
innocence is merely a restatement of the burden of proof.31 This, however, cannot be 
the case.32 The presumption of innocence is a presumption and as such it is an 
instruction to the fact-finder. One of the results of the presumption is that the accused 
cannot have the burden of proof, but the presumption of innocence is more than a 
restatement of where the burden falls. Requiring proof, and who must provide that 
proof, is not the same as presuming innocence. As a presumption it is a direction to 
the fact-finder to find the accused innocent unless the standard of proof is met.33 Thus 
it works in conjunction with both the burden and standard of proof. It is related to 
both, but not the equivalent of either. 
This does not mean that the defence should not participate in the case. 
Defendants can and should challenge the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses 
and evidence in an effort to demonstrate that the prosecution has not met their burden. 
In doing so they can raise doubts in the minds of the fact-finder in an attempt to 
secure an acquittal. This, however, does not shift the burden of proof to the defence.34 
First, the defence is not required to make arguments that the provided proof is 
insufficient. The defence is equally refrain from making any argument and trust that 
the fact-finder properly will evaluate the evidence to determine whether the standard 
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of proof has been met. Second, when the defence makes these types of arguments, the 
prosecution must still prove all elements of the alleged crime to the appropriate 
standard in order to achieve a conviction. The defence is merely highlighting areas in 
which that standard may not have been met. A rejection of an accused’s argument that 
the standard of proof has not been met on the basis of a credibility challenge does not 
overcome the presumption of innocence or require a conviction.35 It merely states that 
the fact-finder does not agree with the defence’s argument regarding that particular 
fact. The fact-finder may still determine that the prosecutor did not meet the required 
standard of proof with regard to other elements or as a cumulative whole.  
1. Affirmative Defences 
	  
If the presumption of innocence prevents the defendant from bearing the 
burden of proof then affirmative defences can seem something of a contradiction. 
Affirmative defences are different from arguing that the prosecution has not met the 
burden of proof, questioning the credibility of witnesses and evidence, or pointing out 
that there may be some places where the standard of proof has not been met. Instead, 
they argue that the defendant cannot be found guilty because there is an excuse or 
explanation that prevents them from forming the requisite mens rea. 
Affirmative defences require some form of proof, the amount of which 
depends on the jurisdiction. First off, there is a burden on the defence to raise an 
affirmative defence if they are going to rely on one during trial.36 However, the 
amount of proof that is needed beyond this is generally limited and is certainly less 
than the standard of proof required for guilt. Affirmative defences merely serve to 
raise a doubt in the mind of the fact-finder.37  Importantly, raising a defence in no way 
shifts the burden required to prove guilt, nor does it lower the standard of proof the 
prosecutor must meet for a conviction. Thus, an affirmative defence does not affect 
the presumption of innocence because it does not change the relationship between the 
defendant and the burden of proof required for a conviction. 
Although the accused is not required to show that an affirmative defence 
meets a certain evidentiary standard it may be required to provide some evidence that 
the circumstances of the affirmative defence exist. Thus, the accused can carry some 
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burden of proof for affirmative defences. One example is the defence of insanity 
where the accused must prove the elements of such a defence to a relatively low 
standard of proof such as either the balance of probabilities or preponderance of the 
evidence standard.38 Attention has been paid to such ‘reverse onuses’ and whether 
these violate the presumption of innocence growing out of the belief of some 
commentators that the presumption of innocence is nothing more than a restatement 
of the burden of proof.39 However, there is no obligation to raise an affirmative 
defence and no set minimum evidentiary threshold that must be met to raise a 
defence.40 Further, requiring the accused to give notice of any affirmative defence on 
which they play not rely does is not shift the burden of proof, but the burden of 
production. The prosecutor must still prove that the accused was responsible the 
alleged crime. 
The International Criminal Court has some of the clearest rules regarding 
burden shifting. There the burden of proof can never shift to the accused.41 This rule 
underwent some discussion during the drafting process, as there is significant 
divergence on this within national jurisdictions.42 However, the Court does have other 
rules that require the accused to give notice to the prosecutor that they plan to rely on 
certain defences at trial.43 It could be argued that the requirement to give notice of 
defences shifts the burden of proving the defence to the accused, rather than the 
defence merely raising doubts that the standard of proof has been met. However this 
does not shift the burden of proof to the accused, but merely allows the Prosecutor to 
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investigate the accused’s claims in their investigation of both sides of the allegation. 
Other international and internationalised tribunals have conducted similar 
inquiries about the relationship between affirmative defences and burden shifting. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s treatment of the alibi defence is an 
illustrative example of how defences do not shift the burden of proof to the defence 
and thus do not run counter to the presumption of innocence. Unlike other defences, 
the accused is not defending his or her actions by raising an alibi, but merely arguing 
that the standard of proof has not been met because the defendant was not present at 
the crime scene.44 In cases where the accused’s direct responsibility for the crime is 
alleged, if there is credible evidence that the accused was not present at the alleged 
crime then the standard of proof necessarily cannot be met.  International criminal law 
does not impose a burden on the defence to prove an alibi, but merely requires him or 
her to raise the possibility of its existence and present ‘evidence tending to show that 
he was not present at the time of the alleged crime.’45 Such evidence need not be 
conclusive, it only must raise a doubt in the mind of the fact-finder as to whether the 
prosecutor has proven that the defendant is the person who committed the crime. This 
is one of the few times when the difference between the burden of proof and the 
burden of production is important.46 There is no set standard of proof for alibi, rather 
the issue is whether it raises doubts as to whether the accused was present at the time 
of the crime. 47  Even when the defence is raised, the burden remains on the 
prosecution to prove that the elements of the crime are proven to the relevant standard 
despite the evidence tending to show an alibi.48 This is because the existence of an 
alibi or the implication that an alibi might be present can be enough to prevent the 
prosecutor from meeting the standard of proof.  
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Rejection of an alibi, as with all defences, does not undermine the accused’s 
presumption of innocence.49 It merely means that the defence did not meet their 
burden to provide sufficient evidence of the alibi. This may seem like the presumption 
of innocence has been violated or overcome because by not believing the alibi the 
court is making a statement on the veracity of the defence’s claims. However, even if 
the alibi fails, the prosecutor still must prove each element of the crime to the proper 
standard of proof including the element that the accused is the person responsible for 
the crime.50 The alibi defence can only negate, or call into question, the prosecutor’s 
proof against the defendant. The Court’s rejection of the defence can never be 
construed as constituting evidence that can be used to convict the defendant. Thus, the 
fact-finder can reject the alibi but still find that the prosecutor has not proven it was 
the defendant who was responsible. 
Ultimately, defences do not contribute to proving the guilt or innocence of the 
accused and therefore are not a reverse onus of proof on the accused mandating that 
the accused disprove their own guilt. They can be excuses for behaviour or they can 
cast doubt on the proof against them, but regardless of the affirmative defence, the 
offence must still be proven by the prosecution to the relevant standard of proof to 
obtain a conviction. The defences merely provide doubt as to whether that standard 
has been met or may mitigate the behaviour of the accused if the standard of proof is 
met. The presumption of innocence prevents a finding of guilt so long as the standard 
of proof has not been met, regardless of whether or not the court accepts an 
affirmative defence presented by the accused.  
2. Judicial Notice 
	  
The compatibility of judicial notice with the presumption of innocence is a 
source of on-going debate in international criminal law. The international and 
internationalised criminal tribunals and courts allow for judicial notice.51 As in 
domestic courts, international and internationalised criminal courts take judicial 
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notice of facts in an effort to save time and other resources.52 Judicial notice is taken 
when a fact is common knowledge or cannot reasonably be disputed and has the 
effect of not requiring the noticed fact to be proved in the present trial.53 This practice 
may violate the presumption of innocence because it reduces the prosecutor’s burden 
to provide proof against the defendant and reduces the defendant’s ability to question 
the veracity of the proof against them. 
All international and internationalised criminal tribunals, except the 
International Criminal Court, allow for judicial notice to be taken of ‘adjudicated 
facts’, which are facts that were found in other proceedings.54 This can cause issues 
for the defendant when judicial notice is taken of a fact from an earlier trial as he or 
she did not have the opportunity to challenge the fact when it was initially presented. 
This can be seen as reversing the burden of proof because the only way the defence 
can counter the presumed fact is by producing evidence.55 
There seems to be a distinction between judicially noticed facts that lend 
themselves to showing that a crime occurred in a general sense and facts that show 
that the individual accused was responsible for that crime. This was an issue at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Rule 94 of the Tribunal’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence provide that judicial notice of facts that are in common 
knowledge can be taken by the Tribunal but not inferences that could stem from those 
facts.56 Further, the Tribunal must ensure that taking judicial notice does not interfere 
with the accused person’s right to fair trial or presumption of innocence.57  During the 
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Karamera, et al. case, the Tribunal took judicial notice of the fact that there were 
widespread or systematic attacks on civilians who were perceived to be Tutsi and that 
those attacks resulted in a large number of Tutsi deaths.58 Further, the Tribunal took 
judicial notice that genocide was committed against the Tutsi ethnic group in Rwanda 
between 6 April 1994 and 17 July 1994.59 In the Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Motion, 
the Tribunal held that facts taken in judicial notice necessarily bear on the guilt or 
innocence of the accused or they would not be relevant to the trial.60 The Court 
argued that this is in accordance with the presumption of innocence because it does 
not shift the burden of persuasion but merely relieves some of the burden of 
production.61 The prosecutor is still required to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt before a conviction can be secured. The Appeals Chamber however, 
could take judicial notice of facts that tend to prove guilt of the accused in the 
accused’s case. In that situation, the Tribunal must use caution when taking notice 
because it shifts the burden of production with regard to rebuttal evidence to the 
accused. It must be ensured that this shift is consistent with the rest of the accused’s 
rights within the particular circumstances of the specific case.62  
Further, the Court limited the areas in which judicial notice could be taken, 
excluding any facts that bear upon the ‘acts, conduct, and mental state of the accused’ 
or facts relating directly or indirectly to the accused’s guilt.63 The court excluded 
those facts for two reasons. The first is that it strikes the proper balance between the 
accused’s rights and the Tribunal’s interest in expediting the proceedings of the cases 
before it.64 The second is that facts proven about an individual in a case other than 
their own raises a concern about the reliability of those facts as the concerned 
individual could not contest those facts at the time, as they were not on trial.65 Thus, 
judicial notice appears to be allowed for facts that tend to show that a crime occurred 
without attributing responsibility to a specific person therefore that a genocide or 
widespread killings occurred can be, and were, included in judicial notice. However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Ibid at paras 26-32; Semanza (n 49) para 20. 
59 Karemera (n 50) paras 33-38; Semanza (n 49) para 20; Schabas and McDermott (n 16) 
1646-1647. 
60 Karemera (n 50) para 48. 
61 Ibid at para 49. 
62 Ibid at para 52. 
63 Ibid at paras 50, 53. 
64 Ibid at paras 51-52. 
65 Ibid. 
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facts tending to show that a specific individual was responsible for or participated in 
such crimes should not be part of judicial notice as those facts go to the specific guilt 
or innocence of the accused. 
This method of taking judicial notice acknowledges that something happened 
to the victims without stating who was responsible for that event. While it does reduce 
the prosecution’s burden of proving that a crime occurred, it does not implicate the 
defendant in any way. It is possible to recognize that victims of a particular crime 
exist without implicating the guilt of the individual.66 This is only acceptable when 
dealing with mass crimes because these crimes can involve multiple prosecutions for 
the same incident and thus, it has already been proven in previous cases that 
something happened to many people. In the instance of mass crimes the situation is 
far more general as the victims are treated as a group. For crimes committed against 
specific individuals, judicial notice that a crime occurred would not be acceptable. 
First, the existence of a crime has not been proven in other cases. It is essential in the 
Rwandan Tribunal that the facts that were judicially noticed were proven in previous 
cases.67 Further, in the context of non-mass crimes, even if an accused is alleged to 
have committed a crime against several people each of which is addressed in separate 
trials, evidence of the existence of a crime in the first trial cannot be taken as judicial 
notice in the last trial because in this instance there are specified individual victims. 
Just because one person suffered an injury that was the result of a crime, does not 
mean that others did. Finally, mass crimes are often witnessed through the media and 
other groups in an international forum. Because of this observation, whether 
something occurred is not really a question, rather, the first question is whether what 
has occurred is a crime. Once it is determined that a crime was committed based on 
the victims’ experience of what happened, the only question that remains is whether 
the individual before the court bore criminal responsibility for these crimes.  
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also allowed 
judicial notice of facts that had been previously proven before the Tribunal. There the 
judicially noticed facts were not as sweeping as those allowed by the Rwandan 
Tribunal and allowed for a greater safeguard of the rights of the accused. At the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Situation in the Central African Republic (Decision on the “Notification by the Board of 
Directors in accordance with Regulation 50(a) of the regulations of the Trust Fund for 
Victims to undertake activities in the Central African Republic”) ICC-01/05, PT Ch II (23 
October 2012) para 10. 
67 Karemera (n 50). 
	   63	  
Yugoslavia Tribunal, the judges held that judicial notice creates a presumption that 
the noticed fact is accurate and does not have to be re-proven at trial.68 So long as it is 
rebuttable, the Court held that it does not contravene the accused’s rights.69 Notably 
Judge Hunt disagreed, and said that judicial notice is a rebuttable presumption in 
favour of the prosecutor, which necessarily places a burden of proof on the accused.70 
However, the overall use of judicial notice at the Tribunal reflected the idea that 
judicial notice created a rebuttable presumption that would not violate the 
presumption of innocence because, while it made the burden of proof easier, it did not 
remove the burden of proof.71 
Interestingly, the Special Court for Sierra Leone also allowed for judicial 
notice of facts established at one trial to be conclusively proven at another trial. 
Significantly, the rebuttal protections to the future defendants, which were allowed at 
the Yugoslavia Tribunal, were not permitted at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. At 
the Special Court, once judicial notice was taken it was considered conclusive and 
could no longer be subject to question by the parties or future parties.72 This approach 
seems to provide greater potential to violate the rights of the accused, as he or she is 
not able to even question the credibility of the fact established in the previous trials. 
While saving the court time, it appears to impermissibly reduce the prosecutor’s 
burden of proof, as all ability of cross-examination or argument against the judicially 
noticed fact is removed.  
While judicial notice is permitted at the International Criminal Court it has a 
far more limited application than the other international and internationalised 
tribunals and courts. Under the Rome Statute, the only time judicial notice may be 
taken is when a fact is of common knowledge.73 As a result, judicial notice of facts 
that occurred in previous cases, as was seen in the Rwandan and Yugoslavian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Milošević (n 54); Prosecutor v Krajisnik et al. (Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for 
Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts and Admission of Written Statements of Witnesses 
Pursuant to Rule 92bis) IT-00-39&40, T Ch I (28 February 2003) para 15. 
69 Milošević (n 54); Krajisnik (n 68) para 15; Schabas and McDermott (n 16) 1646-1647.  
70 Milošević Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt (n 55). 
71 See eg: Prosecutor v Slobodan Milošević IT-02-54-AR73.5 (Separate Opinion of Judge 
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72 Norman (n 55) para 32. 
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Tribunals, is not permitted. This is partly because the International Criminal Court 
handles situations from many different countries. The facts proven in one case 
necessarily cannot be subject to judicial notice in another case because each situation 
dealt with by the International Criminal Court is distinct. This practice is further 
supported by the Prosecutor’s policy of focusing on only a few actors alleged to be 
responsible for the actions, rather than having the aim of prosecuting most of the 
responsible actors.74 Judicial notice across cases in the same situation would hardly be 
worthwhile because often the defendants are few and are tried in the same case. If 
there are separate trials from individuals in the same situation, taking judicial notice 
could save the Court time, but it would need to be balanced against the fair trial rights 
of the accused. 
Judicial notice reduces the prosecutor’s burden of proof and limits the 
defence’s ability to test the credibility and veracity of the judicially noticed fact. This 
has implications on the presumption of innocence, but the two ideas are compatible so 
long as the accused can challenge judicially noticed facts in his or her own trial, 
particularly when the judicial notice is the results of facts proven in a prior case. With 
the exception of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, that is the general approach of the 
other international criminal courts and tribunals. However, to guarantee that the fair 
trial rights of the accused are given maximum protection, judicial notice should be 
limited to the approach pursued by the International Criminal Court.  Judicial notice is 
not without its utility.  Recognizing that a crime was committed, without identifying a 
particular perpetrator, can provide acknowledgment that people have suffered without 
determining who was responsible for that suffering. This can help the victims find 
justice while protecting the accused’s right to be presumed innocent.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, ‘Paper on some policy issues before 
the Office of the Prosecutor’ (September 2003) 3 <www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-
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paper.pdf> accessed 17 April 2018; Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, 
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Afghanistan’ (3 November 2017) <www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=171103_OTP_Statement> accessed on 17 April 2018 (stating 
that focusing on the most responsible actors is the ‘Office’s policy and practice’. 
	   65	  
3. The Right to Silence and Adverse Inferences 
 
The presumption of innocence as a legal presumption is directly linked to the 
right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself. Some commentators believe 
that the latter two rights are derived from the presumption of innocence.75 This is 
because they help ensure that the defendant is not bearing the burden of proof through 
coercion or a requirement that the accused present evidence against him or herself.76 
It is for this reason that although the right to silence and the right to not incriminate 
oneself are separate rights, they are interrelated and for the purposes of the 
presumption of innocence are discussed together. 
The link between the right to silence or the right not to incriminate oneself and 
the presumption of innocence means that the protections of the presumption of 
innocence are at least somewhat present in pre-trial proceedings.77 This is clearly the 
case before the international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals 
although it is less evident in international human rights law, which limits the 
applicability of the right only to a person that has been ‘charged’ with a crime.78 It 
seems that the presumption of innocence, at least with regard to its relationship to the 
right to silence and the right not to self-incriminate, extends to the time period before 
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McGuinness v Ireland ECHR 2000-XII 419, para 40; Saunders v United Kingdom ECHR 
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OUP 2014) 282; Harris et al. (n 19) 461-2. 
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Linton, Sergey Vasiliev, Salvatore Zappalà (eds), International Criminal Procedure: 
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225, 226-227; Schabas ICC Commentary (n 21) 1006; De Meester et al. (n 76) 246; Zappalà 
(n 18) 90; ICC Statute art 55(2)(b); Prosecutor v Lubanga (Redacted Second Decision on 
disclosure by the defence and Decision on whether the prosecution may contact defence 
witnesses) ICC-01/04-01/06, T Ch I (20 January 2010) para 68, citing Funke v France (1993) 
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78 Saunders (n 75) paras 67-75; Pieter van Dijk and Marc Viering (revisors), ‘Chapter 10 
Right to a Fair and Public Hearing’ in Pieter Van Dijk, Fried van Hoof, Arjen Van Rijn, Leo 
Zwaak (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th edn, 
Intersentia 2006) 593-4; De Meester et al. (n 76) 246. 
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charges are filed.  That is because suspects may be questioned before being charged 
and must have these basic protections even in the absence of formal charges.79 In 
Europe, this may not be an issue because of the specific but expansive definition of 
‘charge’ used by the European Court of Human Rights.80 
The scope of the right to silence and the right to not incriminate oneself 
depends on the jurisdiction. The statutes of the International Criminal Court and 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon both mandate that whether the accused exercised his or 
her right to silence cannot be used when determining the accused’s guilt or 
innocence.81 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found that adverse 
inferences could not be taken against the accused if they exercise their right to 
silence.82 One reason that these courts do not allow adverse inferences to be taken 
when an accused exercises his or her right to silence is because the statutes of the 
international criminal courts and tribunals are specialized and must address the rights 
of the accused in some detail, whereas the human rights conventions are concerned 
with human rights generally. Further, the human rights instruments tend to include the 
rights to silence or the protections against self-incrimination as a part of either the 
presumption of innocence or the rights of the accused generally.83 
While most criminal law statutes and conventions contain both the 
presumption of innocence and the right to silence as separate rights, the European 
Convention on Human Rights does not include a right to silence. Rather, this right has 
been read into Article 6 through the presumption of innocence.84 The reason that this 
is part of the presumption of innocence is that requiring the accused to testify reverses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 De Meester et al. (n 76) 246; Saunders (n 75) paras 67-75.  
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the burden of proof because the accused necessarily possesses information that is not 
available elsewhere.85 The current law, stemming from the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, allows for some restriction of the right to silence through the 
limited use of adverse inferences.86 Unlike the presumption of innocence, the right to 
silence provided through the European Court and Convention on Human Rights is not 
absolute. Rather, the European Court of Human Rights protects from ‘improper 
compulsion’ to give a statement or incriminate oneself.87 
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights addressed the question 
of whether an accused’s guilt can be derived from their silence. Before a court can use 
the accused’s silence to create an inference against them regarding their guilt, the 
prosecution must still present a prima facie case against the accused.88 Once a prima 
facie case has been presented, an inference of guilt may only be drawn from an 
accused’s silence if the evidence against the accused is so strong that the inference 
taken is no more than the next step or ‘common sense’ inference arising from the 
facts.89 A conviction involving such an inference cannot be based ‘wholly or mainly’ 
on the suspect’s silence, but an adverse inference may be drawn against the accused if 
it makes sense depending on the circumstances of the particular case.90 In Murray v 
The United Kingdom this was held not to have ‘the effect of shifting the burden of 
proof from the prosecution to the defence so as to infringe on the principle of the 
presumption of innocence.’91 However, it should be noted that the decisions allowing 
adverse inferences are based on Article 6(1) rather than the presumption of innocence 
in Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights has introduced other safeguards to 
protect the accused from adverse inferences resulting from their silence largely based 
on whether the accused was appropriately warned before he or she chose to remain 
silent. These safeguards include: an accused must be given a warning about how 
remaining silent may affect their case;92 only a judge can determine whether an 
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adverse inference is appropriate;93 and judges must explain the inferences taken and 
the reasons behind them.94 Further, an important factor in deciding if an adverse 
inference is appropriate is whether the suspect had access to a lawyer and what legal 
advice was given.95 That is, if the suspect’s lawyer counselled their client to remain 
silent for a legitimate reason, an adverse inference should not be taken against the 
suspect.96 Further, courts must use ‘particular caution’ before applying an adverse 
inference to a suspect’s case based on the accused’s silence.97 These safeguards focus 
on whether the accused was warned that his or her silence could result in an adverse 
inference rather than preventing the adverse inference from occurring in the first 
place. 
It is evident from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights that the 
ability to draw adverse inferences from silence shifts the burden of proof to the 
accused. The prosecutor is only required to present a prima facie case against the 
accused before an adverse inference can be taken. However, a prima facie case alone 
is not sufficient to support a guilty verdict. Therefore, the adverse inference may fill 
the gap between the case presented by the prosecutor at the prima facie standard and 
higher standard of proof required for a conviction. In essence, this means that the 
inaction of the accused directly leads to a guilty verdict. This disrupts the normal 
practice at trial where only the prosecution is required to act and the accused can be 
found not guilty even when he or she declines to participate in trial. When an adverse 
inference is drawn the accused is being punished for his or her non-participation 
suggesting a shift in the burden of proof.  
The international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals provide 
for more specific protections than the human rights courts with regard to adverse 
inferences. 98  Generally speaking the fact-finder can draw inferences from the 
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Overview’ in Keir Starmer, Michelle Strange, Quincy Whitaker (eds), Criminal Justice, 
Police Powers and Human Rights, (Blackstone Press 2001) 219. 
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available evidence. However, this capacity is limited to the extent that an inference 
can only be drawn from circumstantial evidence if it is the only reasonable inference 
that can be taken. 99  This limitation is meant to allow convictions based on 
circumstantial evidence, but only when the evidence tends to prove the crimes 
alleged. However, this does not relieve the prosecutor of its burden or infringe on the 
presumption of innocence.100 The prosecutor must still prove each element of the 
offence to the required standard. If that is through circumstantial evidence, the 
evidence must demonstrate that the inference that tends to show that the standard of 
proof has been met must be the only reasonable inference taken. Otherwise, if there is 
an equally or more plausible inference that could result from the evidence, the doubt 
must go to the accused. 
Further, at some international courts the accused may have the right to make 
an unsworn statement. This right was introduced at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and is also a minimum guarantee in the 
International Criminal Court’s Statute.101 Interestingly, if an accused exercises this 
right he or she cannot be subject to cross-examination, as that would violate the 
presumption of innocence.102 
 The international and internationalised tribunals seem to ensure a strong 
presumption of innocence with respect to the right to silence. At these courts the 
accused’s silence cannot be held against them, and they cannot be forced to give a 
statement. The relationship between the presumption of innocence and the right to 
silence is more complicated in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. While the Court acknowledges that the accused has a right to silence that is 
derived from the presumption of innocence, domestic courts may take adverse 
inferences against the accused should he or she fail to give a statement or testify.  The 
practice of taking adverse inferences appears to shift some of the burden of proof to 
the accused. The Court provides a number of safeguards to prevent inappropriate 
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adverse inferences from being taken but the majority of these safeguards take the 
form of warning the accused, which does not prevent an adverse inference from being 
taken. Whether the European Court of Human Rights upholds the presumption of 
innocence through its case law regarding the right to silence is debatable. The 
European Directive on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of 
innocence and the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings addresses this 
issue, stating that ‘[t]he exercise of the right to remain silent or the right not to 
incriminate oneself should not be used against a suspect or accused person and should 
not, in itself, be considered to be evidence that the person concerned has committed 
the criminal offence concerned.’103 However, this directive has yet to take effect and 
it remains to be seen how or whether the affected countries, which is limited to 
members of the European Union, will comply. 
C. The Presumption of Innocence is Rebuttable - The relationship 
between the presumption of innocence and the standard of proof 
 
The presumption of innocence, as a legal presumption, contributes to the 
requirement that proof must be introduced in criminal cases in order to secure a 
conviction. Unless enough evidence is provided against the accused, the accused must 
be acquitted because they are legally innocent.104 The standard of proof is the amount 
of evidence required to overcome, or rebut, the presumption. While the rules for what 
constitutes sufficient or adequate proof varies between jurisdictions, the presumption 
of innocence mandates that some proof must be introduced before an accused can be 
convicted. The only way that the procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence 
can be overcome is if there is sufficient evidence to meet the standard of proof set by 
the relevant jurisdiction. 105  This means that without proof the presumption of 
innocence cannot be overcome and therefore individuals cannot be found guilty.  
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In order to secure a conviction, the evidence required for conviction must be 
proven to a particular standard. Lower standards of proof require less evidence to 
meet the required standard, whereas higher standards require more evidence. The 
standard of proof is the amount of proof required for the presumption of innocence to 
be overcome. The standard of proof does not need to be met for each piece of 
evidence, but for each element of the crime when the evidence is examined as a 
whole.106 Thus, the standard of proof determines how easy or difficult it is to 
overcome the presumption of innocence and gain a conviction. 
Modern standards of proof for criminal convictions are quite high. It is 
generally thought that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, found in international 
criminal law and the common law, and the civil law’s intime conviction du juge, 
require near certainty that the accused is guilty of the charges alleged.107 A high 
standard of proof is designed to work with the presumption of innocence to prevent 
innocent people from being punished. 108  This is because the presumption of 
innocence acts as the starting point for the fact-finder’s opinion of the accused’s guilt 
as discussed below and a high standard of proof ensures that the presumption cannot 
be overturned without fairly conclusive evidence against the accused.  
However, the presumption of innocence itself does not obligate a court or 
legal system to employ a high standard of proof. It merely requires that a standard 
exists and that fact-finders do not enter a finding of guilt unless that particular 
standard is met. There is quite a lot of controversy over what these standards require. 
Even different chambers of the same tribunal have debated about what exactly beyond 
reasonable doubt means.109 These debates over what a particular standard of proof 
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requires should only be a problem for the presumption of innocence in cases where it 
is a close call as to whether the standard of proof has been met. In theory, as soon as 
the standard of proof has been reached the presumption of innocence is overcome and 
a conviction may be entered against the accused. If however, the fact-finder thinks 
that the standard of proof has just barely been met, but that it depends on what precise 
definition of the standard of proof is applied, then the fact-finder should rule in favour 
of the accused, following the in dubio pro reo principle discussed below. 
Somewhat incongruously, the presumption of innocence does not require a 
finding of innocence when an accusation is not proven to the relevant standard of 
proof, rather it merely prevents conviction.110 This is the result of the different 
definitions of innocence. The presumption of innocence, as a legal presumption, is 
only concerned with legal innocence and not factual or moral innocence. Legal 
innocence exists when the prosecution fails to prove the elements of the crime alleged 
against the accused, regardless of whether the defendant actually committed the 
crimes with which he or she is charged. Ideally this would be the same as the 
accused’s factual innocence vis-à-vis the accusation, but it is beyond the fact-finder’s 
role or ability to ensure that this is so. When the court determines that there is not 
enough proof for conviction they are determining that the accused is legally innocent 
of the charges, which is expressed as ‘not guilty’. However, the court is unwilling 
(and unable) to go beyond that determination to state that the accused is morally or 
factually innocent. 
If the standard of proof is not met then the presumption of innocence, as a 
legal presumption, is not overcome. This results in the presumption of innocence 
remains intact and it creates two related results: 1) a conviction cannot be entered 
against the accused; and 2) the accused cannot be punished for the alleged criminal 
activity. If this finding is the result of a final determination, then the accused is 
acquitted. If an accusation or investigation is discontinued, the presumption of 
innocence remains in place as to those charges and the accused continues to benefit 
from it until such time as the allegations are tried to a final determination.  
If the standard of proof is met at trial then the accused is convicted of the 
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charges. They can be referred to as guilty of those specific charges and can be 
punished. The presumption of innocence, with respect to the particular charges for 
which the individual is being punished would not extend to the sentencing phase 
because at that point, the accused has already been convicted.111 It is important to note 
however, that the presumption of innocence does not end with respect to any other 
crimes alleged against the accused. As a presumption, the presumption of innocence 
is specific to the particular criminal accusation against the accused, thus, for future 
accusations the individual retains their right to the presumption of innocence for the 
new trial.  
1. The presumption of innocence is an instruction to the fact-finder 
 
Fact-finders must respect the presumption of innocence. Their duty with 
regard to the presumption of innocence is elevated beyond their status as public 
officials, and requires an extra duty that specifically arises during the criminal trial.112 
That is: they must find the accused innocent until proven guilty to the required 
standard of proof.113 This is a direction to the fact-finder as to the decision they must 
make regarding the guilt of the accused unless there is sufficient proof to overturn the 
presumption.  
As an instruction for the fact-finder, the presumption of innocence helps 
provide certainty, consistency, and fairness in criminal trial by providing the fact-
finder with a starting point at the beginning of trial before evidence is submitted. 
Often, it is said that the fact-finder should have an ‘open mind’ when making 
decisions about the accused’s guilt.114 It has been argued that this means the fact-
finder must approach each case with a completely open mind as to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused.115 This may be true when they are evaluating the evidence 
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and determining whether the standard of proof has been met, however, at the 
beginning of a case nothing could be farther from the truth. The presumption of 
innocence means that a fact-finder ‘should not start with the preconceived notion that 
the accused has committed the offence charged’.116 This however requires more than 
merely a neutral fact-finder because of the presumption of innocence’s function as a 
presumption. At the beginning of a trial, the presumption aspect of the presumption of 
innocence requires the fact-finder’s decision to already be settled with regard to the 
question of the accused’s legal guilt. All the fact-finder knows about the accused is 
the accusation and thus, there has been no proof or evidence submitted, the standard 
of proof is not met, and therefore the presumption has not been overcome. The 
requirements inherent in the presumption, including the need for sufficient proof 
meeting a certain evidentiary standard, create assurances that every fact-finder, at the 
beginning of the case, would find the accused innocent until such time that adequate 
evidence is introduced.  
This assurance provides certainty that all fact-finders are starting at the same 
point – that the accused is legally innocent. A presumption of guilt would be as 
consistent as the presumption of innocence at the start of trial because all fact-finders 
would enter a trial with their mind made up that the accused is guilty. They would 
maintain this throughout trial unless something happened to change their mind 
(presumably proof of the accused’s innocence, or the presence of some doubt about 
the accused’s guilt is proved to a certain standard). A presumption of guilt has many 
of the same advantages as a presumption of innocence. It would provide a consistent 
starting point for the mind-set of the fact-finder at the outset of trial. It would also 
presumably provide instructions as to how that presumption could be overcome. 
Therefore, although the accused would be in a far more difficult position if he or she 
were presumed to be guilty, at least he or she would be aware of that standard and be 
able to prepare a defence designed to change the fact-finder’s mind. 
In the absence of a rule such as the presumption of innocence, or indeed, a 
presumption of guilt, there would be no instruction to the fact-finder as to where to 
start the case. Thus, it is more interesting to envision a neutral fact-finder starting trial 
with a completely open mind. This scenario would create inconsistency as to how 
fact-finders approached trials on two different levels: first different fact-finders would 
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start with different opinions as to the accused’s guilt, so each case would be highly 
dependent on the identity and mind-set of the fact-finder; and second, depending on 
the facts and the crimes alleged, there would likely be inconsistent starting points 
between different cases before the same fact-finder. There would be no way of 
knowing how the fact-finder would rule in any case at the accusation phase. Each case 
would be dependent on each fact-finder and their particular mood, emotions, and 
biases, and thus would contravene the rule of law. A fact-finder could start a trial 
thinking that the accused is guilty, innocent, maybe guilty, maybe innocent, or with 
no opinion whatsoever. The prosecution and the defence would have no way of 
knowing what the fact-finder was thinking at the start of trial and so would not be 
able to effectively provide enough proof to change their mind. This would likely 
result in more inconsistent and less accurate trial outcomes.  
The open-mindedness of the fact-finder is relevant to the evaluation of the 
evidence and the question of whether the standard of proof has been met. Once 
evidence is presented, the presumption of innocence remains in place unless and until 
the fact-finder has determined that the standard of proof has been met. To do this this, 
the fact-finder must have an open mind about the evidence presented. To determine 
whether the standard of proof has been met the evidence must be evaluated for its 
strength and credibility. The fact-finder must determine that the evidence as a whole 
has satisfied each element of the alleged crime(s) to the appropriate standard of proof. 
Thus, the presumption of innocence is not a restatement of the standard of 
proof. Even in a scenario where there is no presumption of innocence but there is a 
specific standard of proof, there would still be wide inconsistencies between fact-
finders. If, in this scenario, the proof had to reach ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ for a 
conviction, a fact-finder who believes that the accused is innocent from the start 
would require far more proof than a fact-finder who thinks the accused might be 
guilty and even more than the fact-finder who thinks the accused is probably guilty. In 
each situation enough proof could be provided to reach the standard of proof, but the 
amount required by each would be wildly different because each judge would begin 
the case with his or her opinion of the accused’s guilt at a different starting point. 
Instead, the presumption of innocence provides the starting point for the fact-finder’s 
opinion of the accused’s guilt. This helps provide consistency and fairness in criminal 
proceedings. 
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2. in dubio pro reo 
 
In dubio pro reo, a general principle of law, is part of the presumption of 
innocence as a legal presumption.117 In dubio pro reo instructs the fact-finder about 
what to do when the evidence would point either way, toward or away from the 
accused’s guilt. Further, it tells the fact-finder how to act in close cases or situations 
where the evidence is unclear. 
In dubio pro reo means that any instances of doubt regarding the evidence 
should be construed in favour of the accused.118 This is regardless of whether the 
doubt is to the ultimate finding or in the factual findings.119 Despite its reference to 
doubt, in dubio pro reo does not require the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of 
proof.120 Further, it does not require a decision to be absolutely certain. It merely 
requires that the decision of guilt be based solely on the trial’s evidence and that if 
there is a doubt as to any finding, it be construed in the accused’s favour.121  
The in dubio pro reo principle is related to the presumption of innocence’s 
purpose of not punishing innocent people.122 To do this it works in conjunction with 
the standard of proof to ensure that the right person is convicted of a crime that was 
actually committed. It forces the fact-finder to ensure that the standard of proof is met 
for each element of the crime by instructing the fact-finder as to what to do in cases of 
doubt or uncertainty. This helps bolster the presumption of innocence by providing 
reassurance that a legally guilty person is being punished because it forces the 
standard of proof to be entirely met rather than almost met. If this is combined with a 
high standard of proof, then conviction should only occur in cases of near certain 
legal guilt. 
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In dubio pro reo particularly comes up in cases where the evidence is 
circumstantial. Circumstantial, rather than direct evidence, tends to work together as 
pieces of a puzzle to prove guilt and may require some inference on the part of the 
fact-finder to link the pieces together. Direct evidence, on the other hand, shows that a 
crime was committed or that the accused committed that crime without requiring an 
inference.123 As held at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
to find guilt from circumstantial evidence, it must be the ‘only reasonable conclusion 
available. If there is another reasonable conclusion which is also reasonably open 
from that evidence, and which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, he 
must be acquitted.’124 
In jurisdictions where there is a judicial panel or jury that does not require a 
unanimous verdict for conviction the in dubio pro reo principle can have interesting 
consequences. International jurisdictions, and some national jurisdictions, do not 
require a unanimous verdict for a conviction.125 It is unclear whether a less than 
unanimous verdict for guilt could mean that the standard of proof has been met. If 
there are one or more fact-finders who do not think it has been met, it seems that that 
doubt should be construed in the accused’s favour.  
In dubio pro reo may also extend the presumption of innocence, as it relates to 
the fact-finder, to pre-trial decisions. Courts and commentators however, are torn on 
this issue. Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court held that in dubio 
pro reo can apply to all stages of court proceedings. 126  Conversely, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I found that a denial of the confirmation of charges is not based on in dubio 
pro reo but rather on a failure to meet the evidentiary threshold set out in Article 
61(7) of the Statute.127 Any presumption of innocence at an earlier stage of the 
proceedings, including a recognition of in dubio pro reo, makes logical sense because 
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to not allow for the presumption of innocence would be a contradiction. It would be 
awkward and strange for a fact-finder to not uphold the presumption of innocence 
prior to trial and suddenly switch to upholding it during trial.128 However, this may 
signal a difference between the procedural and non-procedural aspects of the 
presumption of innocence. Technically a presumption only needs to be upheld during 
trial, while the non-procedural aspect applies in other contexts. Further, not having the 
presumption exist during the pre-trial proceedings could be remedied by having 
different fact-finders at pre-trial and trial proceedings, such as between the different 
chambers in international criminal law, domestic cases where the jury is the trial fact-
finder, and civil law cases where there is a different judge for the trial stage. 
Regardless, any presumption of innocence recognized by a pre-trial fact-finder would 
work with a lesser standard of proof than at trial because pre-trial matters do not 
directly decide the guilt or innocence of the accused. 129 Therefore, a finding against 
the accused in pre-trial matters would not overcome the presumption of innocence at 
trial by being used against a lesser standard of proof pre-trial. 
3. strict liability 
 
There is some question as to whether strict liability offences may be 
compatible with the presumption of innocence. Strict liability offences remove the 
need to prove the mens rea requirement of an offence.130 Thus, for at least some of the 
elements of an offence, there is no standard of proof. Rather than violating the 
presumption of innocence, strict liability is an example of how the presumption does 
not require a high standard of proof.131 
Strict liability is often considered necessary in situations where the accused 
must have known that a particular fact in question existed, even if there is no proof of 
that knowledge.132 It can be argued that this occurs in international criminal law with 
regard to command responsibility. This is because command responsibility has the 
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mens rea of ‘known or should have known’.133 The ‘should have known’ mens rea 
does not require proof of actual knowledge and could theoretically allow a military 
commander who genuinely did not know that his subordinates were engaging in 
criminal behaviour to be held responsible for those crimes. A similar argument could 
be made regarding the ‘should have known’ mens rea of Article 6(e) of the Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, which describes the crime of genocide by forcibly 
moving children of one group to another.134 However, ‘should have known’ requires 
some proof as it implies at least some type of negligence on behalf of the accused.135 
Thus, strict liability is not formally a part of international criminal law.136 It is 
however, relatively common in national jurisdictions. 
 Sexual offences involving children as victims may be the most common 
example of strict liability in domestic jurisdictions. Often prosecutors are not required 
to prove that the accused knew how old the child was at the time of the offence.  
Instead, merely proving the age of the child satisfies the element of the crime.137 
While there are ages of children where it is obvious to anyone that the person in 
question is a child, for example a six year old could not be mistaken for a sixteen year 
old, this is particularly difficult to reconcile with the presumption of innocence when 
the victim is near the age of consent. In an instance where the victim is close to the 
statutorily required age of consent, such as a year or a few months younger, then it 
would be not necessarily be apparent under the circumstances that the victim was 
underage. In this instance it would not necessarily follow that the accused possessed 
the requisite intent to have sexual relations with a child because it is not necessarily 
obvious under the particular circumstances that the victim was a child. Regardless, 
this type of strict liability has been held to be in accordance with the presumption of 
innocence and is widely used in national jurisdictions.138  
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That is not the only permissible type of strict liability crimes allowed. The 
European Court of Human Rights allows strict liability at the discretion of national 
jurisdictions. This was demonstrated in Salabiaku v France in which an applicant 
went through French customs enforcement with a package containing drugs, which he 
claimed to have thought was a package he was expected to retrieve, the contents of 
which were unknown to him.139 The European Court upheld the French Customs 
Code provision providing that a person is criminally liable when he or she is in 
physical possession of an item that he introduced to France without a customs 
declaration. By doing so, the Court held that states parties could punish behaviour that 
was merely an objective fact, regardless of the criminal intent or negligence on the 
part of the actor so long as the law otherwise complies with the European 
Convention.140 This was justified because the domestic courts had found an ‘element 
of intent’ because the accused had been advised by an airline official to not take 
possession of the package unless it belonged to him.141 This element of intent was 
implied because the code provided that a defendant could be acquitted if they could 
prove force majeure or that they did not know that the items were in their 
possession.142  
The European Court of Human Rights is uneasy with the relationship between 
strict liability and the presumption of innocence. The Court requires an ‘element of 
intent’ and a ‘genuine power of assessment’ of the guilt of the accused when alleging 
strict liability crimes, however what those constitute in practice is unclear.143 For 
example, in Lingens and Leitgeb v Austria, the Court held that although there was no 
need to prove intent in a defamation case, the requirement that the accused prove truth 
as a defence did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof in criminal defamation 
cases.144 This means that while the prosecution did not need to prove intent, the 
defence could be acquitted if they provided proof that they could not have formed the 
intent to defame. This seems to absolve the prosecution of the standard of proof while 
requiring the defence to bear a burden.  
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Strict liability comes into conflict with the presumption of innocence because 
it calls into question what elements the standard of proof applies to. Further, by not 
requiring mens rea for certain important elements, such as whether the victim is under 
a particular age or whether someone intentionally possessed drugs, it necessarily 
helps the prosecutor meet the standard of proof for the relevant element. For the 
prosecutor to prove that the individual intended to possess drugs requires more proof 
than merely proving that the accused possessed drugs. 
This may raise questions about fairness and justice, as it allows for a finding 
of criminal responsibility when the defendant lacked the intention of engaging in 
criminal behaviour. It may also trigger questions about whether the presumption of 
innocence as a human right is being respected during legislative drafting. As a legal 
presumption at trial however, the presumption of innocence is not violated by strict 
liability. As a presumption, the presumption of innocence requires some proof that the 
crime was committed by the accused to be provided by someone other than the 
accused. Further it is required that the provided proof must meet a particular standard. 
With regards to the presumption of innocence, the standard of proof can be high or 
low depending on the jurisdiction and elements of the crime.145 A lower standard may 
not be ideal, and may cause some factually innocent people to be found guilty, but it 
does not violate the presumption of innocence. 
D. Waiver 
As with other rights, the presumption of innocence may be waived. This 
however, only occurs when the accused pleads guilty to a charge against him or 
her.146 A guilty plea is a request on the part of the accused for the fact-finder to enter a 
finding of guilt.147 While it could be considered an admission of the events as alleged 
by the prosecutor, it is actually bypassing the standard of proof. By requesting a 
finding of guilt the accused is stating that the prosecutor has, or could have, enough 
evidence for conviction and that the evidence is credible enough to have no need to 
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challenge it through a formal trial. Thus, the accused is agreeing that the standard of 
proof is met.  
There are particular requirements that must be met in order for a fact-finder to 
accept a guilty plea and enter a conviction against the accused. Those are that the 
accused must enter into the plea voluntarily and knowingly, and the plea must be 
unequivocal and factually based.148 These requirements help protect the accused from 
waiving his trial rights for some reason other than that the guilty plea reflects the 
truth, and that the plea was not a result of undue pressure. This helps fulfil the 
presumption of innocence’s purpose of preventing innocent people from being 
punished or treated as if they are guilty. 
A guilty plea is the only manner in which the presumption of innocence can be 
waived. This is different from a confession. A confession may admit culpability, but it 
does not have the same safeguards as a guilty plea. A confession is a piece of proof 
against the accused. As a result, the confession’s reliability and veracity can be 
questioned at trial. Additionally, a confession is usually a narrative from which the 
prosecutor can argue elements of the crime have been proven, whereas the guilty plea 
involves acknowledgement on the part of the accused that the specific elements of the 
crime have been proven, without requiring the prosecution to actually submit the 
evidence to the required standard of proof. 
A guilty plea must have a factual basis as the accused is conceding to 
operative facts in the prosecutor’s evidence file. 149  In the common law and 
international law systems this requires the accused to state which facts they are 
conceding to, but a full explanation of the alleged events is not required.150  In civil 
law systems a proceeding resembling a mini-trial may be held in which the judge 
reviews the evidence in the case dossier and concludes after the review that sufficient 
evidence exists for the accused to be able to concede guilt. Further, like the waiver of 
other rights, the accused must be of sound mind and understand what they are giving 
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up.151 Guilty pleas must be unequivocal in their acceptance that the prosecutor could 
prove the case against them and that the accused has no legal defences to raise at 
trial.152 
E. Conclusion - The presumption of innocence is a presumption 
At trial the presumption of innocence is a legal presumption. It requires the 
fact-finder to assume a fact, that the accused is not guilty, unless all of the elements of 
the crime are proven to the relevant standard of proof. The presumption of innocence 
works with the burden and standard of proof but is a restatement of neither. As a 
presumption it mandates that the burden of proof cannot be placed on the accused, 
because the accused is never obligated to prove his or her innocence. Further it is the 
mental starting point for the fact-finder before the submission of sufficient evidence 
to reach the standard of proof. The procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence 
remains in place until there is sufficient proof to overcome the presumption. 
There are some scholars who argue that the presumption of innocence either 
lacks practical use or is a rule of thumb to guide the fact-finder but is not necessary 
for the fact-finder to use in a rigid sense. Practice however, indicates that the 
presumption of innocence is a legal presumption. As expressed in judicial decisions 
and statutory law, the presumption of innocence requires fact-finders to find for the 
accused unless the standard of proof is met; the burden of proof cannot fall to the 
accused; and pleading guilty waives the presumption of innocence. 
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Chapter 4. The Non-Procedural Aspect of the Presumption of Innocence 
 
 The second aspect of the presumption of innocence concerns how the accused 
is treated before, during and after trial. This non-procedural aspect is much broader 
than the first aspect, however must still be tied to criminal procedure. This aspect 
describes things that occur outside of the actual trial that can affect how the accused is 
seen during trial. Thus, this aspect has a direct bearing on the rule of law and the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice process.   
This chapter examines the non-procedural aspect of the presumption of 
innocence. It starts by discussing the fact that the presumption of innocence is more 
than a legal presumption and that it has application beyond trial. The subsequent 
sections provide examples of what type of behaviour the second aspect of the 
presumption of innocence prohibits and why it is important to proscribe this type of 
behaviour. The examples focus on statements of guilt by public authorities, actions by 
the media, and that accused people should not be treated in the same manner as 
people who have been found to be legally guilty. The chapter concludes that all of 
these behaviours that interfere with the presumption of innocence are concerned with 
either affecting the opinion of the fact-finder or undermining the legitimacy of the 
courts or criminal justice system. As a result the second aspect of the presumption of 
innocence is largely concerned with things that happen outside the courtroom that 
may affect a fair trial for the accused.  
A. The presumption of innocence is more than a presumption 
The presumption of innocence exists outside of the courtroom and requires 
duties beyond those imposed on the fact-finder during trial. This is because of the 
presumption of innocence’s main purpose, which is to prevent people from being 
treated as if they are guilty when they have not been convicted of a crime.
1 The Human Rights Committee, in General Comment 13, stated that the 
presumption of innocence ‘implies a right to be treated in accordance with this 
principle [of presuming guilt before the charge has been proven beyond reasonable 
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doubt]’.2 Further, the European Commission of Human Rights found that ‘[i]t is a 
fundamental principle embodied in [the presumption of innocence] which protects 
everybody against being treated by public officials as being guilty of an offence 
before this is established according to law by a competent court.’3 The European 
Court of Human Rights and the International Criminal Court recognise that the 
presumption of innocence has two aspects – the procedural presumption and one that 
is broader and extends beyond the trial itself.4  This is clear evidence that the 
presumption of innocence can exist outside of the trial context and it expands the 
understanding of the burden holder to public officials. It also offers a blanket 
prohibition on treating individuals who have not been convicted of a crime as if they 
are guilty, without a limitation as to where that treatment might occur. 
That the presumption of innocence can apply pre-trial is not a unique idea. 
While some limit the presumption of innocence to a specific legal presumption at 
trial, many jurisdictions explicitly tie it to all pre-trial proceedings.5 Limiting the 
presumption of innocence solely to trial would only make sense if the presumption of 
innocence is merely a legal presumption. However, the presumption of innocence has 
the purpose of preventing people from being treated as if they are guilty without a 
conviction. One way that the presumption of innocence manifests itself in pre-trial 
proceedings is in the application of the in dubio pro reo principle. This is certainly the 
case at the International Criminal Court where the Pre-Trial Chamber must be guided 
by at least the principle of in dubio pro reo during pre-trial decisions.6 
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The pre-trial presumption of innocence is different however from the legal 
presumption at trial. First, the procedural aspect only makes sense when making 
decisions of guilt, and that only happens during trial. This is because the presumption 
can only be overcome by a determination that there has been sufficient evidence 
provided by the state to meet the required standard of proof. This cannot happen in 
pre-trial decisions because those decisions are not determining whether the individual 
is guilty of a crime.  
The presumption of innocence also exists in pre-trial proceedings because 
court officials cannot pre-judge the accused as guilty. Court officials have a duty to 
not pre-judge the outcome of the case or enter the case with a preconceived notion of 
guilt.7 Surely, this would extend to all pre-trial proceedings, because the decisions 
made pre-trial, such as evidential hearings, can affect the outcome of the case. For 
example, if a pre-trial judge believes that the accused is guilty the judge may be less 
likely to exclude evidence from trial that would normally be excluded. If this happens, 
then that evidence could be seen by the fact-finder at trial, and could affect their 
decision as to the accused’s guilt.  
 That the presumption of innocence can exist outside of trial procedure is 
further demonstrated in most of the statutes and rules of the international and regional 
courts and tribunals. It is most clearly found in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court where the presumption of innocence is a separate article from the 
minimum procedural rights set out in Article 67.8 The 1996 Preparatory Committee 
Draft further supports the idea that the presumption of innocence extends beyond 
trial.9 The travaux préparatoires address the idea that the presumption of innocence 
was meant to extend beyond trial as there was a disagreement during the negotiation 
of the Statute as to whether the presumption of innocence was to be placed in the 
‘General Principles’ part of the Statute or the part entitled ‘The Trial’.10 Although it 
was ultimately decided to categorise it as part of ‘The Trial’, the fact that its 
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placement was recognised as an issue implies that the presumption of innocence may 
not strictly be a procedural right. Finally, Trial Chamber V(A) recognized that Article 
14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights describes the 
presumption of innocence as a ‘right.’11 The European Convention on Human Rights, 
American Convention on Human Rights, ad hoc Tribunals, Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and Special Court for 
Sierra Leone all include their provisions on the presumption of innocence in the same 
article as the rest of the defence trial rights, but in a paragraph separated from the 
general list of minimum procedural rights.12 Of the jurisdictions studied, only the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights lists the presumption of innocence 
among the minimum procedural guarantees. 13  Considering the presumption of 
innocence separately from the court or tribunal’s general list of minimum fair trial 
rights is evidence that the presumption of innocence is different from those guarantees 
and can exist outside of trial.  
 One of the main arguments supporting a narrow interpretation of the 
presumption of innocence is that other rights act to protect individuals from the harms 
that are allegedly protected by a wider presumption of innocence.14 These other rights 
include the rights to liberty, property and privacy.15 Theorists following the narrow 
conception of the presumption of innocence believe that the presumption has no place 
outside of the context of trial. The theorists with the narrowest views, such as Lippke 
and Laudan, see the presumption of innocence as merely a legal presumption that has 
no application outside of trial itself, as presumptions are only within the duties of the 
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fact-finder to uphold.16 Commentators who hold a somewhat wider view believe that 
the presumption of innocence extends to pre-trial proceedings but only because it 
does not make sense for the court to have a presumption of innocence at trial but not 
while making pre-trial decisions.17 For these theorists, there is no need to extend the 
presumption of innocence further because other rights provide the same protections. 
Thomas Weigend, for example, argues that rather than extending the presumption of 
innocence outside of the courtroom setting, a balancing test with respect to other 
rights could be used to protect individuals from being treated too poorly before a 
conviction.18 This test would consider the severity of the alleged crime, the evidence 
against the person, and the degree of suspicion.19 Weigend argues that where the 
crime is more severe and the evidence against the individual is particularly strong, 
there is greater justification for infringing on the accused’s rights without implicating 
the presumption of innocence.20 This conception of the presumption of innocence 
however, fails to fully consider the presumption’s purpose to prevent individuals from 
being treated as guilty prior to a conviction. The idea that individual rights could be 
balanced against the seriousness of the crime and the strength of the evidence does 
not prevent people from being treated as if they are guilty without a conviction. An 
extreme example of a person alleged to have committed a very serious crime, such as 
murder, where the evidence points to guilt to near certainty, such as being found 
standing over the body with the weapon in hand, would justify a restriction of rights 
on par with guilt despite the fact that there has been no trial or conviction, and the 
investigation may not even be complete. Allowing for this kind of treatment of 
accused persons would permit treatment up to and including punishment, which 
would obviate the need to continue the investigation or trial. While it is true that there 
may be some overlap or interaction between a wide presumption of innocence and 
other rights, this redundancy does not mean that the presumption of innocence is not 
relevant outside of trial. Instead, overlap between the presumption of innocence and 
another right might indicate the boundaries of the two rights and place limits on 
investigation so that the investigation and pre-trial processes do not become 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Richard L Lippke, Taming the Presumption of Innocence (OUP 2016); Larry Laudan, 
‘The Presumption of Innocence: Material or Probatory?’ (2005) 11(4) Legal Theory 333. 
17 Schwikkard (n 1) 405; Trechsel (n 1). 
18 Weigend (n 14) 199. 
19 Ibid; DeAngelis (n 15) 49. 
20 Weigend (n 14) 199. 
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punishment or pre-punishment.21 The presumption of innocence is required to ensure 
that there are no gaps through which individuals could be treated as guilty without a 
conviction. If this kind of treatment were permitted, then there would be no need for 
criminal trials or the presumption of innocence because one could be punished 
without conviction. 
There are two components to not treating someone as if they are legally guilty 
in a non-trial context.  The first involves not imposing unjustified sanctions on 
individuals and the second is reputational.  The first component is rather obvious and 
goes with the presumption of innocence’s purpose as a fair trial right. In the 
courtroom, the presumption prevents punishment without a conviction by providing 
the fact-finder with instructions about the circumstances that must be present before a 
conviction can be found against the accused.22 Because those circumstances are the 
only circumstances which can result in a conviction, and a conviction is the only 
sanctioned road to punishment, then outside of the courtroom, the presumption of 
innocence also has a role in preventing unjustified punishments or sanctions for 
criminal acts. The second consideration is less obvious and mandates that people not 
encourage others to perceive or treat a particular individual as guilty.23 It accepts that 
people have freedom of thought and that they may hold opinions about other people 
regardless of whether the other person has been convicted of a crime.  However, it 
imposes some limit on the ability of the person holding that opinion to act on or 
express that opinion. A violation of the presumption of innocence can occur if the 
opinion becomes action and the person about whom the opinion suffers damage to his 
or her reputation as a result of that opinion.  
Both considerations have to do with the presumption of innocence’s 
relationship to fairness and justice. It is neither fair nor just that the treatment imposed 
on people who have been convicted of a crime should be inflicted on people who have 
not been convicted. Permitting punishment without a conviction eliminates one of the 
purposes of criminal procedure and reduces the importance of convictions. Both 
fairness and justice also relate to the reputation of the individual. People must not be 
treated as guilty so that the wider community will not believe them to be guilty.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops Theory and Practice of International and Internationalised 
Criminal Proceedings (Klewer Law International 2005) 48. 
22 See Chapter 3 discussing the procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence. 
23 See Trechsel (n 1) 156. 
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Not treating people as though they have been convicted of a crime can be 
different from treating people as if they are innocent. There is a whole range of 
behaviour between the treatment that an innocent person should receive and the 
treatment that is allowed toward a guilty person. Individuals that have not been 
convicted of anything may be treated with suspicion, doubt, or mistrust, but such 
treatment should not be equated to the treatment endured by someone who has been 
convicted of a crime. The presumption of innocence provides the upper permissible 
limit of such treatment by indicating how severe the treatment can get before it is 
deemed unacceptable. That is, a non-convicted person may not receive the same 
treatment as someone who has been found legally guilty. That limit will be different 
depending on the context and whether the treatment is imposed by public authorities 
or private individuals. What follows are accepted examples of the specific limits. 
B. Public statements of guilt 
Public authorities must refrain from making statements regarding the guilt of 
people who are accused, but not convicted, of crimes. General Comment 32 of the 
Human Rights Committee specifically states that public authorities have the duty to 
not make public statements of guilt against an accused person.24 The regional human 
rights courts and the International Criminal Court have held that statements about an 
individual’s guilt made by a public authority can violate the presumption of innocence 
when such statements are made before a finding of legal guilt.25 Statements that 
comment on the guilt of an accused person will violate the presumption of innocence, 
although statements of suspicion will still be allowed. There are several reasons why 
statements reflecting the opinion that someone is guilty of a crime without he or she 
having been convicted will violate the presumption of innocence. The statement could 
show that the government has prejudged the case against the accused, exposure to the 
statement could cause the fact-finder’s opinion to be tainted, the public may believe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 32: Right of Equality Before Courts and 
Tribunals and to Fair Trial’ (23 August 2007) UN Doc No CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007) para 39. 
25 Daktaras v. Lithuania ECHR 2000-X 489, paras 41-42; Viorel Burzo (n 4) para 157; 
Allenet de Ribemont (n 4) para 36. The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, 
‘Principles And Guidelines On The Right To A Fair Trial And Legal Assistance In Africa’ 
DOC/OS(XXX) (2003) (African Guidelines) art N(6)(e)(ii) (public authorities); Krause (n 3); 
Allenet de Ribemont (n 4) paras 35-6; International Pen and Others v Nigeria (Decision) 
Comm Nos 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (31 October 1998); Prosecutor v 
Mbarushimana (Decisions on Defence Request for an Order to Preserve the Impartiality of 
the Proceedings) ICC-01/04-01/10-51, PT Ch I (31 January 2011); Gaddafi (n 4). 
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that the accused is guilty as result of the statement, and the statement itself could treat 
the accused as guilty of an offence. 
1. Public authorities must not make statements of guilt 
 
Public authorities are defined as anyone who works in government and in 
some cases extends to individuals exercising quasi-governmental authority. In 
national jurisdictions, public authorities encompass, but are not limited to, 
prosecutors, police, government ministers, judges, and legislators.26   As is discussed 
in the following sections, the strength of a particular public authority’s duty depends 
on his or her relationship to the case in question. It is less clear who qualifies as a 
public authority in an international jurisdiction as there is no ‘government’ in the 
same sense as in a national jurisdiction. At the International Criminal Court, the 
presumption of innocence is specifically a duty borne by all organs of ‘the Court’ and 
it appears that this is true at the other international courts and tribunals as well.27 Both 
the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia have held that their Registry has a duty to uphold the presumption 
of innocence.28 Further, the Registrar at the Special Court for Sierra Leone was 
required to be ‘mindful of the need to ensure respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and particularly the presumption of innocence’ when creating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Allenet de Ribemont (n 4) (holding that public authorities have a duty to not violate the 
presumption of innocence); Allen v. the United Kingdom ECHR 2002-IX 41 (judges are 
included in ‘public official’); Salabiaku v France (1988) Series A no 141-A paras 15-16 
(holding that the legislator is included in ‘public authorities’); GCP v Romania App No 
20899/03 (ECtHR, 20 December 2011) (public prosecutor and minister of the interior making 
statements of guilt); Kuzmin v Russia App No 58939/00 (ECtHR, 18 March 2010) (statement 
of guilt by candidate for public election)). Daktaras (n 25) paras 41-42; Viorel Burzo (n 4) 
para 157; Allenet de Ribemont (n 4) para 36; Böhmer v Germany App No 37568/97 (ECtHR, 
3 October 2002) para 59 See van Dijk, Pieter and Marc Viering (revisors), ‘Chapter 10 Right 
to a Fair and Public Hearing’ in Pieter Van Dijk, Fried van Hoof, Arjen Van Rijn, Leo Zwaak 
(eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th edn, Intersentia 
2006) 625; Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR 
Commentary (NP Engel 1994) 254, para 36. 
27 ICC Statute arts 1, 66; Prosecutor v Lubanga (Decision on the Press Interview with Ms Le 
Fraper du Hellen) ICC-01/04-01/06, T Ch I (12 May 2010); Mbarushimana (n 25); Schabas 
and McDermott (n 3) 1640, para 15. 
28 See Prosecutor v Lubanga (Trial Transcript) ICC-01/04-01/06, T Ch I (9 November 2006) 
(web site ordered to be changed when wrongly listing an individual as accused, rather than a 
suspect before the Confirmation of Charges Hearing); Prosecutor v Popović et al. (Trial 
Transcript) IT-05-88-T, T Ch (9 November 2006) (The Tribunal declared statements 
‘inappropriate’ and contrary to the presumption of innocence when Registry spokesperson 
said that denying the genocide in Bosnia would be ‘shameful’) respectively. See also 
discussion in Schabas and McDermott (n 3) 1640, para 15. 
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and adopting rules for detention.29 While it may be somewhat obvious that individuals 
working for the court or tribunal are ‘public authorities’ for the purpose of 
international criminal justice, the sphere may extend beyond those who work directly 
for the court. At the international level, the term public authorities may also describe 
the United Nations and all of its constituent parts as well as employees of other 
related international organisations.30  
At the international level a broad definition of ‘public authority’ should be 
utilised and the definition extended to include not only court personnel but also 
employees of the United Nations and other groups involved in investigating, 
peacekeeping, or oversight of the incident that resulted in a criminal accusation. 
Unlike national jurisdictions the international courts and tribunals must rely on other 
groups to help with their investigations and enforcement. Those groups that are relied 
on should not be exempt from the requirements of the presumption of innocence 
because to do so would lessen the presumption’s impact and effect. That said, much 
like national public authorities, the further an international public authority is from 
direct involvement in the criminal procedure against the accused, the less likely their 
statements would have influence over the criminal process against the particular 
accused person. Including all of those individuals involved in the criminal process at 
the international level as public authorities would help to balance the power between 
international criminal justice and individuals. 
2. What is a public statement of guilt? 
	  
Public statements of guilt are statements or judicial decisions that ‘reflect an 
opinion that [the accused] is guilty before [the accused] has been proved so according 
to law’.31 The statement does not necessarily have to be explicit but it ‘suffices, even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Court for Sierra Leone (as amended 7 March 
2003) r 33(c); Special Court for Sierra Leone, ‘Rules Governing the Detention of Persons 
Awaiting Trial or Appeal before the Special Court for Sierra Leone or Otherwise Detained on 
the Authority of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“Rules of Detention”) (as amended on 14 
May 2005) <www.rscsl.org/Documents/rulesofdetention.pdf> accessed 16 April 2018 
preamble. 
30 Schabas, ICC Commentary (n 10) 1007; Schabas and McDermott (n 3) 1646, para 28. 
31 For example, Austria v Italy (1961) 7 CD 23; Daktaras (n 25) para 41; Krause (n 3); 
Ismoilov and Others v Russia App No 2947/0649 (ECtHR, 24 April 2008) paras 166-167; 
Deweer v. Belgium (1980) Series A no 35 paras 37, 57; Allenet de Ribemont (n 4) paras 35-
36; Böhmer (n 26) para 59; Fatullayev v Azerbaijan App No 40984/07 (ECtHR, 22 April 
2010) para 160; Nešt’ák v Slovakia App No 65559/01 (ECtHR, 27 February 2007) paras 88-
89; Prosecutor v Popović et al. (Trial Transcript) IT-05-88-T, T Ch (26 March 2007) p 9463. 
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in the absence of any formal finding, that there is some reasoning to suggest that the 
official regards the accused as guilty.’32 It is important, however, to distinguish 
between statements of guilt and statements that reflect that a person is under 
suspicion. Statements that reflect the idea that the accused is under suspicion, but do 
not state that the accused person is guilty, will not violate the presumption of 
innocence.33 A continuing state of suspicion is necessary for criminal procedure to 
continue and thus it is accurate to state that someone is suspected of a crime if there is 
suspicion. A statement of guilt without a conviction however, implies that the 
person’s responsibility for the alleged crime has been prejudged and can lead to the 
accused being treated as if they are guilty. 
Judicial decisions reflecting an opinion that a person is guilty of a crime 
without a conviction first being secured violate the presumption of innocence.34 This 
is not only because the judge, as a fact-finder, is not respecting the first aspect of the 
presumption but also because a judge’s statement about the guilt of an accused both 
suggests that he or she has pre-judged the case that can cause the public to believe 
that the accused is guilty. In Minelli v Switzerland, Minelli was accused of defamation 
in a private prosecution.35 The prosecution was time-barred but Minelli was ordered 
to pay costs, despite no finding of guilt. In its decision, the trial court said that ‘the 
incidence of the costs and expenses should depend on the judgement that would have 
been delivered.’36 The European Court of Human Rights held that this statement by 
the judge violated Minelli’s presumption of innocence because by requiring the 
accused to pay costs, the trial judge essentially stated that the accused was guilty and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This is supported by the finding International PEN (n 25); Minelli v Switzerland (1983) series 
A no 62, para 37; Trechsel (n 1) 164; Stephanos Stavros, The Guarantees for Accused 
Persons under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 
1993) 49, 68-69; David J Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Edward P Bates, Carla M Buckley, 
Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 
2014) 460. 
32 Daktaras (n 25) para 41; Allenet de Ribemont (n 4) para 35; Böhmer (n 26) para 59; 
Fatullayev (n 31) para 160; Ismoilov (n 31) para 166; Nešt’ák (n 31) paras 88-89; Popović 
(Trial Transcript, 26 March 2007) (n 31) p 9463. This is supported by the finding in: 
International PEN (n 25); Minelli (n 31) para 37. 
33 Garycki v Poland App No 14248/02 (ECtHR, 6 February 2007); Lutz v Germany (1987) 
Series A no 123, para 62; Leutscher v the Netherlands ECHR 1996-II 436, para 31. 
34 Allenet de Ribemont (n 4) para 35; Minelli (n 31) paras 27, 30, 37; Garycki (n 33) para 66; 
Deweer  (n 31) para 56; Daktaras (n 25) paras 41-44; Matijašević v Serbia ECHR 2006-X 
127, para 45. 
35Minelli (n 31).  
36 Ibid para 38. 
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applied a sanction despite the absence of a verdict.37 Public statements of guilt by the 
fact-finder before or without a conviction must obviously be prohibited under the 
presumption of innocence.38 These kinds of statements violate both aspects of the 
presumption. 
Judicial decisions however, are not the only instances in which statements of 
guilt by public authorities are prohibited. All public authorities are prohibited from 
making any public statements of guilt about suspects or accused persons.39 Most 
often, it seems these statements are made in the media or press releases. Statements 
by public authorities must not ‘encourage the public to believe the suspect is guilty 
and prejudge the assessment of the facts by the competent judicial authority.’40 Like 
all parts of the presumption of innocence, statements of guilt by public authorities 
must be linked to the criminal process. Statements of guilt made before a person is 
‘charged’ may violate the presumption of innocence once the person is actually 
charged, so long as the statement relates to the specific charges against the accused.41 
If a statement of guilt is made, but no specifically related charges are brought against 
the person,  the presumption of innocence will not be implicated. In the 
Mbarushimana case, the Prosecutor stated that Mbarushimana was a ‘genocidaire’, 
however Mbarushimana was not charged with genocide before the International 
Criminal Court or any other court.42 As a result, the Court held that the statement was 
‘the result of an oversight, rather than an intended statement.’43 Despite the fact that 
some charges were brought against the accused person, those charges were not 
sufficiently linked to the statement of guilt to implicate the presumption of innocence. 
In order to determine whether a statement violates or interferes with the 
presumption of innocence the court will look to the context in which the statement 
was made. In particular, the identity of the person making the statement and the 
conditions under which the statement was made can determine whether the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Minelli (n 31). 
38  Ibid paras 27, 30, 37; Zollman v United Kingdom ECHR 2003-XII 361; Allenet de 
Ribemont (n 4) para 35; Garycki (n 33) para 66; Deweer (n 31) para 56; Daktaras (n 25) paras 
41-44; Matijašević  (n 34) para 45. 
39 African Guidelines (n 25) art N(6)(e)(ii) (public authorities); Nowak (n 26) 254. 
40 X v Netherlands (1981) 27 DR 37; Mbarushimana (n 25) para 161. 
41 Zollman (n 38); Allenet de Ribemont (n 4). 
42 Mbarushimana (n 25), para 14. 
43 Ibid. 
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presumption of innocence has been violated.44 The closer the statement of guilt comes 
to stating that an individual is actually guilty of a particular crime, the more likely it is 
to violate the presumption of innocence.45 What matters most is the actual meaning of 
the statement, not its ‘literal form.’46 It is however, unclear how explicit statements of 
guilt need to be in order to violate the presumption of innocence.47 If any more 
innocuous meaning can be attributed to the statement, it is very unlikely that a 
violation will be found. This makes the choice of terms used and the wording of the 
statement very important.48 Statements of guilt are different from statements that 
convey the idea that someone is suspected of committing a crime. Statements of 
suspicion are permissible both before a final determination and in situations in which 
a final determination is never reached.49 Whether a statement regarding the accused 
by a public authority will be deemed a statement of guilt or a statement of suspicion 
depends on both who is making the statement and how definitive the statement is 
regarding culpability. In order to determine whether a statement violates the 
presumption, courts will make great efforts to consider both the wording of the 
statement and the overall circumstances under which the statement was made. 
One example of the importance of the statement’s context and an innocuous 
meaning being attributed to a prosecutor’s statement regarding an accused person can 
be found in Daktaras v Lithuania.50 In this case, in a quasi-judicial decision to 
continue the charges against the accused, the prosecutor stated that ‘[t]he fact that H. 
Daktaras … intimidated the victim is fully proved by the evidence’.51 The European 
Court of Human Rights held that the use of the word ‘proved’ was not the best choice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Gaddafi (n 4); Daktaras (n 25) para 42; Böhmer (n 26) para 59; Adolf v. Austria (1982) 
Series A no 49, para 36-41; Garycki (n 33); AL v Germany App No 72758/01 (ECtHR, 28 
April 2005) para 31; Pandy v Belgium App No 13583/02 (ECtHR, 21 September 2006) para 
43; Harris, O’Boyle, Bates, Buckley (n 31) 466; Christoph Grabenwarter, European 
Convention on Human Rights (Beck, Hart 2014) 168, para 159. 
45 Ismoilov (n 31) para 166; Nešt’ák (n 31) para 89. 
46 Viorel Burzo (n 4) para 157; Lavents (n 7) para 126. 
47 Stavros (n 31) 69. 
48 Gaddafi (n 4); Mbarushimana (n 25); Daktaras (n 25) para 41; Arrigo and Vella v Malta 
App No 6569/04 (ECtHR, 10 May 2005); Khuzhin and Others v Russia App No 13470/02 
(ECtHR, 23 October 2008) para 94; Viorel Burzo (n 4) para 157; Garycki (n 33) para 70; YB 
(n 4) para 49; Fatullayev (n 31) para 161-162; Stavros (n 31) 69. 
49 Fatullayev (n 31) para 160; Mbarushimana (n 25) para 11; Butkevicius v Lithuania ECHR 
2002-II 349, para 52; Nešt’ák (n 31) para 89; Sekanina v Austria (1993) Series A no 266-A, 
para 30. 
50 Daktaras (n 25). 
51 Ibid para 42. 
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of words, however taken in the context of the specific motion the use of the word 
‘proved’ did not violate of the presumption of innocence.52  
Statements of guilt must also be considered in context as demonstrated in 
Krause v Switzerland.53 In this case the European Commission of Human Rights 
found that a statement by the Swiss Chancellor that the applicant ‘committed common 
law explosive offences and that she must accept responsibility for it’ was not a 
violation of the presumption of innocence.54 Rather, by taking the Chancellor’s whole 
statement into account, and noting that he also stated that the applicant would need to 
stand trial and that the verdict of such a trial remained unknown, the Commission 
found that the Chancellor was informing the public about the prosecution.55 It seems 
very clear from the words of the statement itself that the Chancellor meant to indicate 
that the accused committed the alleged offences. However, the Commission’s 
examination of the statement’s context allows for this alternative interpretation, which 
permits the investigation and criminal proceedings to continue as there is no identified 
violation of the presumption of innocence. 
The Libya Situation at the International Criminal Court provides an example 
of a court taking a more innocuous reading of an apparent statement of guilt.  In an 
interview with Vanity Fair magazine the International Criminal Court’s Prosecutor 
called one of the suspects, Saif Gaddafi, a liar while reviewing statements made by 
Gaddafi about his knowledge of, and involvement in, the alleged incidents leading to 
his indictment.56 The Pre-Trial Chamber held that the statement was ‘inappropriate in 
light of the presumption of innocence.’57 The Court stopped short of saying that the 
presumption of innocence was violated in this case, but stated that the statements 
could potentially be ascribed to the Court as a whole as the Prosecutor is an elected 
official of the Court.58 The Court also found that the Prosecutor was not biased 
because he did not endorse or side with Libya nor did the statements imply that he 
could not carry out his duties.59 According to this judgment a comment can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid. 
53 Krause (n 3). 
54 Ibid. See also X v Austria (1970) 36 CD 79 for a similar situation and finding. 
55 Krause (n 3). 
56  Sands, Philippe, ‘The Accomplice’ Vanity Fair 22 August 2011 
<www.vanityfair.com/news/2011 /08/qaddafi-201108> accessed 16 April 2018. 
57 Gaddafi (n 4) para 33. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid para 35. 
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inappropriate with regard to the presumption of innocence but not violate it if the 
statement does not cast doubt on the Prosecutor’s impartiality. 
This is an interesting finding as it is difficult to believe that publicly calling 
the accused a liar does not show that the Prosecutor is biased against the accused. 
Further, it seems to conflate two related but separate rights – the right to the 
presumption of innocence and the right to an unbiased tribunal. Calling the defendant 
a liar obviously can taint the reputation of the accused, allow their veracity to be 
called into question, and, if it is raised about the particular charges against them, their 
innocence. Stating that the defendant is lying about his or her involvement in the 
situation is different from stating that he is guilty of the charged crimes. Obviously 
one can lie and not commit crimes against humanity or could commit a crime and not 
lie. In this case, the court ascribed a more innocuous meaning to the Prosecutor’s 
statements than might have otherwise been ascribed.  This seems to be an acceptable 
outcome with regard to the presumption of innocence but does raise questions about 
Gaddafi’s ability to receive a fair trial to the extent that the truthfulness of any future 
testimony has already been called into question. 
The International Criminal Court took a similar approach in a situation 
involving an even clearer statement of guilt by the Prosecutor.  In Prosecutor v 
Mbarushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber I also ascribed an innocuous meaning to a 
statement made by the Prosecutor about the defendant. Here, the Prosecutor stated in 
a press release that Calixte Mbarushimana was the leader of Forces démocratiques 
pour la liberation du Rwanda and that members of that group committed more than 
three hundred rapes while the group was under his leadership.60 In ruling that the 
presumption of innocence was not violated by the statement, Pre-Trial Chamber I held 
that it would have been ‘desirable’ for the Prosecutor to couch his statements in terms 
of allegations rather than facts because the statement as worded gives the impression 
that certain facts had already been proven before the Court.61 The Court suggested 
that the Prosecutor could have achieved this by using terms such as ‘there are 
reasonable grounds to believe’ or ‘alleged’ in order to distance the idea of prejudged 
guilt from the accused.62 When one examines the Prosecutor’s statements with the 
elements of the alleged crimes, it could be argued that these statements imply that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Mbarushimana (n 25) para 12. 
61 Ibid para 13. 
62 Mbarushimana (n 25) para 17. 
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most, if not all of the elements of rape as a crime against humanity were proven 
against the accused.63 Thus, although the prosecutor did not state that Mbarushimana 
was guilty, he did essentially state that most, if not all, of the elements of a crime 
charged against him had been proven. The difference between what the Prosecutor 
said and calling the defendant guilty is minimal and yet there was no violation of the 
presumption of innocence because a more innocuous meaning could be ascribed to 
the statements. 
In both Gaddafi and Mbarushimana, the Prosecutor implied that the accused 
was guilty of wrongdoing but in neither instance did the Court find a violation of the 
presumption of innocence. The Prosecutor’s statement in the Gaddafi case calls into 
question the statements, testimony and arguments of the accused, but does not 
explicitly say that the accused is guilty of the alleged crimes. Lying is not a primary 
crime within the Court’s jurisdiction, nor is it a required element of the crimes.64 In 
Mbarushimana, the Prosecutor’s statement more clearly suggests that the accused was 
guilty of some of the crimes alleged, but stops short of explicitly saying so. However, 
the Court looked beyond the statements made by the Prosecutor and focused on their 
context.  This approach allowed the Court to find a more innocuous meaning for 
statements that would otherwise be fairly clear statements about the guilt of the 
accused.  It also leaves open the question of what sort of statement, if any, would 
sufficiently implicate the presumption of innocence before the International Criminal 
Court will be find a violation. 
It is clear that context is extremely important in determining whether a 
statement that comments on someone’s guilt when he or she has not been convicted 
will violate the presumption of innocence. To constitute a violation, public statements 
of guilt must be specific and fairly explicit, because the relevant court will ascribe a 
more innocuous meaning to the statement if possible. In order to avoid violations, but 
still discuss the suspicions against the suspect or accused limiting language is used. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  International Criminal Court, ‘Elements of Crimes’ (2011) <www.icc-
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45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf> accessed 16 April 2018 art 7(1)(g)-1 Crime 
against humanity of rape. 
64 The Court can prosecute people for lying under oath during proceedings before the Court 
itself, however this is not considered a crime for which the Court has jurisdiction. Rather, it is 
to prevent individuals from hindering the administration of justice. See ICC Statute art 70. 
The primary crimes before the court are genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 
See ICC Statute arts 6, 7 and 8 respectively.  
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As the International Criminal Court suggested in Mbarushimana, using words such as 
‘alleged’, ‘suspected’, or ‘accused’ can all help keep statements regarding crimes that 
a particular person has been accused of from becoming a specific statement of guilt.65 
Limiting terms such as these are widely used and preserve the accused person’s 
presumption of innocence while allowing others to comment on the situation and 
avoid charges of defamation. 
3. How do public statements of guilt impact the presumption of 
innocence? 
 
Public authorities’ statements of guilt do not themselves violate the 
presumption of innocence. Instead, it is the effect that the statement has which 
determines whether the presumption is violated.66 While courts are willing to discuss 
whether the presumption of innocence has been violated because of particular 
statements they offer far less discussion about why the statements violate the 
presumption or what impact those statements have on the right to be presumed 
innocent. The relevant courts have found four ways statements of guilt affect the 
presumption of innocence. The statement may: show prejudgment; potentially taint 
the fact-finder; cause the public to believe in the accused’s guilt; and treat the accused 
as guilty. Each of these types of impact will be discussed below and will be related to 
the aspect of the presumption of innocence that is affected. 
   i. Shows prejudgment 
	  
 Courts are primarily concerned that public statements of guilt show 
prejudgment of the facts on the part of the public authority. This is not limited to the 
fact-finder’s statements or indications of prejudgment; all public authorities have a 
duty not to prejudge the facts of a criminal case. As was stated in General Comment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Yvonne McDermott, Fairness in International Criminal Trials (OUP 2016) 42; Situation in 
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Mbarushimana (n 25); Prosecutor v Popović (Trial Transcript, 26 March 2007) (n 31); 
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Rosalind Greenstein (trans) OUP 2011) 664, para 
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66 Prosecutor v Uwinkindi (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic 
of Rwanda Rule 11 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Ref 
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32: ‘It is the duty for all public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a 
trial, e.g. by abstaining from making public statements affirming the guilt of the 
accused.’67 The reason this is so significant is that a prejudgment of the facts by any 
public authority can call into question or undermine the fairness of the criminal 
process.68  
 This was highlighted by the European Court of Human Rights in Allenet de 
Ribemont v France. The case involved a situation in which the French Minister of the 
Interior and two senior police officers, the head of the Crime Squad and the Director 
of the Paris Criminal Investigation Department, gave a press conference regarding the 
future of the French police budget.69 During the press conference they discussed the 
theory of the case against de Ribemont, the responsibility of the parties to the case in 
detail, and called de Ribemont an ‘instigator’ of the alleged crime.70 All of this 
occurred a few weeks before de Ribemont was actually charged with an offence.71 
The European Court found a violation of the presumption of innocence and indicated 
that one reason statements of guilt by public authorities are to be avoided is because 
they prejudge ‘the assessment of the facts by the competent judicial authority.’72 
There is no explanation in the decision as to how the statement demonstrates 
prejudgment of the facts, nor is there any discussion about why this type of statement 
should be avoided under the presumption of innocence. It could be argued that if any 
public authority is prejudging a case’s facts it could either result in a prosecution 
where the investigation is based on bias or it could be an indication that the case has 
been prejudged on a number of different levels of government, which could 
potentially trickle down to the fact-finder. Either would upset the balance of power 
between the government and individuals.   
The International Criminal Court has expressed similar concerns about the 
relationship between pre-conviction statements of guilt and prejudgment of the facts.  
Although the Pre-Trial Chamber ultimately found in Mbarushimana that the context 
of statements made by the Prosecutor mitigated the impression that Mbarushimana 
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70 Ibid. 
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was responsible for these alleged crimes, it also expressed concern that the 
Prosecutor’s statements demonstrated pre-judgment of the facts.73 The Prosecutor’s 
statements in the Gaddafi case similarly show that public statements of guilt affect the 
presumption of innocence by suggesting that the facts have been pre-judged. The 
Court held that the Prosecutor’s statements were ‘inappropriate in light of the 
presumption of innocence’ but did not demonstrate bias against the accused.74 The 
importance of this determination lies in the special role that the Prosecutor has at the 
International Criminal Court. The Prosecutor must investigate all sides of an alleged 
crime including inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.75 While the Prosecutor must 
prosecute individuals accused of crimes, they should do this without bias against the 
individuals. By expressing an opinion about the accused’s guilt the Prosecutor 
essentially abdicated the responsibility it owed to the accused to neutrally investigate 
the crime. 
The Gaddafi case also identifies some potential remedies for when a public 
authority’s statement is inappropriate in light of the presumption of innocence but 
does not show bias and thus disqualification cannot be achieved. The Appeals 
Chamber suggests that either the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber can take action short of 
disqualification to remedy this kind of statement by the prosecutor. 76  Potential 
remedies include: limiting the Prosecutor’s ability to make public statements; 
ordering the Prosecutor to remediate the damage done by the statements; remind the 
Prosecutor about what constitutes appropriate communications to be issued by the 
Office of the Prosecutor; reprimand the Prosecutor for inappropriate behaviour; and 
subject the Prosecutor to misconduct proceedings.77 These possible remedies reflect 
the Court’s concern that the statements of the Prosecutor will reflect badly on the 
Court itself and its awareness that a failure to act could create the impression the 
Court supports the prejudgment. The Appeals Chamber states that this is a concern, at 
least in part because the Prosecutor is a high-ranking official at the Court and because 
statements made by the Prosecutor and the Office of the Prosecutor are frequently 
attributed to the Court itself.78 If the Prosecutor were to make statements that clearly 
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implied that he had prejudged the case and they were attributed to the Court, it could 
also call into question the fairness and impartiality of the judges, the Court and the 
whole institution of the International Criminal Court. While the Prosecutor was not 
found to have violated the presumption of innocence nor was he found to be biased 
against the accused, the Appeals Chamber of the International Court found that the 
statements made by the Prosecutor in the Vanity Fair article could reflect badly not 
only on the Prosecutor and his office, but on the Court as a whole.79 This helps show 
that public statements from someone other than the fact-finder could impute 
prejudgment onto the Court. It also suggests that there is a legitimacy and rule of law 
argument to be made. If the reputation of the whole court could be called into 
question by statements by a public official, then the public may not see that court as 
reputable and the decisions it makes may not be seen as credible or requiring respect. 
Despite this, the Appeals Chamber stopped short of finding a violation of the 
presumption of innocence. They found that the statements were ‘inappropriate’ with 
regard to the presumption of innocence but that the Prosecutor could not be 
disqualified because the statements did not also show bias. By linking the remedy 
sought in the case directly to whether the presumption of innocence was violated and 
whether there was bias on the part of the prosecutor shows that prejudgment is the 
main concern. While the Appeals Chamber suggests further remedies that may be 
sought when the Prosecutor makes an inappropriate but not biased statement against 
the accused, it does not expound upon any other reasons why the prosecutor should 
not be permitted to make inappropriate statements or how inappropriate statements 
might impact the case, the accused, the public, or anything else. 
The European Court of Human Rights also does not directly discuss how 
public statements of guilt show prejudgment, but it is clear that when other public 
authorities make statements of guilt it could be similar to the situation involving the 
Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court in that the statements could be 
attributed to the Court itself. Courts are required to be impartial rendering them 
helpless in the face of negative statements about individual cases. This inability to 
intervene can create the appearance that statements by public authorities regarding the 
guilt of an accused person can also be imputed to the court itself. Further, if some 
public authorities do prejudge the facts of the case, then it might be assumed that all 
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or most public authorities are prejudging the facts which would call into question the 
court’s ability to be fair, uphold the procedural aspect of the presumption of 
innocence, and provide other necessary fair trial rights.  
  ii. Taints the opinion of the fact-finder 
	  
 Another concern regarding public authorities making statements of guilt 
absent a conviction is that the statement might taint the fact-finder’s opinion of the 
case before trial. This is more of an issue when the fact-finder is a jury, but judges are 
not immune to influence.  When the fact-finder is a lay jury, the fear that the jury 
members’ opinions will be tainted by negative statements made by public authorities 
stems from the fact that juries lack training and therefore may not be capable of 
separating statements made outside of the courtroom from the evidence presented 
during trial.80 It has however, been found that it may be possible for a judge to correct 
any persuasive effect an out-of-court statement may have on the jury.81 This suggests 
that there may be instances in which a judge can able to provide instruction to a lay 
jury in order to help ensure that the jury is only considering evidence presented at trial 
when reaching its decision. In turn, this implies that the particular circumstances of 
the statement in relation to the case are important in determining whether a jury can 
ignore out-of-court statements that implicate the guilt of the accused. 
Unlike juries, judges have specialised training in how to evaluate evidence and 
to disregard out-of-court statements when reaching their decisions. 82  The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found in Munyagishari v the Prosecutor 
that this is even true of national judges who have been exposed to public comments 
adverse to the accused who were transferred from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal back 
to the jurisdiction of the Rwandan domestic criminal courts.83 In these cases, senior 
Rwandan officials, including the President of Rwanda and the Rwandan media, made 
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public comments that may have violated the presumption of innocence.84 Notably, in 
the Uwinkindi case, the Tribunal found that Uwinkindi was previously found guilty in 
a Gacaca Court, his sentence and conviction were announced in public in Rwanda and 
placed on display in public for one month, and then, once the accused was arrested, a 
Rwandan pastor expressed his opinion that ‘[a]ll the people that feature on the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda arrest warrant are important enough…. 
Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi would be a big catch.’85 The International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda held that the case could transfer from the Tribunal to the domestic court 
in Rwanda because these activities would not have tainted the fact-finder’s opinion of 
the case as they have specialised training.86 The Tribunal further found that domestic 
Rwandan judges were capable of separating these statements from evidence presented 
in the courtroom as they were specially trained, are prohibited from making public 
comments regarding guilt or innocence before the end of trial, and are held to high 
ethical standards.87 This is an interesting position for the Tribunal to hold. While it is 
true that judges have specialist training and that they should understand and uphold 
the rules of trial, a blanket statement about the ability of local judges to ignore public 
statements of guilt seems rather extreme especially in circumstances like Uwinkindi’s. 
It would seem that whether a judge could ignore outside statements would depend on 
both the individual judge and the context in which the statements were made. 
Whether an out-of-court statement would affect the fact-finder’s opinion could 
be a matter of what kind of fact-finder is used within the particular jurisdiction. It 
seems that there is a general idea that juries are more susceptible to negative 
statements about the accused than judges. When the statement is from a public 
authority, the weight of the statement might be increased in the mind of a lay juror 
because public authorities are understood to have some standing in government. 
Judges however, are seen as less likely to be influenced by statements of guilt by 
public authorities. This is attributed to their specialist training. It is however, hard to 
imagine that the training would ensure that all judges are immune to statements of 
guilt under all circumstances. 
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   iii. May cause the public to believe the accused is guilty 
	  
 When a public authority makes a statement that an accused person is guilty it 
may affect public opinion about the accused individual or the criminal justice process. 
This differs from concerns that a statement will taint the opinion of potential jury 
members, and has more to do with affecting the public’s relationship with the 
criminal justice system in a general sense. While this is a less cited reason to avoid 
public statements of guilt, it has interesting implications for the rule of law.  
The European Court of Human Rights has held that public statements of guilt 
can encourage the general public to believe that the accused person is guilty of a 
crime.88 Interestingly, in Allenet de Ribemont v France this was stated as the first 
reason why public authorities should avoid making declarations of guilt although 
there is no explanation of how statements of guilt are meant to encourage the public to 
believe that the accused is guilty, nor is there explanation as to why that must be 
discouraged. 89  Looking to the explanations of other courts may provide some 
answers. 
 Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court dealt with a similar issue 
during the Lubanga case. While the Lubanga case was on going, an employee of the 
Complementary and Cooperation Division of the Prosecutor’s Office made a remark 
during a press interview about the veracity of the evidence and witnesses and said ‘Mr 
Lubanga is going away for a long time.’90 This statement was found to be prejudicial 
to the accused and to the proceedings as it ‘tend(s) to prejudice the public’s 
understanding of the trial’ and ‘bring(s) the Court into disrepute.’ 91  The Trial 
Chamber was not so much worried that the public will believe that the Prosecutor’s 
witnesses are telling the truth, or that Lubanga was guilty of the accused crimes, but 
that such statements might reflect poorly on the Court itself. Trial Chamber I’s 
concern seems well founded. If the public believes that the Prosecution evidence is 
accurate based on statements to the press, and the Court finds otherwise, then the 
legitimacy of the Court could be called into question. Additionally, if the Court is 
seen as making statements discussing the accuracy and truthfulness of witnesses and 
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intermediaries that the public knows are not true, then the Court will be seen as 
unreliable.   Further, the legitimacy and fairness of the Court could be called into 
question. 
The African Commission on Human Rights dealt with a different kind of 
concern arising from statements which cause the public to believe that the accused is 
guilty of the charged offences.  At issue were public statements of guilt being 
purposefully used to convince the public that the accused was guilty in order for the 
government to fulfil a political aim. In Communications 222/98 and 229/99, Law 
Office of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan, the Commission found that the government 
declared three individuals accused of terrorism guilty of the allegations in an effort to 
convince the public that a coup had been attempted.92 In this case the government 
organised publicity around the case specifically to convince the public that the 
arrested individuals were responsible for an attempted coup. The statements of guilt 
were found to be a violation of the accuseds’ presumption of innocence because they 
declared the guilt of the accused individuals without first obtaining a conviction 
against them. The statements were clearly meant to convince the public of the 
accuseds’ guilt and responsibility for the alleged attempted coup. The reason that the 
government wanted the public to believe that the individuals were guilty was to 
further the government’s political aim. 
 The practice of looking to the context of the statement and finding that 
relatively clear statements of guilt do not violate the presumption of innocence 
implies that courts and tribunals are more worried that there may have been some 
prejudgement of the case or that the fact-finder might be tainted, than with the 
manipulation of public opinion. While there is recognition that the presumption of 
innocence prevents statements of guilt that might convince the public that the accused 
are guilty of the alleged offences, there is very little explanation of how that works or 
why such statements should be avoided. One idea is that statements which encourage 
the public to unnecessarily stigmatise accused individuals or carry out informal 
punishments, should be avoided, but the case law does not support this notion. It 
appears that the apprehension is more about how it would undermine the justice 
system if public officials’ statements act to convince the general public of the 
accused’s guilt.  Further, if the subsequent trial were to result in an outcome other 
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than guilt after the public had become convinced that the accused is guilty it could 
also undermine the general trust in the rule of law and legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system. Finally, there seems to be some concern that the government could 
make public statements of guilt to further political aims. Instances like this may be 
rare, but if successful, can lower the trust that the public has in government and 
justice institutions. Statements of guilt by public authorities could have the affect of 
making the public distrust the courts and the criminal justice system. If they have 
made up their mind about the case based on a statement of the government or other 
public official and then the outcome is the opposite, the public may feel that the 
criminal justice system is faulty or not reliable. This undermines the trust in criminal 
procedure and the rule of law. 
  iv. treats the accused as guilty 
 
The fourth and least cited reason that public authorities’ statements of guilt 
can violate the presumption of innocence is because the statements treat the accused 
as guilty in the absence of a conviction.93 This is a different issue than actually 
treating people as guilty, which will be discussed below. Here, the statements 
themselves imply some guilty or punishing treatment toward a person who has not 
been convicted of an offence. As was stated in Krause v Switzerland, ‘[i]t is a 
fundamental principle embodied in this Article which protects everybody against 
being treated by public officials as being guilty of an offence before this is established 
according to law by a competent court. Article 6(2), therefore, may be violated by 
public officials if they declare that somebody is responsible for criminal acts without 
a court having found so.’94  The European Court of Human Rights has linked 
statements of guilt made by public authorities with treating the accused as if they have 
been convicted although it failed to explain how a statement could treat a person as if 
they are guilty. 95  
In a way, any statement of guilt treats an accused person as if they are guilty. 
This is because public authorities are not meant to refer to people as guilty unless they 
have actually been convicted of a crime, thus, even referring to someone as guilty 
treats that person as if they are guilty because the statement gives the accused the 
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label of ‘guilty,’ which is reserved for those who have been found legally guilty. The 
European Court of Human Rights has found a connection between statements of guilt 
and the treatment of individuals, however this reason that statements of guilt by 
public authorities will violate the presumption of innocence is not particularly 
convincing. It is difficult to see how the statements themselves treat the accused as if 
they are guilty rather than call for that type of treatment. This is rarely cited as a 
reason for how a public statement of guilt has violated the presumption of innocence. 
4. Public statements of guilt and freedom of expression 
 
Public authorities have a right to freedom of expression which is curtailed by 
the prohibition on public statements of guilt. Aside from limiting freedom of 
expression, imposing such a limitation is particularly an issue because it calls into 
question whether public authorities who have other duties related to the criminal 
justice system are able to carry out those duties. This section will discuss these issues 
with a particular focus on whether prosecutors can refer to the accused as guilty in the 
courtroom, whether public authorities can keep the public informed of on-going trials 
and investigations, and whether victims’ advocates can assist victims before there is a 
finding of guilt. 
Prosecutors are public authorities and can violate the presumption of 
innocence by making public statements regarding the guilt of the accused.96 In some 
jurisdictions however, it is a natural part of criminal procedure for the prosecutor to 
argue to the fact-finder that the defendant is guilty at trial.97 The prosecutor may even 
be allowed to specifically state that the defendant is guilty of the charges within the 
context of the courtroom setting. In Daktaras v Lithuania for example, the prosecutor 
stated in court that ‘it has been established from the evidence collected in the course 
of the pre-trial investigation that the applicant is guilty of these crimes.’98 The Court 
found that the prosecution could infringe on the presumption of innocence through 
statements made in court, particularly when the prosecution has a quasi-judicial role, 
however a violation was not found in Daktaras.99 The European Court determined 
that whether the prosecutor’s statements violated or infringed the presumption of 
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innocence would be determined from the particular context from which the statement 
was made.100 A public out-of-court statement of guilt by the prosecutor is far more 
likely to violate the presumption of innocence than one made in a court setting. 
Courtroom statements are more expected from the prosecutor because of their role.101 
Despite the in court statements of guilt by the Prosecutor, the fact-finder understands 
that this is not a command to find guilt, but that it is the argument of the prosecutor. 
The fact-finder is free to engage in their role of evaluating the evidence to determine 
whether guilt will be found. 
The prohibition on public statements about the guilt of an accused does not 
mean that public authorities cannot inform the public of on-going investigations or 
prosecutions. The right to impart information, as a part of the right to freedom of 
expression, must be weighed against the right to a fair trial.102 Indeed, there is a great 
public interest in knowing what kinds of investigations are being conducted.103 This 
may involve publishing the suspect’s photograph, or stating that someone is 
suspected, that a person has been arrested or that they have confessed.104 However 
when making these types of statements public officials must make clear that the 
named suspects are not considered guilty of the crimes alleged.105 Thus, public 
officials can talk about specific incidents and victims of crime and what caused their 
victimhood, as a person’s guilt does not need to be determined to accept that someone 
has been victimised.  Of course, public authorities would need to be careful when 
discussing a specific incident to ensure that a particular person’s guilt is not 
implicated.  
Some public authorities have duties that require them to make public 
statements about an alleged crime or the suspicions they have about a particular 
person’s involvement in a crime. For example, police or other investigators may have 
to make a public appeal for evidence or witnesses to a crime, prosecutors may 
comment about on-going cases or investigations, and other public officials may weigh 
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in to notify the public about the particular events for safety or other reasons.106 
Further, comment is appropriate in cases about serious crimes or crimes involving the 
government as it is in the public’s interest to know about these types of cases.107 
Public authorities may notify the public about on-going criminal investigations and 
trials; however, when doing so they must respect and uphold the presumption of 
innocence. 108  In practice this means that while those officials can report on 
suspicions, arrests, and confessions, they cannot comment directly on anyone’s guilt 
unless a court has made a finding of guilt.109 The European Court of Human Rights 
held in Allenet de Ribemont v France that a senior police office calling the accused an 
‘instigator’ of a crime was a declaration of the accused’s guilt that both ‘encouraged 
the public to believe him guilty’ and ‘prejudged the assessment of the facts by the 
competent judicial authority’.110 Less definitive statements that are couched more in 
opinion, such as having ‘no doubt’ that an individual was involved in a particular 
criminal act, may also raise concerns about prejudgment.111 
Public authorities that work with or on behalf of victims of crimes can be 
caught between their duties to the victims and their obligation to uphold the 
presumption of innocence of the alleged perpetrator of those same crimes. This issue 
has been raised at the International Criminal Court. At times the Trust Fund for 
Victims has sought approval for projects designed to benefit victims of alleged crimes 
that are to be carried out before the completion of the trial of the accused person being 
tried for those particular crimes.112 Per Regulation 50 of the Regulations of the Trust 
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Fund for Victims, the Court left this issue open by stating that it is possible for 
projects of the Trust Fund for Victims to violate the presumption of innocence.113 
When seeking to conduct a project before the end of trial, the Trust Fund must file a 
notice with the Court, which then has forty-five days in which to grant approval for 
the project.114 Projects are approved once the Court determines that there are victims 
of an incident, who should benefit from the Trust Fund’s projects, without ascribing 
responsibility for the situation that caused the victimisation. This formulation 
highlights some tension between victims’ services and the presumption of innocence. 
Within the international context, this practice respects victims by acknowledging that 
something happened to them, while respecting the presumption of innocence of those 
accused by not ascribing responsibility for the victimisation to a particular person 
before trial. The focus is on outreach and assistance rather than placing blame on 
individuals. This demonstrates an understanding that people can be victimised 
regardless of whether someone is held legally responsible for the actions that caused 
their suffering. Similar victim outreach programmes can exist within national 
jurisdictions and not violate the presumption of innocence.  
While public authorities have duties that require them to discuss cases with the 
public or assist victims, they still must refrain from making statements of guilt about 
the accused. One narrow exception to this is when the prosecutor is carrying out his or 
her role in trial. This is an exception because it is seen as part of the unique role of the 
prosecutor to argue during trial that the accused is guilty, and doing so is not seen as 
prejudging the facts of the case because the fact-finder is free to appropriately weigh 
the evidence and statements. While the prohibition on making statements of guilt 
against suspected or accused people is a limit on public authorities’ freedom of 
expression the limit is quite narrow. The statements that are to be avoided must be 
fairly specific in their content and the particular context will be taken into account. 
The presumption of innocence will not prevent investigators, prosecutors or victims’ 
advocates from being able to carry out their other professional duties. 
Out-of-court statements that imply the guilt of a person who has not been 
convicted can violate the presumption of innocence. Courts however, appear to be 
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reluctant to find such statements violate the presumption of innocence. When 
determining whether a violation has occurred, a court will look at the full context of 
the statement and decide whether it was an explicit statement of guilt. If a more 
innocuous meaning can be ascribed to the statement it is likely that the court will 
accept this meaning and not find a violation. There are several reasons why 
statements of guilt by public authorities violate the presumption of innocence. The 
most convincing arguments are that these statements show prejudgement on the part 
of the public authority. This is directly related to the first aspect of the presumption of 
innocence but extends beyond the fact-finder. Public statements of guilt may also taint 
the fact-finder’s opinion, cause the public to see the accused as guilty, or actually treat 
the accused as guilty. In addition to prejudging the facts, statements of guilt by public 
authorities can undermine the rule of law and the public trust in the criminal process.  
C. The Media must avoid ‘undermining the presumption of innocence’ 
While a single statement of guilt can violate the presumption of innocence, 
excessive media coverage of a particular case can also be a cause for alarm. 
According to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, ‘[t]he media should 
avoid news coverage undermining the presumption of innocence.’ 115  Excessive 
negative media coverage may violate the presumption of innocence because it may 
affect the fact-finder’s opinion of the case. The media has an important function in 
informing the public about crimes, investigations and trials, and yet the need to 
disseminate news cannot overshadow an individual’s presumption of innocence. 
When discussing whether the media has violated or interfered with the 
presumption of innocence it is important to consider whether the news organisation in 
question has free editorial control over its content or whether the news it publishes is 
dictated by the relevant government. If the government controls the content of the 
media then the news coverage would be more akin to a statement made by a public 
authority and should be analysed as such when determining whether the presumption 
of innocence has been violated. However, when the media largely determines its own 
content it enjoys the right to freedom of expression and requires a different analysis of 
the impact its statements can have on the presumption of innocence. 
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The media has a complex role with regard to preserving the presumption of 
innocence for accused people and informing the public about crime and criminal law 
issues. The media has a responsibility to impart information and the public has a right 
to receive such information.116 It is in the public’s interest for the media to cover 
criminal law issues so that the public can monitor the government’s investigations, 
media coverage of investigations can provide transparency which could help prevent 
corruption in criminal investigations and trials, and the public can be informed about 
crime for public safety reasons. Further, the media’s role in reporting on criminal 
activity or criminal procedure can take several forms. Alternatively, the coverage 
might quote or paraphrase statements about the accused made by others, in which 
case it is not necessarily the media’s fault if the person making the statement infringes 
upon the accused’s right to the presumption of innocence. The coverage could include 
commentary or editorials by the media itself that have a much more direct connection 
to the media’s responsibility to uphold the presumption of innocence. While the 
media has a responsibility to keep the public informed and a right to freedom of 
expression, this must be weighed against an accused person’s right to a fair trial.117  
It is possible that the extent of media coverage about a particular incident 
could interfere with an accused person’s presumption of innocence, even in instances 
where any one particular statement would not interfere with the presumption of 
innocence. Extensive media coverage may be ‘likely to prejudice, whether intentional 
or not, the chances of a person receiving a fair trial or to undermine the confidence of 
the public in the role of the courts and in the administration of criminal justice.’118 
One way media coverage might deprive the accused of a fair trial is if that coverage 
taints the fact-finder’s opinion of the case. Much like with public authorities’ 
statements of guilt, this is a greater concern if the fact-finder is a jury rather than a 
judge.119 Media coverage could undermine public confidence in the courts and 
criminal justice by portraying bad investigation techniques, allowing people to 
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speculate about what the various parties to the matter might do, or portraying one side 
as particularly sympathetic over another. For example, if the victim is portrayed as 
being very vulnerable or sympathetic, the public might call for greater action to be 
taken with regard to the accused, possibly resulting in an outcry for stiffer penalties or 
a faster trial. Additionally, if the outcome of trial is the opposite of what everyone 
believes should happen based on the media’s portrayal of the case, then the public 
could believe that the criminal justice system is flawed or corrupt. This is a particular 
risk in cases of terrorism or other sensational crimes.120 
In order to determine how much media coverage is required to interfere with 
an accused’s presumption of innocence the European Court of Human Rights has 
suggested that an interference or violation of the presumption of innocence may result 
from a ‘virulent press campaign’.121 A press campaign is virulent when it is so 
influential that the individual’s fears of the fact-finder being biased against him or her 
are ‘objectively justified or legitimate doubts as to the impartiality of the court’ as a 
result of the publicity.122 This test is objective, meaning that it requires more than the 
accused’s fear of bias, but that those fears are likely justified. It should be noted 
however, that cases that are in the public’s interest are likely to receive significant 
media coverage and negative publicity should be expected. 123  While negative 
publicity should be anticipated in some cases, the European Court has cautioned that 
it can pose a threat to the presumption of innocence because of the possible negative 
influence it might have on the minds of the fact-finders. This is particularly true when 
the fact-finder is a jury. The Court has stressed that negative publicity about a trial is 
especially dangerous in jury trials because it can influence public opinion, and thus 
the minds of potential jurors, against the accused.124 Judges however, are not immune 
to the affects of negative publicity regarding a case. The Court has also expressed 
concern that negative press could affect the presumption of innocence in trials where 
a judge is acting as the fact-finder, but sees this as being of more limited concern 
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since judges should receive training to help them disregard external influences when 
reaching their decisions.125  
In cases with a large amount of publicity, a burden appears to be on the 
government to ensure that the press does not infringe on the accused’s fair trial rights, 
including the right to the presumption of innocence.126 Where there have been 
violations of the presumption of innocence because of negative press campaigns, the 
government of the State in question, rather than the media, is held responsible.  This 
is, at least in part, a result of the fact that the European Convention on Human Rights 
only has authority over member states and cannot make findings against private 
individuals or groups.127 Although the government bears some responsibility for 
curtailing excessive media coverage, at the national level, there may be room for 
members of the media to also be held responsible for press campaigns which affect 
the presumption of innocence. 
The International Criminal Court has also recognized the risk of prejudice 
against individuals who fall victim to too much pre-trial publicity. In the Kenya 
Situation, Pre-Trial Chamber II acknowledged that releasing the accused’s name to 
the public before the issuance of a formal indictment may unduly expose the accused 
to negative publicity.128 While the decision to release a suspect’s name is left to the 
discretion of the Prosecutor’s Office, the Court held that the Prosecutor should err on 
the side of keeping suspects’ names confidential until the issuance of a formal 
indictment in order to avoid unnecessarily exposing suspects to the media.129 This is 
most important during the situation phase at the International Criminal Court. 
Suspects identified during the early stages of an investigation may not ever be 
formally charged with crimes. To identify suspects publically before charging them 
might needlessly expose them to stigmatisation and prejudice. 
While excessive publicity should be avoided, it may be possible to remedy the 
taint of an adverse press campaign against an accused individual. The impact of 
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negative press on jurors may be overcome either through judicial instructions or when 
a sufficient amount of time has passed between when the press coverage occurred and 
when the case is tried.130 Jury instructions can be used to overcome prejudice 
generated by a media campaign that does not rise to the level of the objective test of 
whether there was a virulent press campaign.131 Once sufficient time has passed, it is 
believed that the prejudice that the media attention may have caused will no longer be 
in the forefront of the public’s mind. The Human Rights Committee identified an 
additional way to overcome media prejudice. In a case involving Trinidad and 
Tobago, ‘widespread and continuous’ pre-trial publicity that the accused was a 
‘notorious drug baron’ was remedied by changing the rules regarding jury 
selection.132 Specifically the trial court was able to avoid the taint that negative 
publicity would otherwise have caused by amending the Jury Act to allow for an 
unlimited number of potential jurors to help ensure finding people who were not 
negatively tainted by the publicity to be members of the jury, and by amending the 
Evidence Act to permit the deposition of deceased witnesses to be received as 
evidence at trial.133 While this was found to remedy the situation, it is rather extreme 
in that it involved amendment to several legal provisions. This may not be possible in 
every case of excessive publicity. 
The Human Rights Committee makes it clear that the media should avoid 
excessive press coverage of alleged crimes. Media coverage can violate or infringe on 
the accused’s right to the presumption of innocence. Too much pre-trial publicity can 
lead to the fact-finder’s opinion being unduly tainted against the accused. Further, 
media campaigns can cause members of the public to see, and then treat, suspects as if 
they were guilty. This however, can be avoided. The media can regulate the amount 
and severity of the coverage portrayed about any particular crime. The government 
may be able to step in to stop the media when the coverage gets close to being 
excessive. Further, it is possible that any taint or stigmatisation that the publicity 
caused could remedied by time, judicial instruction, or a widening of the jury pool. 
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D. People should not be treated as guilty without a conviction 
Related to the requirement that the accused should not be referred to as guilty 
in public is the obligation not to treat people who have not been convicted of a crime 
in the same manner as someone who has been found guilty. Individuals cannot be 
treated as if they are guilty unless they have been convicted.134 This includes avoiding 
both pre-punishment and making the individual physically appear guilty through the 
wearing of prison issued clothing, restraints or any other alterations to their physical 
appearance that are reserved for those who have been convicted.135 The purpose of 
this aspect of the presumption of innocence is to prevent individuals from being 
punished for crimes they did not commit and to prevent them from being convicted 
based on their appearance. 
The Human Rights Committee, in General Comment 13 and General 
Comment 32, stated that the presumption of innocence ‘implies a right to be treated in 
accordance with this principle [of not presuming guilt before the charge has been 
proven beyond reasonable doubt]’.136 Further, the European Commission of Human 
Rights suggests that ‘[i]t is a fundamental principle embodied in [the presumption of 
innocence] which protects everybody against being treated by public officials as being 
guilty of an offence before this is established according to law by a competent 
court.’137 This demonstrates that the presumption of innocence can exist outside of the 
trial context as it offers a blanket prohibition on treating individuals as if they are 
guilty without a conviction, without a limitation as to where that treatment might 
occur. 
It is clear that punishment without a conviction, and pre-punishment, that is, 
punishment in anticipation of a conviction, violates both the procedural and non-
procedural aspects of the presumption of innocence. This is because punishment 
without a conviction circumvents the criminal justice process. If individuals could be 
punished without evidence, standards of proof, and little to no protections there would 
be no need for trials or other criminal procedure. However, because the presumption 
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of innocence is a legal presumption, then it is part of the mechanism that helps 
determine when people may be subjected to punishment or punishment-like 
treatment.138 It follows that if the procedural aspect prevents people from being 
punished without a conviction, the non-procedural aspect prevents people from being 
punished or treated as if they are being criminally punished in all other areas of life. 
Otherwise, the first aspect would not be needed at trial and criminal procedure would 
not be necessary to punish or treat people as if they are guilty. 
That the presumption of innocence is concerned with not unjustly inflicting 
criminal punishment on individuals, or otherwise treating individuals as if they are 
guilty of a crime, does not mean that the government cannot take action against 
individuals during criminal investigations.139 This worry that the presumption of 
innocence restricts legitimate government action is a frequent criticism of the 
presumption of innocence as a broad human right.140 Searching individuals or their 
property, restraining individuals, and other investigatory activities are generally not 
forms of punishment.141 These activities can also encompass procedures that are more 
invasive to the person, such as breathalyser tests and blood and urine sampling.142 The 
presumption of innocence is concerned with limiting those investigatory techniques 
that could suggest that the accused is guilty, act as a form of pre-punishment, or that 
are not ‘strictly necessary in order to conduct the investigation and trial.’ 143 
Conducting physical searches, requiring the wearing of handcuffs, pre-trial 
incarceration and restricting contact with certain individuals under particular 
circumstances are all commonly accepted ways of treating an accused prior to 
conviction. However, these methods are not acceptable from a presumption of 
innocence standpoint unless particular investigatory tests have been met because these 
sorts of limitations have the tendency to identify the accused as different from non-
accused people. While these activities may negatively affect the people being subject 
to these investigatory activities, such tests are furthering investigation and are 
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generally not retributive or punishing in nature and a finding of guilt is necessarily not 
required to engage in these activities. Once an individual is found guilty or not guilty 
they will not be subject to investigative techniques, thus, these techniques cannot be 
considered punishment or punishment-like. Although they may feel like punishment 
to the individuals being investigated and they may cause some damage to the 
individual’s reputation in the community, they are not incompatible with the non-
procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence. It is important, however, that 
these pre-determination activities do not become punishment, for example 
impermissibly detaining an individual without proper justification, because that would 
violate the presumption of innocence. 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated that because of the 
presumption of innocence, ‘[d]efendants should normally not be shackled or kept in 
cages during trials or otherwise presented to the court in a manner indicating that they 
may be dangerous criminals.’144 Before conviction a suspect should not be made to 
appear guilty because it could cause the fact-finder and others to believe that they are 
guilty. Further, during trial it is important that the individual not appear to be guilty.  
An accused forced to wear prison clothes or remain visibly shackled and/or caged in 
the courtroom implies that he or she cannot be trusted and that the authorities believe 
them to be guilty despite not being convicted.145 This is particularly important during 
jury trials as lay fact-finders may not know why the accused is being detained, or that 
many innocent people are in fact held in pre-determination detention.  
That the presumption of innocence includes not causing the accused to appear 
to be guilty is controversial, but is supported in practice. Accused people and 
defendants at the international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals fair 
better than those in national jurisdictions as they regularly appear in court without 
shackles, at a table in the defence section of the courtroom and in non-prison clothing. 
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the accused may be manacled in 
court so long as ‘this does not create the wrong impression in the mind of the jurors or 
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hamper his defence.’146 Further, while the practice seems to be falling out of favour, 
the European Court allows the use of certain docks and cages for defendants so long 
as they are able to participate in their trial and communicate with their lawyer.147 
Accused people cannot be presented in court in prison clothing that is specific to 
convicted persons, but if it is non-specific, or is specific to accused prisoners, it may 
be permitted.148 The European Directive on the strengthening of certain aspects of the 
presumption of innocence and the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings 
intends to strengthen these rules in favour of the accused by encouraging countries to 
limit the use of cages and shackles to instances when they are necessary for either 
security or to prevent the accused from absconding.149 The Directive further indicates 
that suspects and accused individuals should not be presented in public in prison 
clothing ‘where feasible’.150 While on its face there are clearly many scenarios in 
which non-convicted people can still be presented in public in a manner that conveys 
guilt, the Directive confirms that this treatment is connected to the presumption of 
innocence and that states should make a better effort to avoid having non-convicted 
people physically appear to be guilty. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that physically 
portraying individuals as guilty before trial in public or the media violates the 
presumption of innocence.151 The Inter-American Court has decided this issue in 
several different cases involving accusations of treason. In these cases it was stated 
that the accused was a perpetrator of treason and the accused was ‘paraded before the 
media, dressed in defamatory clothing’ before the commencement of trial.152 The 
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Court focused on the government’s portrayal of the accused in the media in its 
entirety in holding that the public would impermissibly believe that the suspects were 
guilty despite the fact that no conviction had been entered against them.153 These 
cases are rather extreme examples, but they stand for the idea that there is a fear that 
the physical appearance of the accused could affect the attitude of the fact-finder and 
could affect the treatment of the concerned individuals within their community. 
The Inter-American Commission has also found that the presumption of 
innocence is violated when the media presents an individual as being guilty of the 
crimes alleged. The Commission indicated in a 1983 Report on the Situation of 
Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin that 
publically broadcasting the accused’s confessions before a final verdict was reached 
led the public to prejudge the defendants’ guilt.154 Further, in its 1981 Nicaragua 
Report, the Commission established that publishing photographs of the accused on 
every page of the newspaper with accompanying statements describing them as 
‘henchmen’, and inviting the public to do justice, violated the rights of the accused 
because it would cause the public to prejudge the people portrayed as guilty and may 
taint witnesses. 155  This goes beyond the regular, and permissible, investigatory 
technique of publishing photographs of suspects or accused people and asking for 
help, as the papers clearly intended for people to be thought of as guilty.156 
People who have not been convicted of a crime cannot be treated as if they are 
guilty because this will violate the presumption of innocence. This includes refraining 
from punishment, pre-punishment, and physically presenting the accused in a way 
that communicates their guilt before a conviction. Investigatory techniques should be 
sufficiently different from punishment and should be used only when required 
standards are met. Restrictions of the accused that are necessary for security purposes, 
such as the use of shackles or a prison uniform in court, may be permitted but should 
be used only when necessary. Finally, exhibiting an accused person as guilty in the 
media will violate the presumption of innocence because it tends to imply a 
conviction and encourages the public to treat the individual as guilty. 
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E. The presumption of innocence and post court proceedings 
The preceding rules regarding the presumption of innocence dictate how a 
person may be treated regarding criminal charges while they are suspected. This 
however, raises questions of what happens regarding the non-procedural aspect of the 
presumption of innocence once the criminal case against an individual ends. The 
case’s outcome determines whether the second aspect of the presumption of 
innocence has been overcome for the particular accusation. 
Whether there is a final determination on the charges, and what that 
determination is, controls when this aspect of the presumption of innocence ends. 
Once there is a conviction, there can be public statements of guilt made against the 
accused with regard to those charges.157 This is because they have been found guilty 
to the required standard of proof and their guilt is no longer in question. Further the 
presumption of innocence is inapplicable during sentencing proceedings because at 
that point the guilt of the accused has already been established.158 Thus, after 
conviction, a person may be punished and treated in a manner consistent with his or 
her legal guilt. During an appeals process, public authorities can make statements of 
continued suspicion against the accused.159 This is true even in circumstances when 
the appeal is against an acquittal.160 This is because during the appeals process the 
outcome of the trial decision is not final; it may be changed or altered by a higher 
court. 
If the accused is acquitted, public statements of guilt or even suspicion must 
not be made against the accused regarding the specific accusation.161 This is due to a 
concern of undermining the court’s authority and legitimacy. The European 
Commission on Human Rights has held that the judicial authority of criminal courts 
‘would be severely undermined if after an acquittal a suspicion could be maintained 
that the accused had committed the offences dealt with at the trial.’162 An acquittal is 
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a final determination of the charges which means that the accused person is, at least 
legally, not guilty. Thus, the person must be treated as not guilty and because of the 
final determination also can no longer be treated as a suspect.  
In the event that a case is terminated against an accused or suspected person in 
any way other than conviction or acquittal, the presumption of innocence continues to 
provide protection from statements of guilt. If the case is discontinued before a final 
verdict of guilty or not guilty, the presumption of innocence remains intact and public 
statements that the accused person is guilty may not be made, even in other types of 
hearings that the accused person may have in relation to the incident that gave rise to 
the charges.163 In this scenario however, it is possible to make public statements that 
the person is suspected of the alleged criminal activity so long as there is some 
continued state of suspicion. 164 If however, the accusations are terminated and the 
accused is no longer suspected of the crimes that were alleged against him or her, 
statements that imply that the formerly accused person is still under suspicion are not 
allowed. 
Courts other than the criminal court that conducted the trial against an accused 
must respect the accused’s presumption of innocence.165 Courts other than criminal 
trial courts cannot make findings of guilt. 166 This is important in instances of 
simultaneous proceedings, and separate civil proceedings, which may stem from the 
same incident that gave rise to the criminal charges.167 This is in part because the 
presumption of innocence prevents people from being treated as if they are guilty 
without first being convicted.168 It is also because the criminal process is specialised 
and requires all of the fair trial safeguards. 
The presumption of innocence may be relevant to subsequent procedures, 
however they must be linked with the criminal procedure at issue. At the European 
Court of Human Rights ‘[t]he subsequent procedure must however be linked with the 
issue of criminal responsibility in such a manner as to bring the proceedings within 
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the scope of article 6(2).’169 This link can be created either by the topic of the 
subsequent case, such as compensation for detention, or by the language or reasoning 
used by the court that implies that the subsequent procedure is a consequence of the 
criminal procedure.170 
The non-procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence has a wider 
application than the procedural aspect. While the procedural aspect applies only at 
trial and ends with a final determination of the charges, the non-procedural aspect 
applies beyond the trial setting. It clearly applies before trial, once someone is 
accused and also can apply after trial. If someone is acquitted or the charges are 
discontinued, the second aspect is still applicable. Further, in subsequent or parallel 
proceedings, the second aspect of the presumption of innocence must be respected. 
F. Conclusion 
 
While the relevance of the presumption of innocence outside the courtroom is 
controversial, in practice the presumption of innocence as a human right does extend 
beyond the trial setting. It must reach beyond the courtroom in order to preserve the in 
courtroom aspect of the presumption of innocence and the other fair trial rights.171 It 
is contradictory to prevent punishment without a conviction at trial while also 
allowing such treatment before trial. If one could be punished or otherwise treated as 
if guilty without a trial there would be no need for criminal procedure.  
The presumption of innocence as a human right protects individuals from 
stigmatization, pre-punishment, and other adverse outcomes without a conviction.  
However, it seems that courts are reluctant to find that out-of-court statements of guilt 
or negative press campaigns violate the presumption of innocence. The context of the 
statement or campaign appears particularly important in order to determine how the 
statement negatively impacted the individual concerned. This reluctance is 
particularly noticeable when the statement in question is politically, rather than 
legally motivated, or where the statement did not result in a significant miscarriage of 
justice.172 Because of the balance between freedom of expression, the need to inform 
the public of crimes, and the presumption of innocence, those who have a closer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Allen (n 26); Zollman (n 38). 
170 Zollman (n 38); See eg: Sekanina (n 49) para 22; Ringvold (n 166). 
171 Stavros (n 31) 50. 
172 Ibid 69-70. 
	   125	  
involvement with the actual proceedings have a stronger duty than people who are 
more removed from the criminal process. For statements of guilt, the courts will take 
into account the context in which they were made and whether a more innocuous 
meaning can be ascribed to the statement.  
Similar to statements of guilt, excessive media campaigns can violate or 
interfere with the presumption of innocence. While the press should not interfere with 
the presumption of innocence they also have duties to keep the public informed of 
criminal matters. Their right to provide information and right to freedom of 
expression must be taken into account when determining whether a press campaign 
violates or interferes with an individual’s presumption of innocence. Courts also seem 
reluctant to find that a media campaign in fact violates a particular individual’s 
presumption of innocence as it has been held that such negative publicity might be 
remedied by either the passage of time, an instruction to jurors, or finding a fact-
finder who has not been tainted by the media coverage. 
The non-procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence also prevents 
people from being treated as if they are guilty without a conviction. This includes pre-
punishment, punishment, and physically presenting the accused as if they are guilty. 
These activities violate the presumption of innocence because they cause the public to 
believe that the individual is guilty, which can taint the fact-finder’s opinion or cause 
the public to take negative actions against the accused. Further, these activities can 
bypass the criminal justice process, allowing for punishment to occur without a 
conviction.  
The non-procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence is different and 
less stringent than the legal presumption aspect. Where the first aspect applies to the 
fact-finder in the courtroom setting, the second aspect allows people to benefit from 
the protections of the presumption of innocence outside of the confines of trial. It 
prohibits certain treatment and behaviour toward a suspected or accused person 
because to not do so would obviate the need for criminal procedure. Thus, the non-
procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence also helps maintain the legitimacy 
and respect for the courts and criminal procedure. 
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Chapter 5. Who has the right and when does it attach? 
While the presumption of innocence generally applies within criminal law and 
procedure and it is agreed that the presumption is applicable during trial, the question 
of whether the right attaches before trial, and if so, at what point, remains open. The 
statutes of the international and regional human rights courts, the International 
Criminal Court, and the ad hoc and internationalised tribunals state who the 
presumption of innocence applies to in one of two ways, using either the word 
‘every’, such as ‘everyone’ or ‘every person’, or the word ‘accused’.1 While these 
terms have two different meanings, neither limits who can enjoy the presumption of 
innocence.  The distinction actually concerns when the right becomes operable, rather 
than to whom the right belongs. These classifications all mean that humans, without 
limitation, may enjoy the presumption. This is supported not only in the wording of 
the statutes but also in the classification of the presumption of innocence as a human 
right. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the presumption of innocence is limited to 
criminal proceedings. This however, is a very broad category that encompasses a 
wide range of behaviours and situations. Further, the presumption of innocence is a 
human right that is not limited to any particular type or category of person.  Thus, the 
question arises: at what point does the right attach? That is, when do the benefits of 
the presumption of innocence begin? Although the presumption of innocence applies 
during trial, is there a point before trial where individuals may benefit from the human 
rights protections? The provisions contained in the human rights conventions and the 
statutes of the international and internationalised criminal courts fall into three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 Dec 1948, 217 A (III) 
(UDHR) art 11(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 
November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (ECHR) art 6(2); American Convention on Human Rights 
(adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) (ACHR) art 8(2); African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217 (African Charter) art 
7(1)(b), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) (ICC Statute) art 66, 
UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (25 May 1993) (ICTY Statute) art 21(3), UN Security Council, Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (8 November 1994) (ICTR Statute) article 20(3), 
UN Security Council, Statute of the United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal 
Tribunals (22 December 2010) (ECCC Statute) article 35 new, UN Security Council, Statute 
of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (30 May 2007) (STL Statute) art 16(3)(a); UN Security 
Council, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (16 January 2002) (SCSL Statute) art 
17(3). 
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categories: (1) at all times; (2) when a person is accused; and (3) when a person is 
charged.  A closer examination reveals that when the right becomes operable is more 
consistent than these categories imply. The general rule is that the presumption of 
innocence begins when a person is charged.  
A. Every human has the right to the presumption of innocence 
The international and regional statutes and conventions addressing the 
presumption of innocence indicate that there are two basic constructions used to 
describe who can enjoy the right. The first type implies that everyone has the right to 
the presumption. These use words like ‘everyone,’ ‘every person’ and ‘every 
individual’ to describe those with the right to the presumption of innocence.2 The 
second construction seems far more limited in terms of who can enjoy the 
presumption of innocence and affords that right only to ‘the accused’.3 Whether the 
first or second construction is employed depends on whether the statute itself is 
intended to address events that have not yet occurred or whether it is created to deal 
with specific past events. Both are theoretically equally inclusive as they can 
encompass actual persons, legal persons, and groups. However, groups and legal 
persons are specifically excluded from some courts. The use of ‘every person’ or 
‘every individual’, while seeming equally inclusive, actually limit who may enjoy the 
right to the presumption of innocence because these phrases can more easily exclude 
groups and legal persons. While groups and legal persons may be excepted, the 
presumption of innocence is not limited to certain or particular categories of people. 
Every human may enjoy the presumption of innocence. 
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, and Rome Statute all 
state that the presumption of innocence applies to ‘everyone’.4 Using the word 
everyone is indicative of a very expansive right without limit as to who can enjoy the 
presumption of innocence.5 There is evidence that this is intentional. The travaux 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ICC statute art 66(1); UDHR art 11(1); ICCPR art 14(2); ACHR art 8(2); African Charter art 
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3SCSL Statute art 17(3); ICTY Statute art 21(3); ICTR Statute 20(3); ECCC Statute 35 new; 
STL Statute art 16(3)(a). 
4 UDHR art 11; ICCPR art 14(2); ECHR art 6(2); ICC Statute art 66(1). 
5 Young Sok Kim, The Law of the International Criminal Court (William S Hein & Co 2007) 
215; W Schabas and Y McDermott, ‘Article 66: Presumption of Innocence’ in Otto Triffterer, 
Kai Ambos (eds), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (3rd edn, 
CH Beck 2016) 837; Gregory S Gordon, ‘Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due 
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préparatoires of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court both indicate that earlier drafts provided the right only to 
the accused but were later changed so as to provide the right to everyone.6  This 
change increases the number of people who may enjoy the right and implies that the 
presumption of innocence may extend outside the specific context of trial. 
The statutes of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, ad hoc Tribunals, and Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
all state that the presumption of innocence applies to ‘the accused’.7 While this 
formulation is more limited on its face, stating that the presumption of innocence 
applies to ‘the accused’ does not limit the type of person who might enjoy the 
presumption of innocence. What it does is create a narrower category as to when the 
right may be enjoyed, that is, when the right attaches, and thus, when there can be a 
remedy for a violation of the right. The difference between using ‘everyone’ and ‘the 
accused’ focuses on when the right becomes operable, rather than who may enjoy the 
right. Rather than applying to all people at any time, ‘the accused’ implies there is a 
specific point in time or specific things that must happen before a person can enjoy 
the presumption of innocence. It implies that some criminal process has already 
begun, that formal charges have been brought against the individual, and cuts off the 
possibility of people not formally involved in the criminal justice process of being 
presumed innocent.  
‘Everyone’ is such a broad term that it implies that the presumption of 
innocence might go beyond humans to include legal persons. Some jurisdictions such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Process Aspirations and Limitations’ (2007) 45(3) Colum J Transnat’l L 635, 666; Haji N A 
Noor Muhammad, ‘Due Process in Law for Persons Accused of Crime’ in Louis Henkin (ed), 
The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Colum UP 
1981) 150; Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR 
Commentary (NP Engel 1994) 254, para 34; Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Decisions on 
Defence Request for an Order to Preserve the Impartiality of the Proceedings) ICC-01/04-
01/10-51, PT Ch I (31 January 2011). See also Mark Hareema, ‘Uncovering the Presumption 
of Factual Innocence in Canadian Law: A Theoretical Model for the ‘Pre-Charging 
Presumption of Innocence’’ (2005) 28 Dalhousie LJ 443, 446. 
6 David Weissbrodt, The Right to a Fair Trial Under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 
20; Commission on Human Rights, Summary Record of the Fifty-Fifth Meeting (2 June 
1948) UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.55, (2 June 1948)  13; Schabas and McDermott (n 5) 1639 para 
11; 1996 Preparatory Committee II, see note 14, p 194. Actually, it started with ‘anyone’, but 
this was later changed to ‘everyone’. 
7 ECCC Statute art 35 new, SCSL Statute art 17(3), ICTY Statute art 21(3); ICTR Statute art 
20(3); STL Statute art 16(3)(a). 
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as the International Criminal Court, specifically do not provide for non-human 
prosecutions, while others, leave this issue open.8 Increasingly, corporations and other 
legal beings have been subjected to criminal prosecutions, which leads to the question 
of whether non-human legal entities are entitled to the presumption of innocence.9 
Whether legal persons or entities are entitled to the presumption remains unresolved. 
It is however, likely that such entities would be afforded the presumption if they were 
subjected to criminal prosecution in a jurisdiction where such prosecution is 
permitted.10 Ultimately whether legal persons can enjoy the right to the presumption 
of innocence in a jurisdiction that allows ‘everyone’ the right is an issue for the 
specific jurisdiction. 
Similar to ‘everyone’, although perhaps slightly more limited in scope, the 
American Convention on Human Rights uses the phrase ‘every person’11 while the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights uses the phrase ‘every individual’.12 
These phrases are still quite expansive and, by the use of the word ‘every,’ are 
intended to be inclusive. For humans, this has the same affect as ‘everyone.’ With 
regard to the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, there may be a different interpretation when it comes to 
whether legal entities can benefit from the right to the presumption of innocence 
because of the use of the word ‘person’ and ‘individual’.13 These terms seem to be 
exclusive of legal persons and groups. Beyond the issue of non-human legal persons, 
focusing on the individual or person would mean that groups in general would not 
enjoy the presumption of innocence. This could potentially have a knock-on effect on 
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Beirut S.A.L. Cases at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2015) 13(2) JICJ 313, 319-320; 
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9 For some discussion see Trechsel Stefan, ‘The Right to be Presumed Innocent’ in Stefan 
Trechsel and Sarah Summers (eds) Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (OUP 2006) 171-
172; Roger A Shiner ‘Corporations and the Presumption of Innocence’ (2014) 8(2) Crim L & 
Phil 285. 
10 Shiner (n 9).  
11 ACHR art 8(2). 
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individuals appearing within a relevant jurisdiction. If a group, made up of 
individuals, is seen as guilty (or at least not innocent) of some action, then proving 
that an individual is part of that group could lead to some portion of the group’s guilt 
spilling over onto the individual without proof that the individual was responsible for 
or participated in the specifically alleged criminal act. This could be a particular issue 
if military, paramilitary, militias or other groups are accused of mass crimes.  
Which term is used to describe who can benefit from the presumption of 
innocence appears to depend on the type of agreement under scrutiny. The more 
inclusive sounding versions, using the term ‘everyone’, ‘every individual’, and ‘every 
person’ are primarily the international and regional human rights agreements.14 The 
international and regional agreements are written to be inclusive and somewhat 
flexible in their implementation.15 In addition, these agreements are written this way 
because the future situations they will be called upon to address cannot be predicted. 
Thus, these conventions and statutes must be flexible enough to be relevant to future 
situations. The Rome Statute also uses the word ‘everyone’.16 The International 
Criminal Court is not a general human rights body, but rather a criminal court with 
specific criminal jurisdiction.17 The Court however, still requires a great amount of 
flexibility within its statute. The International Criminal Court must be flexible for two 
reasons. First, the International Criminal Court would like to have all countries 
become states parties to the Rome Statute, giving the Court the ability to have 
jurisdiction over atrocity crimes committed anywhere in the world.18 Therefore, the 
Rome Statute is written in a way so as to be inclusive of all potential parties and 
people who might come under its jurisdiction. Secondly, like the regional human 
rights courts, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over unknown future 
events. This is unlike the ad hoc and internationalized tribunals, which were 
specifically created to have jurisdiction over events that have already occurred. Like 
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the human rights agreements, this look to the future by the International Criminal 
Court must necessarily be more general and inclusive so as to try to anticipate any 
situation that the Court may need to deal with. Thus the more inclusive terms are in 
the statutes that must attract member states and that must be applicable to future 
events. 
 Unlike the general agreements on human rights and the International Criminal 
Court’s Statute, the statutes designed to specifically be used as rules or elements of 
criminal law, mostly use the phrase ‘the accused’ to describe who can enjoy the 
presumption of innocence. This is because these statutes create rules for courts with 
jurisdiction over events that have already occurred. 19  These statutes provide 
competence to the relevant court only for particular events that occurred during a 
particular timeframe. Thus, these articles providing for the presumption of innocence 
can be more specific in terms of who the presumption applies to, as they anticipate 
particular crimes being tried within the court.  Further, these statutes require fewer 
parties to agree to them before they become operative. The ad hoc and 
internationalized tribunals only require the agreement of the United Nations and a 
limited number of countries to become operational. Thus, the ad hoc and 
internationalized tribunals have no reason to be more inclusive. These statutes are not 
meant to attract universal application, but are specifically limited to incidents that 
occurred within one country or region over a particular period of time.  
Whether the statutes use ‘everyone,’ ‘every person,’ ‘every individual’ or the 
‘the accused’ to describe who can enjoy the presumption of innocence does not limit 
what type of person has the right. In fact, these phrases do not necessarily limit 
whether individuals, groups, actual persons, or legal persons can be presumed 
innocent. Rather, that type of limitation is jurisdictional and housed elsewhere in the 
applicable statute or agreement. Unlike more general formulations using the word 
‘every,’ the use of ‘the accused’ has implications for when the right becomes 
operable, or when a remedy may be sought for a violation of the right, which is not 
implied by the word ‘everyone.’  
Thus, the studied agreements provide the presumption of innocence to 
everyone without limiting what type of person has the right to the presumption of 
innocence. That the studied statutes and conventions provide the presumption of 
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innocence to everyone is in keeping with the idea that the presumption of innocence is 
a human right. Human rights are meant to be available for every person to use and 
benefit from.20 There may be certain times when the right is more relevant than 
others, but this is not a limit on what kind of person can benefit from the protections 
that a human right provides. 
B. When the right to the presumption of innocence attaches 
 Although the presumption of innocence applies to every human, this does not 
mean that the presumption applies to every person at all times. In addition to its 
applicability being limited to the context of criminal law and procedure, the 
presumption is also limited with regard to when the presumption of innocence 
becomes operable of attaches as a right. Because the presumption of innocence is 
inextricably tied to criminal law, when the right becomes operable is linked to the role 
that the individual (the potential right-holder) occupies in the criminal process. 
Determining when the right applies helps identify how wide or narrow the right is and 
who can seek redress when a violation has occurred. Whether or not the right 
becomes operable determines how an individual may be treated by the particular 
duty-holder. It provides legal certainty and tells the right-holder what to expect. This 
is particularly interesting in the pre-trial and pre-charging contexts. If the presumption 
becomes operable before trial, then it could have implications for what investigative 
techniques are allowed, and could affect other rights, such as the right to privacy or 
liberty in cases of pre-determination detention. If, on the other hand, the presumption 
is solely limited to trial, then other rights might provide protection pre-trial, but the 
presumption of innocence would be irrelevant when considering investigations and 
pre-trial decisions. 
Among theorists there is a fierce debate regarding when the presumption of 
innocence may be enforced as a right. All agree that if the presumption of innocence 
is a right, that it is applicable in the trial setting.21 The arguments centre on whether 
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21 See Larry Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law (CUP 2006) 95; Larry Laudan, ‘The 
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and how far before (and after) trial the right can be enjoyed. Those that argue that the 
presumption of innocence can only be enjoyed at trial believe that the presumption of 
innocence is closely tied to the standard and burden of proof. The most extreme 
among them claim that the presumption is merely a restatement of these principles.22 
For those arguing that that the presumption of innocence extends to some period of 
time before trial, the presumption of innocence has more, and wider, purposes such as 
protecting citizens from overly intrusive governments, protecting the individual’s 
reputation, and protecting individuals’ legal status of innocence before conviction.23 
As a result of the differing opinions on the presumption’s purpose, the arguments 
about when the right becomes operable range from only at trial to when someone is 
suspected, accused, or even extending to everyday life.24  
 There are two explanations as to why the argument is so wide-ranging as to 
when the presumption of innocence becomes operable. One is that each theorist 
approaches the presumption of innocence with his or her own legal culture in mind. 
Antony Duff, for example, states that his theory of the presumption of innocence was 
written from the perspective of common law jurisdictions.25 Larry Laudan and 
Richard Lippke use the United States’ legal system for their examples.26 Lonneke 
Stevens sets her theory within Dutch law, and Thomas Weigend has examined the 
presumption from a German perspective.27 This however, can only be part of the 
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25 Duff, ‘Presumptions Broad and Narrow’ (n 24); Duff, ‘Who Must Presume’ (n 21) 170. 
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explanation because these scholars hint that their theories may have some application 
beyond national law. The other explanation is that the theorists are largely concerned 
with developing a normative theory of the presumption of innocence. This means that 
they are concerned with what the presumption ought to be, rather than what it 
necessarily is in practice. There is a contradiction in stating that the presumption of 
innocence should apply only to the accused at trial when in practice it demonstrably 
applies outside of trial as well. Stating what should be, from a theoretical standpoint, 
is different from stating what is. Examining the presumption of innocence in 
international and regional practice therefore, may help determine when the 
presumption of innocence becomes operable in practice and reconcile some of the 
theories. 
 Among the examined charters, conventions and statutes the presumption of 
innocence becomes operable in one of three contexts: to ‘everyone,’ 28  to ‘the 
accused,’29 and to ‘everyone charged.’30 These terms and phrases provide guidance as 
to when an individual can enjoy the presumption of innocence, however, the 
interpretation of these terms leads to some unexpected results. 
The agreements that provide that ‘everyone’ shall have the right to the 
presumption of innocence contain the most expansive formulation of the right. The 
use of ‘everyone’ should mean that the only limit to whether someone can enjoy the 
presumption of innocence is whether the situation is within the realm of criminal law. 
The articles concerning the presumption of innocence in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Statute of the International Criminal Court use 
‘everyone’ as an unqualified term. Specifically, they state that ‘[e]very individual 
shall have… [t]he right…to be presumed innocent…’ and ‘[e]veryone shall be 
presumed innocent…’ respectively.31 These Conventions give no further clue as to 
when the right might become operable. Thus they imply that the right may attach 
before criminal proceedings of any type have been initiated, so long as the general 
situation is within the realm of criminal law. Looking beyond the statutes themselves 
however indicates that when the right attaches for these two agreements is more 
specific than it initially seems. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 African Charter art 7; ICC Statute art 66. 
29 ECCC Statute art 35 new; SCSL Statute art 17(3); ICTY Statute art 21(3); ICTR Statute art 
20(3); STL Statute art 16(3). 
30 UDHR art 11(1); ICCPR art 14(2); ECHR art 6(2). 
31 African Charter art 7; ICC Statute art 66(1). 
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Interpretation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is aided 
by the ‘Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in 
Africa’, which is meant to ‘further strengthen and supplement the provision relating to 
fair trial in the Charter and to reflect international standards.’32 The presumption of 
innocence is specifically discussed in the section on ‘Provisions Applicable to 
Proceedings Relating to Criminal Charges’.33 This section states that the presumption 
of innocence applies to ‘[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence’.34 Further it 
specifically establishes that while public officials can inform the public of criminal 
investigations, officials cannot express views on whether a suspect is guilty.35 This 
means that the right afforded in the African Charter is actually more limited than the 
term ‘everyone’ suggests. The ‘Principles and Guidelines’ imply that the presumption 
of innocence becomes operative in two separate ways. The first is that the right 
attaches when an individual is ‘charged with a criminal offence.’36 Although there is 
no further direction, this is presumably the full right to the presumption of innocence, 
including both aspects. The second part implies this is the case because it requires a 
specific element of the presumption of innocence to apply to a wider group of people. 
The second part provides the presumption of innocence to suspects, a group that is 
more expansive than the group described as being ‘charged with a criminal offence’. 
Suspects are merely under suspicion, they may end up being charged and prosecuted, 
or they may not. This is therefore a far more inclusive term than ‘charged’. The 
section also provides that the part of the presumption of innocence that suspects are 
entitled to enjoy is the part preventing public officials from making statements of 
guilt. This is a limited part of the non-procedural aspect of the presumption of 
innocence as was discussed in Chapter Four. Thus, under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights a wide group of people, ‘suspects’, can benefit from a 
narrower right that protects against public statements of guilt. Once a person is 
charged however, the whole of the presumption of innocence attaches and the 
individual can benefit from both aspects fully. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, ‘Principles And Guidelines On 
The Right To A Fair Trial And Legal Assistance In Africa’ DOC/OS(XXX) (2003). 
33 Ibid N. Provisions Applicable to Proceedings Relating to Criminal Charges. 
34 Ibid N(6)(e), N(6)(e)(i). 
35 Ibid N(6)(e)(ii). 
36 Ibid N(6)(e). 
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The International Criminal Court’s Statute is also more limited than the term 
‘everyone’ denotes. Despite being included in ‘The Trial’ section of the Rome 
Statute, the presumption of innocence is clearly meant to be applicable during other 
phases of the adjudicative process.37 The use of the word ‘everyone’ is different from 
the rest of the fair trial rights included in within this section. Most of the other rights 
apply only to ‘the accused’.38 Interestingly, the earliest drafts state that the accused is 
entitled to be presumed innocent, but this was changed in later drafts to the indicate 
that everyone shall be presumed innocent, as it appears in the Rome Statute.39 This 
implies that everyone is a deliberate choice of words and has a wider application than 
the other trial rights. In the Mbarushimana case the Appeals Chamber used this line of 
reasoning to hold that the right attaches early in the criminal process; ‘not only to 
accused persons, but also to those with respect to whom a warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear has been issued, before their surrender to the Court.’40 The word 
‘everyone’ suggests an extension of the right, and signifies that the presumption of 
innocence exists at all points in the formal proceedings before the Court.  
Unlike the European Convention on Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which house the presumption of innocence in 
the same article as the rest of the rights of accused persons, in the Rome Statute, the 
presumption of innocence is explicitly a separate article from the rest of the rights of 
suspected people and the rights that are specifically granted to those standing trial.41 
This highlights the presumption of innocence’s importance and that it is intended to 
be a right separate and distinct from the rest of the defence rights and could be 
extended beyond the bounds of trial. It shows that the right is meant to be more 
widely applicable than the rights given to defendants at trial.42 Further, keeping in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 M Cherif Bassiouni (ed), The Legislative History of the international Criminal Court: 
Introduction, Analysis and Integrated Text, vol 1 (Transnational Publishers 2005) 85; Gordon 
(n 5) 669-670.  
38 See ICC Statute art 66 (presumption of innocence) as opposed to art 67 (rights of the 
accused); Mbarushimana (n 5) para 8. 
39 This was changed in the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, ‘Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held 4 to 15 
August 1997’ (14 August 1997) Doc No A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev.1, 33; See also Schabas, 
ICC Commentary (n 8) 1003-1004 for discussion. ICC Statute art 66. 
40 Mbarushimana (n 5) para 8. 
41 ICC Statute art 66 entitled the Presumption of Innocence, art 67 entitled the Rights of the 
Accused. Schabas, ICC Commentary (n 8) 1004-1005; Schabas and McDermott (n 5) 1636 
para 2. 
42 Schabas, ICC Commentary (n 8) 1004-1005. 
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alignment with the interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, even the fair trial rights of Article 67(1) have been interpreted to extend 
beyond trial.43 Were the presumption intended to be just another trial right, it could 
have been included with the rights held within Article 67. The presumption of 
innocence was always drafted as an article separate from the other rights and was 
never meant to be combined with the articles containing the other rights of the 
accused. 
The limited case law from the International Criminal Court dealing with the 
issue of when the right to the presumption of innocence becomes operable supports 
the notion of an expansive right, however it is not as inclusive as the term ‘everyone’ 
suggests. In Mbarushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber I held that because Article 66(1) 
states that the right is guaranteed to ‘everyone’ means that the right must extend to 
more than only accused persons.44 However, the decision goes on to list specific 
stages of the proceedings during which the right to be presumed innocent is 
guaranteed, including: ‘to those with respect to whom a warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear has been issued, before their surrender to the Court.’45 This 
interpretation by Pre-Trial Chamber I limited the presumption of innocence to less 
than the ‘everyone’ promised by the Article 66. It allows for the presumption of 
innocence to become operative before trial, but it seems only once the individual has 
been formally notified of the criminal procedure against them by arrest warrant or 
summons. A logical conclusion to deduce from this is that the presumption of 
innocence is not operable during the situation phase of the International Criminal 
Court’s proceedings. That the presumption would not provide individual protection 
during the situation phase is logical because at that point the entire situation is being 
investigated overall and no individuals have been singled out for prosecution.46 While 
this interpretation is far more limited than the term ‘everyone’ indicates, it is in 
keeping with the other jurisdictional and procedural rules of the Court. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Prosecutor v Lubanga (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the 
Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) 
of the Statute of 3 October 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06, A Ch (14 December 2006) para 37; citing 
Nowak (n 5) 244. 
44 Mbarushimana (n 5). 
45 Ibid. 
46 ICC Statute arts 13, 14, 15, 53; International Criminal Court, Regulations of the Office of 
the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09 (entered into force 23 April 2009) reg 33.  
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Thus, while there are two agreements that claim that ‘everyone’ is entitled to 
the presumption of innocence, a close examination of the documents surrounding the 
International Criminal Court and the African Charter show that the right operates in a 
more limited way. Both allow for the presumption of innocence to be relevant pre-
trial, however at the International Criminal Court it appears that the individual must 
have been formally notified of the charges against them. Under the African Charter 
for Human and Peoples’ Rights the full right to the presumption of innocence 
becomes operable for those who have been charged with a criminal offence while a 
narrower portion of the non-procedural aspect, specifically the provision concerning 
public statements of guilt, becomes operable once an individual is suspected. 
The majority of agreements provide for the presumption of innocence to ‘the 
accused’. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, ad hoc Tribunals, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon all have articles 
establishing the presumption of innocence using the phrase ‘[t]he accused shall…’.47 
The American Convention on Human Rights has similar wording indicating that 
‘[e]very person accused has the right...’.48  
That the right is available to those who are accused seems fairly 
straightforward. On its face, this means that the full right to the presumption of 
innocence would attach once a formal accusation occurs. The ad hoc and 
internationalised tribunals all set out the definition of ‘accused’ as being anyone who 
has one or more counts of an indictment confirmed against them.49 The American 
Convention on Human Rights however, does not set out a definition of ‘accused’. 
This is presumably because the American Convention was drafted to be flexible so as 
to accommodate the various traditions of its member states so long as those practices 
fall within the general parameters of the Convention.50 This lack of a clear definition 
makes it difficult to determine who qualifies as an accused under the American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 ECCC Statute art 35 new; SCSL Statute art 17(3); ICTY Statute art 21(3); ICTR Statute art 
20(3); STL Statute art 16(3)(a). 
48 ACHR art 8(2). 
49 Internal Rules, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (as amended 16 January 
2015) (ECCC Internal Rules) glossary ‘accused’ p 79; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (as amended 7 March 2003) r 2, Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (as amended 8 July 
2015) r 2(A), Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(as amended 13 May 2015) r 2(A), Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (29 November 2010) r 2(A). 
50 Medina (n 15) 9, para 14. 
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Convention, although it is clear from the case law that once a person is arrested for a 
criminal charge they are ‘accused’.51  
It appears from these statutes, that once an accusation occurs, the presumption 
of innocence becomes operable. That accused individuals have the right to the 
presumption of innocence is consistent throughout the case law and other 
documentation pertaining to these courts. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia however, provides an exception that implies that the right may be 
relevant at some point before a formal accusation. At the Extraordinary Chambers, 
Article 35 new of the Statute provides that the presumption is applicable to those 
accused. However, Rule 21, within the section of procedure and general principles of 
the Internal Rules, provides fundamental principles that are to be used to safeguard 
the interests of suspects, individuals who are charged, the accused and victims, and to 
provide legal certainty and transparency in the proceedings.52 Specifically, Rule 
21(1)(d) states: ‘Every person suspected or prosecuted shall be presumed innocent as 
long as his/her guilt has not been established.…’53 The inclusion of Rule 21 within the 
section of procedure and general principles shows that the presumption of innocence 
may be wider in scope than merely applying to the trial phase. This Rule is more 
expansive than Article 35 new because it includes those people who are suspected. 
Where Article 35 new merely states that the presumption of innocence belongs to ‘the 
accused’, Rule 21 expands that right to every person ‘suspected or prosecuted’. 
Provided that one can be suspected without being accused, the right to the 
presumption of innocence at the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia 
might become operable before the point of accusation.  
 The third manner in which the operability of the right to the presumption of 
innocence is expressed within the studied jurisdictions is through the use of the phrase 
‘everyone charged’. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights all 
formulate the presumption of innocence in this way.54 One reason that they use this 
formulation is because the European Convention and the International Covenant are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See for example Tibi v Ecuador (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 114 (7 September 2004). 
52 ECCC Internal Rules r 21(1). 
53 ECCC Internal Rules r 21(1)(d). 
54 UDHR art 11.  
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both based on the Universal Declaration.55 Additionally, they are similar because they 
are all human rights documents of general application. Thus, the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights were both written in a general way in order to attract member states.56 The 
European Convention on Human Rights is more limited in that only European States 
can become members, but it was decided early on that it would contain only ‘essential 
rights and fundamental liberties [that] could be guaranteed which are, today, defined 
and accepted after long usage, by democratic regimes.’ 57 This has the benefit of 
reconciling the various diverse legal systems amongst states parties and required a 
somewhat general wording in order to maintain the agreement among the drafters.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  Aside from the first draft, the presumption of innocence was incorporated into the 
Convention in much the same formulation as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights: 
William A Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP 
2015) 266-269 citing Preliminary Draft Convention for the Maintenance and Further 
Realization of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (15 February 1950), as reprinted in 
Council of Europe Collected Edition of the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, vol II (Martinus Nijhoff 1985); Amendments to Articles 1, 2, 
4, 5,6,8 and 9 of the Committees Preliminary draft proposed by the expert of the United 
Kingdom (6 March 1950), as reprinted in Council of Europe Collected Edition of the 
‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights, vol II (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1985); Appendix to the Report of the Committee of Experts on Human Rights; Draft 
Convention of Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (16 March 1950), as 
reprinted in Council of Europe Collected Edition of the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, vol IV (Martinus Nijhoff 1977) Conference of 
Senior Officials (8-17 June 1950), as reprinted in Council of Europe Collected Edition of the 
‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights, vol IV (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1985); Fifth session of the Committee of Ministers, Draft Convention adopted by the 
Sub-Committee (7 August 1950), as reprinted in Council of Europe Collected Edition of the 
‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights, vol V (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1985); Fifth session of the Committee of Ministers, Draft Convention adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers, as reprinted in Council of Europe Collected Edition of the ‘Travaux 
Préparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights, vol V (Martinus Nijhoff 1985) 
Fifth session of the Committee of Ministers, Appendix A. Draft Convention of Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as reprinted in Council of Europe Collected 
Edition of the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights, vol V 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1985) Documents prepared by the Secretariat-General, Text of the Draft 
Amended by the consultative Assembly including notes on the articles not yet approved by 
the Committee of Ministers and the Adoption of which is urged by the Consultative 
Assembly, as reprinted in Council of Europe Collected Edition of the ‘Travaux 
Préparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights, vol V (Martinus Nijhoff 
1985); ICCPR preamble/chapeau; Weissbrodt (n 6); Marc J Bossuyt, Guide to the ‘Travaux 
Preparatoires’ of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 
1987). 
56 See ICCPR  art 48; Samnøy (n 15) 14-20. 
57 Sitting 5th September 1949, Report presented by Mr. P.H. Teitgen (5 September 1949), as 
reprinted in Council of Europe Collected Edition of the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, vol I (Martinus Nijhoff 1985) 
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The presumption of innocence provision in the Universal Declaration of 
Human rights underwent some substantial changes during the drafting process, which 
give some clue as to when the presumption should become operative. The original 
version of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights described the presumption of 
innocence as:  
‘[n]o one shall be held guilty until proved guilty and 
convicted. No one shall be convicted or punished for 
crime or any other offence except after public trial at 
which he has been given all guarantees necessary for his 
defence and which shall be pursuant to law in effect at 
the time of the commission of the act charged.’58  
 
Eleanor Roosevelt, as the Chair of the Working Group on the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, argued that the presumption would be improved by rephrasing the 
statement to say, ‘[a]ny person is presumed innocent until proved guilty.’59 This was 
adopted as the first sentence of the article’s first paragraph.60 This change simplifies 
the wording of the article, but also substantially changes it. The original version’s use 
of the phrase said that ‘no one shall be held guilty’ implies it was concerned with 
either pre-trial detention or treatment of the accused, not the procedural aspect of the 
presumption of innocence. Thus, both aspects of the presumption of innocence were 
not necessarily contemplated in the original draft. Additionally, changing the phrase 
from ‘no person’ to ‘anyone’ makes the idea more of a positive right for the 
individual rather than a negative limit on government power. Both formulations imply 
that the presumption of innocence becomes operable at some point pre-trial, perhaps 
without limit. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting [of the Working Group on the Declaration of 
Human Rights] held at the Palais des nations, Geneva (8 December 1947), as reproduced in 
William A Schabas (ed) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, vol 1 (CUP 2013); 
Weissbrodt (n 6) 17. 
59 Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting [of the Working Group on the Declaration of 
Human Rights] held at the Palais des nations, Geneva (8 December 1947), as reproduced in 
William A Schabas (ed) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, vol 1 (CUP 2013) 
1193-1194. 
60 Ibid. This was adopted four votes to nil with two abstentions. Article 10, Draft International 
Declaration of Human Rights (Draft United Nations Declaration of Human Rights) (Annex 
A) (18 June 1948), as reprinted in William A. Schabas (ed ) The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, vol 2 (CUP 2013); Report of the Economic and Social Council on the Second 
Session of the Commission [on Human Rights] held at Geneva, from 2 to 17 December 1947 
(17 December 1947), as reprinted in William A. Schabas (ed) The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, vol 2 (CUP 2013); Weissbrodt (n 6) 18.  
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The Declaration was again changed during the third session of the 
Commission to provide consistency between the French and English versions by 
adding the phrase  ‘charged with a penal offence’ after ‘everyone’, which would 
account for the appearance of the word ‘accusée’ in the French text.61 This change 
also emphasised that the article was written to be applicable to criminal law.62 
Throughout the drafting process it became clear that Article 11 only applied to 
criminal cases that were adjudicated in formal hearings.63 After making this change, 
the Third Committee finalized the wording of Article 11 and forwarded it to the 
General Assembly.64 While this change emphasizes the criminal law requirement of 
the presumption of innocence, it also limits when the right becomes operable. With 
this change the presumption went from applying to ‘anyone’ to requiring that the 
person be charged. It also indicates that while there are limits to when the 
presumption of innocence applies, there is still room for the presumption of innocence 
during pre-trial procedures and possibly during appeal, depending on how ‘charged’ 
is interpreted. 
The presumption of innocence was included in all of the drafts of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.65 Early drafts however, were 
found too restrictive as to whom the presumption protected. Discussions occurred 
during the 5th, 6th and 8th sessions of the Commission on Human Rights about 
broadening the scope to include: those who had been charged and were facing trial; 
those who had been charged and not arrested; and those who suffered from 
wrongfully inflicted punishment.66 It was determined that the phrase ‘Everyone 
charged with…’ encompassed the proper scope as it allows anyone charged, 
regardless of whether they are arrested, to benefit from the presumption of 
innocence.67 Thus, in a manner similar to that in the Universal Declaration of Human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.55 (n 6) at 13; Weissbrodt (n 6) 20; 
Trechsel (n 9) 154. 
62 Weissbrodt (n 6) 20. Article 10 applies to both civil and criminal law while Article 11 only 
applies to criminal law. Schabas, ECHR Commentary (n 55) 265. 
63 Weissbrodt (n 6) 23. 
64 UN doc. E/800, Annex A, article 9. See also Raimo Lahti, ‘Article 11’ in Gudmundur 
Alfredsson and Asbjørn Eide (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1999) 241; Weissbrodt (n 6) 23. 
65 See generally Bossuyt (n 55) 291-293. 
66 Ibid. The changes regarding the presumption of innocence are on pages 291-293 citing 
Commission on Human Rights, 5th Session (1949), 6th Session (1950), 8th Session (1952). 
67 Ibid. See also Muhammad (n 5) 150; Nowak (n 5) 254, para 34. 
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Rights, the International Covenant also requires that an individual be charged before 
the presumption of innocence becomes operable. 
Like the word ‘criminal,’ the European Convention on Human Rights has 
been interpreted to give an autonomous meaning to the word ‘charged’. This 
development has primarily grown out of the case law pertaining to the right to trial 
within a reasonable time.68 Charged means ‘the official notification given to an 
individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a 
criminal offence’ or other action that has ‘the implication of such an allegation and 
which likewise substantially affects the situation of the suspect.’69 This meaning is 
considered ‘substantive’ rather than ‘formal’ and thus the Court will ‘look behind the 
appearances and investigate the realities of the procedure in question’ to see if the 
suspect has been substantially affected.70 Although arrest or formal summons for a 
charge are included, for the most part someone is ‘charged’ if they have received any 
official notification that an investigation has been launched against him regardless of 
whether an arrest occurred.71 Article 6(2) has been specifically interpreted to reject 
the notion that suspects not (yet) charged have the presumption of innocence.72 
Article 6(2) therefore does not include protections for individuals who have been 
arrested for other reasons, such as preventative detention.73 However, if a public 
statement of guilt is made about an individual who is not charged at the time of the 
statement, but later becomes charged with a criminal offence that the previous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Adolf v. Austria (1982) Series A no 49 para 30; David J Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Edward 
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statement is relevant to, the earlier prejudicial statement can be evaluated to determine 
whether it violates the presumption of innocence for the current charge.74 This means 
that the right does not attach before the charge, but once the presumption is relevant, 
events that occurred before the right was operable can be remedied. However, the 
opposite is also true; if prejudicial statements are made about an individual who is 
never charged with a relevant criminal offence, the presumption of innocence is not 
relevant to those statements. 
 The wording of the statutes, conventions and covenants seem to indicate that 
the presumption of innocence is available to everyone, all of the time. Once the 
interpretation of the supporting documents and cases for these agreements is 
examined, however, it becomes clear that when the presumption becomes operative is 
fairly uniform across jurisdictions. First, the presumption of innocence applies during 
trial regardless of when its protection otherwise commences. No matter the system 
used the procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence attaches at trial. The non-
procedural aspect applies during trial, but is also wider than the procedural aspect and 
has a starting point before trial starts. Second, no jurisdiction has a presumption of 
innocence that is available to ‘everyone’ without qualification. Even the Rome Statute 
and African Charter, which offer ‘everyone’ the right, have been interpreted in a more 
limited way. This helps tie the presumption of innocence to criminal law because it is 
only available to individuals who have some role in the criminal process. Third, the 
presumption of innocence applies to everyone who is charged. Across these 
jurisdictions it is consistent that those charged will have the right to the presumption 
of innocence. There may be some difference in how the jurisdiction defines when the 
presumption becomes operable and what constitutes the status of ‘charged’ but it at 
least includes when the person is formally notified of the charges against them.  
C. Conclusion 
That the presumption of innocence is a human right implies that everyone may 
enjoy the right to the presumption of innocence. This idea is supported by the 
foundational documents of the conventions, agreements, and statutes studied. None of 
these allow the presumption of innocence to apply to some people and not others. 
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Rather, it is open to all without qualification. When it comes to human beings, 
everyone may enjoy the presumption of innocence’s protections.  
While everyone can enjoy the right to the presumption of innocence, it does 
not apply in every context. Determining that context is essential to knowing when the 
presumption of innocence is relevant. As was examined in Chapter 2, the presumption 
of innocence is only available within the broad context of criminal law. Further, it is 
agreed among theorists and courts that the presumption of innocence applies at trial. 
While the procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence is confined to the trial 
setting, the non-procedural aspect is wider. It appears that the general consensus in 
practice is that the non-procedural aspect applies when one is ‘charged’ or formally 
accused of a criminal offence. What constitutes the status of being charged depends 
on the particular jurisdiction but at the very least it includes when one receives formal 
notice of the charges against them. While being charged appear to be the agreed upon 
starting point, individual jurisdictions could provide for even earlier protection to 
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Chapter 6. Who Carries The Duty To Uphold the Presumption of Innocence? 
The right to the presumption of innocence requires a corresponding duty on 
the part of those who must uphold the presumption.1 The duty, expressed through the 
conduct of the duty holder, mainly falls to fact-finders and other public authorities, 
however the media and private entities and individuals may also have some duty to 
uphold. The duty of each of these actors differs depending on their role regarding the 
individual right-holder and the context in which the action or statement takes place. 
The way the duty is expressed, and who bears that duty, is crucial to understanding 
how the presumption of innocence works because it determines how duty-bearers 
must act in a given situation and whether a remedy may exist for inaction or a failure 
to uphold the presumption of innocence. 
The theory regarding who has the duty is as wide-ranging as the theoretical 
debates about the presumption of innocence itself. That is because who has the duty to 
uphold the presumption of innocence is at the heart of the debate between interpreting 
it as a narrow or a broad presumption. Every commentator who believes that 
upholding the presumption of innocence requires a duty agrees that the duty lies with 
the fact-finder. In addition, there are also some who think that the duty extends to 
public officials, media, and even possibly to private individuals. Each of these 
categories will be discussed using the case law and rules of the international and 
regional courts and tribunals and this chapter will argue that the duty to uphold the 
presumption of innocence extends to fact-finders and public authorities.  
The duty to uphold the presumption of innocence arises in both aspects of the 
presumption – procedural and non-procedural. What those duties entail depends on 
which aspect of the presumption of innocence is being applied in the particular 
situation. This chapter focuses on who has the duty. How the duty is carried out, that 
is, what each aspect requires was discussed in Chapters Three and Four. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 James W Nickel, ‘How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide’ (1993) 15(1) 
Hum Rts Q 77; See for example Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 32: Right 
of Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and to Fair Trial’ (23 August 2007) UN Doc No 
CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007) para 39 (General Comment 32”) (conveying duty on public officials); 
Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v Spain (1988) Series A no 146 (conferring a duty on public 
officials). 
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A. The Presumption of Innocence Requires a Duty 
The presumption of innocence is a human right and as such it requires a 
corresponding duty. A duty is a legal obligation to either take a particular action or 
refrain from acting in a particular manner.2 Most commentators accept that the 
presumption of innocence carries some duty although there is disagreement as to who 
has that duty.3 The narrow theorists believe the duty is limited to the fact-finders, and 
possibly prosecutors, at trial, while the broader theorists argue that people beyond 
fact-finders can also carry a duty to uphold the presumption of innocence.4 In 
practice, the duty and duty-holder may be different depending on which aspect of the 
presumption of innocence is applicable. 
The procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence makes it relatively 
clear that a duty exists because the statutes and case law of the criminal courts provide 
instructions as to how certain individuals are to uphold the procedural aspect. The 
Statutes of the International Criminal Court and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, for 
example, state that the ‘onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused’ 
and that ‘[i]n order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt of 
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.’5 This places the responsibility to uphold the 
presumption aspect of the presumption of innocence on the Prosecutor and the fact-
finder. The duty regarding the presumption aspect is not only found in the statutes, 
but is also set out in the relevant case law. For example, various Trial and Appeals 
Chambers at the ad hoc Tribunals have found that the fact-finder must not convict a 
person unless the required standard of proof is met is the fact-finder’s duty with 
regard to the procedural aspect.6 These cases and statutes put a burden or duty on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Sandara Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 
2008) 66-89; Nickel (n 1). 
3 See eg: Larry Laudan, ‘The Presumption of Innocence: Material or Probatory?’ (2005) 11(4) 
Legal Theory 333, 360; Antony Duff, ‘Who Must Presume Whom to be Innocent of 
What?’(2013) 42(3) NJLP 170; Thomas Weigend, ‘There is Only One Presumption of 
Innocence’ (2013) 42(3) NJLP 193; Hock Lai Ho, ‘The Presumption of Innocence as a 
Human Right’ in Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter (eds), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights 
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4 Narrow Theorists: Laudan (n 1); Richard L Lippke, Taming the Presumption of Innocence 
(OUP 2016) Broader Theorists:  Duff, ‘Who Must Presume’ (n 3).  
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 
1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 (“ICC Statute”) art 66(2) and 66(3); Statute of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (adopted 29 March 2006) S/RES/1757 (STL Statute) art 16(b) and 
16(c). 
6 Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana et al. (Judgement) ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, A Ch 
(13 December 2004) para 103; Prosecutor v Ntagerura et al. (Judgement) ICTR-99-46-A, A 
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fact-finders and prosecutors because they tell them what they must do in order to 
uphold the procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence. Additionally, that it is 
a mandatory legal presumption is further evidence that a duty is required.7 The 
mandatory nature of the presumption aspect necessarily requires or obligates someone 
to uphold this aspect and therefore confers a duty. 
It is somewhat less obvious that the non-procedural aspect of the presumption 
of innocence carries a duty because the relevant statutes and conventions themselves 
do not provide explicit instructions as to who holds the duty when applying this 
aspect. Despite this lack of direction there is no doubt that someone bears the duty of 
upholding the presumption when it is expressed beyond being a legal presumption 
during trial.  Because the presumption of innocence is being applied as a human right 
the implication necessarily follows that there is a corresponding duty to uphold that 
right.8 Further, the use of the word ‘shall’ within most of the statutes and conventions 
studied allows for the supposition that someone or some entity must uphold the 
presumption of innocence.9 While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does 
not use the word ‘shall’ it specifically refers to the presumption of innocence as a 
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58 (African Charter) art 7(1)(b); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 
16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 14(2).   
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‘right’.10 This is reinforced by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
which has held that there is a duty to uphold the non-procedural aspect because the 
right is violated when individuals do not act in a particular manner and those actions 
affect another person’s right to the presumption of innocence.11 Stated another way, 
that the non-procedural aspect can be violated confers obligations on individuals to 
not do certain acts such as making public statements of guilt or treating people as if 
they are guilty. For example, as was discussed in Chapter Three, public statements of 
guilt made against someone who has not been convicted of a crime can violate the 
presumption of innocence. The duty to uphold the non-procedural aspect of the 
presumption of innocence may not be as robust as the duty required by the procedural 
aspect, because there are fewer clear instructions about what steps must be undertaken 
to protect the presumption as a human right, who should take those steps, and what 
actions will violate the presumption of innocence. Nevertheless, the non-procedural 
aspect of the presumption of innocence carries some obligations and duties that must 
be upheld. 
In contrast, Magnus Ulväng argues, with regard to the non-procedural aspect, 
that the presumption of innocence does not create a duty or a burden because the 
presumption of innocence is actually not a right. He describes it instead as a guiding 
principle that people are not required to follow, but may choose to follow if they 
deem it appropriate.12 He bases his argument on the general statutory construction of 
the presumption of innocence. In his view, a narrow reading of a presumption of 
innocence statute appears to give an instruction to the fact-finder, while a broad 
reading does not provide guidance on how the presumption can be extended beyond 
the courtroom.13 Thus, Ulväng argues that because of this lack of instruction, the 
broader reading of the presumption of innocence does not convey a mandatory right 
but rather a principle or rule of thumb that goes to the deep structure of criminal 
law.14 Because the broader presumption of innocence is general and structural in 
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11 See for example: Ismoilov and Others v Russia App No 2947/0649 (ECtHR, 24 April 2008) 
para 166; Nešták v Slovakia App No 65559/01 (ECtHR, 27 February 2007) para 89. 
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nature, rather than a specific right, it does not convey a specific duty on any 
individual.15 
The way that the presumption of innocence is typically constructed does not 
support Ulväng’s argument. Most of the statutes containing the right to the 
presumption of innocence use the word ‘shall’ when stating who has the right.16 There 
is no indication that the word ‘shall’ should be respected when applying the narrower, 
presumption aspect but ignored when using the wider human right aspect. Ulväng is 
correct that the typical statutory construction of the presumption of innocence does 
not direct a duty-bearer in how to act with regard to the non-procedural aspect. 
However, the use of the word ‘shall’ in clauses establishing the presumption supports 
the notion that the presumption of innocence is both mandatory and indicative of a 
right. The presumption is usually worded as a positive right held by the right holder 
and not as a specific affirmative duty imposed on the duty-bearer. Rather than being 
an instruction, the articles direct that the right must exist, but do not give instructions 
on how the right must be upheld. Whether it is stated as a positive right or as 
instructions for the duty-holder should not matter because both convey that the 
presumption of innocence is a right and it must be followed. Thus, the required right 
creates an obligatory duty. 
Additionally, the argument that the presumption of innocence is a rule of 
thumb, rather than a right, ignores the fact that the presumption of innocence is a 
recognized human right.17 As a human right, there must be people who are able to 
enjoy the right as well as people who are able to exercise the duty. Further, there is a 
significant amount of case law recognizing that the presumption of innocence requires 
people to carry a duty.18 As will be explained in detail below, the duty to uphold the 
non-procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence as a human right has been 
recognized in case law. 
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16 ECHR art 6(2); ICC Statute art 66; ECCC Statute art 35 new; SCSL Statute art 17(3).  
17 UDHR art 11(1); ICCPR art 14(3); ECHR art 6(2); American Convention on Human 
Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) (ACHR) art 8(2); 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (published on 27 June 1981, entry into force 
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18 See for example Krause v Switzerland (1979) 13 DR 73 (duty conveyed to the Swiss 
Chancellor); Prosecutor v Gaddafi (Decision on the Request for Disqualification of the 
Prosecutor) ICC-01/11-01/11, A Ch (12 June 2012) (duty required of the Prosecutor). 
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One way to reconcile Ulväng’s theory with practice is that his theory is similar 
to the lawmaker’s duty to uphold the presumption of innocence as a human right. 
Lawmakers must bear the presumption of innocence in mind whilst writing laws but 
are not required to enforce the presumption of innocence with respect to specific 
individuals.19 That is, laws must uphold or support the presumption of innocence, but 
in a general way, rather than with regard to the personal rights of any particular 
individual. Rather than conveying a specific duty, there is a general responsibility to 
create a law that is supported by, and not contradictory to, the presumption of 
innocence. The issue with this explanation of Ulväng’s theory is two-fold. First, legal 
principles give rise to duties – in this case the requirement of respecting the 
presumption while writing laws. This duty is somewhat more amorphous when 
compared to the active duty of actually presuming a particular person innocent or not 
treating individuals as guilty unless they are convicted. Ulväng suggests that under 
these circumstances the presumption could be seen as a guiding rule rather than as 
requiring the fulfilment of a duty. However, there is more than one part to the 
presumption of innocence and even if the non-procedural aspect is more similar to a 
rule of thumb than the more active and concrete duties of the procedural aspect, the 
fact remains that the presumption of innocence is both procedural and non-procedural 
in nature. Both aspects require individuals to exercise a duty. 
The presumption of innocence requires a duty to uphold it. The procedural 
aspect provides relatively clear instructions as to what the duty is and who is 
responsible for that duty, while the non-procedural aspect is less clear. That the 
presumption of innocence is a human right implies that there is a duty to uphold the 
right. Further, that individuals have been held responsible for violating the non-
procedural aspect confers some obligation on individuals to not engage in certain 
behaviour. The following sections will discuss which people have the duty to uphold 
the presumption of innocence. 
B. The Fact-Finder Must Uphold the Duty 
 The least controversial and most straightforward duty-bearers of the 
presumption of innocence are fact-finders. For the purpose of this discussion, ‘fact-
finder’ includes both judges and juries. Whether the fact-finder is a judge or jury 
depends on the jurisdiction. At the regional human rights level no distinction has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The presumption of innocence as a human right is discussed in Chapter 2. 
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drawn between how juries and professional judges must uphold their duty to respect 
the presumption of innocence.20  The fact-finder has the strongest duty to uphold the 
presumption of innocence because they must uphold both aspects.  
The procedural aspect carries a duty that specifically falls to the fact-finder. In 
terms of this duty, the fact-finder must find the accused not guilty unless and until all 
of the elements of the alleged crime(s) are proven to the relevant standard of proof.21  
To uphold this duty a fact-finder may not even suggest that the person in question is 
guilty before he or she is convicted.22 This is true regardless of whether the statement 
is made in the courtroom or outside of it.23 Additionally, the fact-finder violates the 
presumption of innocence if counsel or witnesses make prejudicial comments and the 
judge does not control these comments, as it can be deemed to show prejudicial bias 
on the part of the fact-finder.24 The fact-finder’s duty is specifically tied to the 
criminal trial process and requires the fact-finder to uphold the procedural aspect of 
the presumption of innocence. 
This duty includes approaching the case without any ‘pre-conceived idea that 
the accused has committed the offence charged.’25 That the fact-finder should not 
have preconceived notions of guilt is closely related to the right to an impartial and 
unbiased fact-finder. It has been argued that this is completely subsumed by the right 
to an impartial tribunal, however the European Court of Human Rights specifically 
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Right to a Fair and Public Hearing’ in Pieter Van Dijk, Fried van Hoof, Arjen Van Rijn, Leo 
Zwaak (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th edn, 
Intersentia 2006). 
23 Kypiranou v Cyprus ECHR 2005-XIII 47 (statements by a judge made during a court 
hearing); Lavents v Latvia App No 58442/00 (ECtHR, 28 November 2002); Nešták (n 11) 
para 88; Garycki v Poland App No 14248/02 (ECtHR, 6 February 2007) para 66. 
24 Austria v Italy (1961) 7 CD 23; Nielsen v Denmark (1959) 2 YB 412; X, Y, Z v Austria 
(1980) 19 DR 213. 
25 Barberà (n 1) para 77; Christoph Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human Rights 
(Beck, Hart 2014) 167, para 156; William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd edn, OUP 2016) 1002; Paul Mahoney, ‘Right to a Fair 
Trial in Criminal Matters under Article 6 E.C.H.R.’ (2004) 4(2) JSIJ 107, 120; Manfred 
Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP Engel 1994) 
254, para 35. 
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recognizes this idea as a part of the presumption of innocence.26 Preventing the fact-
finder from having preconceived notions of guilt clearly fits within both rights – the 
presumption of innocence and the right to an unbiased court. These rights are related 
however they do not completely overlap. The non-procedural aspect of the 
presumption of innocence includes not making statements of guilt before a conviction 
and not treating the accused as guilty, both of which could show bias on the part of 
the fact-finder against the accused. However, the presumption of innocence is more 
than this, it includes a specific legal presumption that the fact-finder must hold in the 
accused’s favour. It could be possible that a fact-finder or other duty-bearer might 
treat an individual as guilty without actually prejudging their guilt. This would violate 
the presumption of innocence in terms of the non-procedural aspect but would not 
violate the right to an unbiased fact-finder. Further, one can think of other ways a 
biased tribunal may manifest itself, not only through prejudging the case, but also by 
giving undue weight to certain types of testimony or evidence or accepting bribes. 
Thus, while the right to an impartial tribunal is related to the fact-finder’s duties under 
the presumption of innocence, neither right is completely subsumed by the other. 
The procedural aspect is unique to fact-finders. They are the people who must 
evaluate the evidence to determine whether the relevant standard of proof has been 
met and whether the presumption of innocence has been overcome. The fact-finder’s 
duty however, is not only limited to the presumption aspect. As public authorities, 
fact-finders are also responsible for all of the other duties imposed upon public 
authorities.  
C. Public Authorities Have a Duty to Uphold the Presumption of 
Innocence 
	  
The duty to uphold the presumption of innocence is not restricted to fact-
finders at trial. All public authorities have a duty to uphold the presumption of 
innocence. 27 Examples of this duty are that public authorities must not prejudge the 
outcome of a case or make public statements of guilt against the accused.28 The 
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specific duty required of a particular public official however, is determined on their 
role and relationship to the particular right-holder. 
The main reason that public authorities have a duty with regard to the 
presumption of innocence is related to the presumption’s role in relation to the rule of 
law and the power that government officials often have over private individuals. This 
primarily arises in the context of the presumption of innocence’s non-procedural 
aspect.  The main purpose of this aspect is to ensure that people will not be treated as 
if they are guilty of a crime unless they have been convicted.29 To conform to that 
right, a duty is imposed public authorities.  Failure to uphold this duty could expose 
non-convicted people to informal punishment and other sanctions against individuals 
who may never be prosecuted. There would also be less need for criminal procedure 
because without this duty, people could be treated the same regardless of whether 
they have been convicted of a crime through formal criminal proceedings. This would 
result in an increase of punishment in the absence of due process. While this might 
save time and money it would not uphold the rule of law. 
Another main reason for extending the duty to uphold the presumption of 
innocence extends to all public authorities is a concern that statements or actions 
made by public officials might lead the public to believe that the particular individual 
in question is guilty before he or she has had the benefit of a trial.  One reason for this 
concern is that statements made by public officials are thought to represent the 
opinions of the government or court.30 Thus, if a public official makes a statement 
prejudging a person’s guilt it could be thought to represent the opinion of the 
government itself, which includes the judges who are assigned to the particular case, 
and could create the appearance that the case was prejudged against the defendant. 
Further, the statements of public authorities may taint the opinions of members of the 
public against the suspected individual is because public authorities are thought to be 
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February 2013) para 91; Borovsky v Slovakia App No 24528/02 (ECtHR, 2 June 2009); 
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29 See Chapter 2. 
30 See eg Gaddafi (n 18) (chamber expressed fear that the Prosecutor’s statements would be 
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more believable, reliable and trustworthy than private individuals.31 Public authorities 
must take care to ‘avoid, so far as possible a misinterpretation by the public which 
could possibly lead to the suspect’s innocence being called into question before 
trial.’32 The public is expected to trust the government and people who work in public 
positions are expected to know more about the workings of government than the 
average citizen. This leads to the conclusion that if a public authority treats someone 
as guilty it may be based on information not available to the public-at-large.  This can 
include evidence not released publicly, certain types of investigatory materials, or a 
greater understanding of the law and how the criminal process works. Put another 
way, there is some expectation that public officials have opinions of a higher quality, 
because they are privy to more information or expertise, and should be more trusted 
or respected. 
D. Non-public entities have a limited duty to uphold the presumption of 
innocence 
	  
When considering the presumption of innocence’s non-procedural aspect, 
public authorities are always the group with the strongest duty. One purpose of human 
rights is to protect the ability of the people to exist and be free from an oppressive 
government, including a government that would be able to punish without due 
process. 33  This however, does not mean that private entities do not have any 
responsibilities to uphold human rights between one another.34 The duty regarding the 
presumption of innocence is not as clear however, for those who are not public 
entities, specifically the media or private individuals. These entities may have a duty 
but it is far more limited than that of public authorities because of the presumption of 
innocence’s necessary connection to the realm of criminal law and because any duty 
to uphold the presumption of innocence must be balanced against the non-public 
entity’s own rights.  
1. Non-public entity’s duty limited by realm of criminal law 
 
As was discussed in Chapter Two the presumption of innocence is only 
applicable within criminal proceedings. One of the purposes of criminal law is to 
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32 Stavros (n 20) 69; Bricmont v Belgium (1989) Series A no 158. 
33 Weigend (n 3); UDHR preamble. 
34 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 29(1). 
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determine liability for actions the government has deemed to fall outside of norms of 
permissible behaviour and to impose punishment in lieu of vigilantism or informal 
punishment.35 Although criminal law is largely involves the relationship between the 
government and the people, the media and other individuals are not precluded from 
bearing some responsibility for upholding the presumption of innocence.  
Private entities are often not directly involved in the criminal justice process. 
Criminal investigations, prosecutions and trials are usually entirely conducted by 
public authorities. However, private individuals participate in the criminal justice 
process as victims, witnesses, or by disseminating news about crimes that have been 
committed. Additionally, private individuals often initiate the criminal process by 
reporting crime to the police. When private individuals are involved in the criminal 
process, they should uphold the non-procedural aspect of the presumption of 
innocence. Private individuals should not engage in punishment or otherwise treating 
people as if they are guilty without a conviction. When an individual or the media is 
directly involved in the criminal process they should have a duty to uphold the 
presumption of innocence. The duty must be less demanding when they are not 
directly involved in the criminal process because the further criminal law and 
procedure the situation is, the presumption of innocence becomes less relevant. 
2. The media’s duty regarding the presumption of innocence 
 
In General Comment 32 the Human Rights Committee states that ‘[t]he media 
should avoid news coverage undermining the presumption of innocence.’36 This use 
of ‘should’ contrasts with the ‘duty for all public authorities to refrain from 
prejudging the outcome of trial’ that is referred to earlier in the same paragraph. 
Nevertheless, it imparts some responsibility on the media. The use of ‘should,’ rather 
than ‘must’ or ‘duty’ is cautious and may reflect that the media’s freedom of 
expression, and role in reporting information about criminal activity, must be 
balanced with the media’s duty to uphold the presumption of innocence. This idea of 
balancing the media’s freedom of expression against their duty under the presumption 
of innocence appears to be supported in the case law as well as the European 
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Treatise on Government  (H Davidson 1982). 
36 General Comment 32 (n 1) para 39. 
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Directive on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and 
the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings.37 
The media has some duty to protect the presumption of innocence however; 
there is a question as to what constitutes ‘the media’. When one thinks of the media it 
may be envisioned as newspapers, radio, and television outlets. The internet, greater 
technology and access to information have increased the amount of information 
disseminated from less traditional and more casual sources which leads to the 
question of whether these newer, and perhaps less formal, sources should be 
considered ‘media’, or something else. 38  Whether something is considered ‘the 
media’ is an open question, and one that the law concerning the presumption of 
innocence does not address. 
Regardless, while the media has a duty to uphold the presumption of 
innocence, this duty must be balanced by the media’s own rights to freedom of speech 
and expression. Therefore, what the media’s specific duty is could depend on how 
much control the state has over the particular media outlet’s content or how 
independent the media in question is from state control. The question of who controls 
the media’s content is controversial and the answers are quite wide-ranging. 39 If state 
control over the media were portrayed as a spectrum, one could imagine that media 
that is completely state controlled would be on one end and media that is completely 
independent of state control would be on the other end. Most media however, falls in 
between.  
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The amount of state control over the media’s content however, should help 
determine to what extent the media has a duty to uphold the presumption of 
innocence. Media that falls closer to being state controlled should fall within the 
category of ‘public authority’ as the content being transmitted is controlled by the 
state, meaning that public authorities control the narrative and, in the context of 
criminal law, can choose whether to portray someone as guilty. Media where the state 
has greater control over the content would therefore have the same duties as all other 
public authorities.  
Media that is more independent and less controlled by the state has a greater 
right to freedom of expression.40 Media that is more independent, or not state 
controlled, is not a ‘public authority’ but it does serve certain important public 
functions such as reporting of government actions, serious crimes and other issues in 
the public. Likewise, the media can also shape the public’s and fact-finder’s opinion 
about people and events, even if it is independent from state control.41 Because public 
opinion can be shaped by the media, which is similar to some of the reasoning behind 
the public authorities’ duty, the media should have some duty regarding the 
presumption of innocence. This duty however, needs to be balanced with the media’s 
right to freedom of expression and responsibility to report events that are in the 
public’s interest. 
3. Individual’s duty regarding the presumption of innocence 
 
Private individuals have some duty to uphold the presumption of innocence 
however their duty is even less stringent than that of the media.42 This is for two 
reasons. Individuals have other human rights that must be balanced against their duty 
to uphold the presumption of innocence and private individuals tend to have less 
influence than public authorities or the media over other individuals. 
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 The human rights of private individuals cannot be curtailed except when they 
encroach on other people’s rights or the ‘just requirements of morality, public order 
and the general welfare in a democratic society.’43 Thus, private individuals can enjoy 
their rights and freedoms so long as they do not conflict with these limits. With regard 
to the presumption of innocence, although there is wide freedom for individuals to 
treat others with suspicion or distrust, there is a societal or moral harm done when a 
member of the public presumes someone to be guilty without justification.44 This is 
because treating someone with suspicion or as though they are guilty, without cause 
implies that the suspected person is disregarding his or her societal obligations or 
disrespecting the community.45 
Private individuals have other rights that take precedence over upholding the 
presumption of innocence for other private individuals. For example, private 
individuals are entitled to hold opinions, biases and beliefs that do not have to be 
based on evidence. Further, freedom of speech and freedom of expression allow 
individuals to express those opinions (even if reprehensible) to others within certain 
wide limits.46 Additionally, while people are entitled to their biases against specific 
individuals (or even groups) any mistreatment resulting from that bias should not be 
akin to the type of treatment that can be permissibly inflicted on someone following a 
finding of guilt. This means that people should not be shunned, sanctioned or 
similarly punished by members of society without cause. When the behaviour of 
private citizens gets too close to the type of treatment that would normally result from 
a conviction, or is otherwise too far outside the acceptable level of behaviour, the 
non-procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence may have been interfered with 
and the mistreated individual could seek recourse in either civil or criminal law. 
 Another reason that the individual’s duty to uphold the presumption of 
innocence is less stringent is because of the relative lack of influence that private 
individuals have over others. There is a concern that the government or public 
authorities, and to a lesser extent the media, will exert influence over the general 
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public resulting in the imposition of informal sanctions against individuals that have 
not been convicted of anything. Private individuals however, rarely have this kind of 
influence over other private individuals. The opinion of one person may influence 
others, but in a more specific and less widespread manner than the risk posed by the 
government or media. 
Legal theorist, Antony Duff introduces an interesting normative theory 
relating to the individual’s duty to uphold the presumption of innocence. Duff argues 
that the presumption of innocence imposes a duty on individual citizens and is 
‘essential in a society committed to fairness and social justice.’47 His formulation is 
based on the idea that the presumption of innocence ‘reflects our belief that 
individuals are decent and law-abiding members of the community until proven 
otherwise.’48 It is a notion based on the duty of mutual respect that members of a 
society have towards each other generally and would serve as both a duty and a right 
of all citizens in their daily lives.49 Duff’s approach extends the presumption of 
innocence beyond the realm of criminal law and procedure to the civil interactions 
that individuals have with each other.50   
Duff argues that individuals have a duty as citizens to extend a ‘civic trust’ to 
all of the other citizens, meaning that members of a society (or citizens of a polity) are 
required to treat our fellow citizens as if they can be trusted to not commit crimes and 
that they are capable of both understanding reason and acting in accordance to 
reasoned decisions.51 He believes there should be an expectation that people will act 
in accordance to social norms and obligations and refrain from crime.52 Further, he 
suggests that we expect people to understand the reasons behind laws that criminalise 
behaviour, and we only wish to convict people who act according to their own will.53  
To demonstrate this point Duff gives the example of how society takes 
precautions against crime. One way individuals prevent crime is by locking our car 
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doors, which is a legitimate act to deter crime because it is a general precaution.54 If, 
however, you were to lock your car door as a response to seeing another person 
approaching you, that person will likely feel insulted by your action because they 
know you are presuming them guilty of criminal intent and showing a specific distrust 
of them in particular.55 This argument is strengthened in the criminal court context 
because an accused person must be treated as innocent if one is to continue to treat 
them as a citizen.  That is, you must treat an accused person as you would any citizen, 
because to do otherwise would be to treat them as if they are guilty.56  
This theory is interesting when considering the presumption of innocence 
from a normative perspective. What Duff appears to do is apply the presumption of 
innocence to the normal actions of individuals in an effort to determine whether the 
presumption could provide an explanation for regular everyday non-criminal 
behaviour. When thinking about how human interaction works, it is quite common for 
individuals to approach strangers with a sense of neutral trust, that is, without a sense 
of trust or distrust towards them. One generally expects that people encountered in 
everyday situations will act rationally and in a law-abiding manner. Prejudices aside, 
it is not until that individual says or does something specific, that our attitude, or level 
of trust, changes. Further, if one displays an attitude of distrust towards others without 
reason, the person who experiences that distrust will find the behaviour outside of the 
norm. This is much like how the presumption of innocence works in criminal 
procedure. The presumption of innocence requires duty-holders to approach 
individuals with a belief in their innocence that can only be displaced once a certain 
amount of evidence has been provided to displace it. 
While the civic presumption of innocence proposed by Duff is an attractive 
theory, it is very different from the legally defined presumption of innocence. The 
latter is ‘specific and retrospective,’ in that it is about a specific person and specific 
events that are alleged to have already happened.57 Thus, it is both temporally and 
individually limited. 58 The civic presumption of innocence on the other hand, is 
‘general and prospective’ meaning that each person is presumed innocent of past 
crimes that he or she has not been found guilty of as well as all ‘future crimes in 
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general’.59 Thus, not only does the civic presumption of innocence not create an 
individual duty to uphold the presumption of innocence, but also when it applies, its 
purpose and its goals are fundamentally different. While the civic presumption of 
innocence is interesting because it appears to reflect how people act, and how they 
should act, in regular situations, it is theoretical and very different from the 
presumption of innocence.  
E. How is the duty expressed? 
One expects a duty to be carried out through actions, not thoughts. There is 
some confusion with the duty required by the presumption of innocence however, 
stemming from the fact that it is a presumption. On one hand, it seems that the duty to 
uphold the presumption of innocence, as with any duty, should be carried out by 
conduct. Conversely, legal presumptions are generally believed to be based in thought 
as they are inferences.60 In practice, the duty lies in the actions taken by the duty-
holder and not the thoughts or beliefs that the duty-holder may have.  What that 
means is that it does not matter what someone thinks about an accused’s guilt or 
innocence so long as the duty-holder’s actions serve to uphold their duty associated 
with the presumption of innocence.  This highlights the difference between thinking 
someone is innocent and treating them as if they are innocent.   
Duties require action because the word ‘duty’ puts an obligation to on the 
duty-holder. This implies that the duty-holder must actually do something in order to 
fulfil his or her obligation. The duty to uphold the presumption of innocence requires 
action in order for the obligation to be fulfilled.61 This conduct is represented in the 
words or treatment that the duty-bearer uses toward the right-holder. While it is 
possible for someone to have biases against the accused in their mind, if they do not 
act on those biases the presumption of innocence remains intact. This is seemingly 
obvious, but it is important to bear this in mind while discussing who has the duty and 
what that duty entails as the only way that one can know whether the presumption of 
innocence has been violated is through the words or actions of a duty-bearer.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Duff, ‘Who Must Presume’ (n 3) 181. 
60 John D Lawson, The Law of Presumptive Evidence (AL Bancroft & Co 1885) 555, rule 
117; see Philippe Merle, Les Presomptions Legales en Droit Penal, These, 20 December 
1968, Universite de Nancy, Faculte de Droit et Des Sciences Economiques, Librairie 
Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence (Paris 1970);  Morton and Hutchison (n 7) 11. 
61 Duff, ‘Presumptions Broad and Narrow’ (n 50) 272. 
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Presumptions generally are inferences or beliefs that individuals hold. 62 
Attitudes and beliefs are thoughts that, unless expressed, stay in a person’s mind. 
While it may be ideal for individuals to express what they think, if a person thinks 
something and does not express it then the thought stays with them. There is no way 
of knowing what private thoughts people might carry. This is particularly challenging 
within criminal law because if upholding a presumption is an internal process, then 
there is no way of knowing if the duty bearer is upholding it correctly. This is 
particularly true in cases that do not result in a written opinion. 
There is a contradiction in the idea that someone could believe that a person is 
guilty, before the presumption of innocence has been overcome, and yet not violate 
the right to the presumption of innocence. Internal thoughts that the duty-bearer has 
about the right-holder’s innocence however, can only be proven by the actions and 
speech of the duty-bearer. Further, violations of a right must have some consequence 
on the right-holder otherwise there would not be a violation. If a duty-bearer is able to 
maintain their thoughts or suspicions of guilt, while upholding both aspects of the 
presumption of innocence, then the right-holder has suffered no consequences and 
there can be no violation.   
That does not mean that the duty-bearers’ words must be taken without 
interpretation. The context of duty-bearers’ statements will be considered in order to 
try to determine the true meaning, rather than merely focusing on the form of the 
statement.63 That context will take into account both who said the statement and 
whether the statement can have a more innocuous interpretation.64 Interpreting the 
meaning of a statement helps prevent duty-bearers from hiding their true intention of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Lawson (n 60) 555, rule 117; see Merle (n 60);   Morton and Hutchison (n 7) 11 The 
presumption or procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence is discussed in Chapter 3. 
63 See for example Lavents (n 23) para 126; Daktaras (n 22) para 42; A.L. v Germany App No 
72758/01 (ECtHR, 28 April 2005) para 31; Ismoilov (n 11) para 166; Nešták (n 11) para 89; 
Krause (n 18); Gaddafi (n 18) para 33; Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Decisions on Defence 
Request for an Order to Preserve the Impartiality of the Proceedings) ICC-01/04-01/10-51, 
PT Ch I (31 January 2011); This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
64 See for example Gaddafi (n 18) para 33; Mbarushimana (n 63); Krause (n 18). See also X v 
Austria (1981) 26 DR 214 for a similar situation and finding. J v Peru (Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C 
No 275 (27 November 2013); Fatullayev v Azerbaijan App No 40984/07 (ECtHR, 22 April 
2010) para 159; Allenet de Ribemont (n 28) para 38; Garycki (n 23) para 69; Bernadette 
Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks, and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey the European Convention 
on Human Rights (6th edn, OUP 2014) 287; W Schabas and Y McDermott, ‘Article 66: 
Presumption of Innocence’ in Otto Triffterer, Kai Ambos (eds), Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary (3rd edn, CH Beck 2016) 1645-6, para 27. 
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depriving someone of their right to the presumption of innocence and further 
underscores the importance of this right. 
F. Conclusion 
The presumption of innocence is a human right owed to the right-holder.   
There must, therefore, be some corresponding duty obligating others to ensure that the 
right-holder has access to the right. While everyone bears some duty to uphold the 
presumption of innocence, the practical application of the presumption indicates that 
while the right may belong to everyone equally, the duty is somewhat narrower and 
depends on the duty-holder’s role. This more limited category of duty-holders results 
from the fact that the imposition of a duty must not unduly limit the rights and 
freedoms of the person upon which the duty is being imposed. 
Fact-finders at trial have the broadest duty with regard to the presumption of 
innocence, as they must uphold the presumption in both its procedural and non-
procedural aspects. By comparison, public authorities are only required to uphold the 
non-procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence. However, they also have a 
strict obligation with regard to that duty. Public authorities must not treat a non-
convicted person as if he or she is legally guilty. Greater limitations on the rights and 
freedoms of public authorities, such as their right to freedom of expression, may be 
justified because of the influence public authorities may have over public opinion or 
because of how a public authority’s actions may reflect back onto the court or 
criminal justice system. To allow public authorities to treat non-convicted people in 
the same manner as those with a conviction would obviate the need for due process 
and the criminal justice system generally. 
Private entities have some duties to uphold the non-procedural aspect of the 
presumption of innocence. This duty must be balanced against the entity’s other 
rights. Private entities must be able to enjoy their own rights and freedoms so long as 
they do not violate other people’s rights or the society’s morality or welfare. 
Generally speaking when someone does this it will be handled within the applicable 
criminal or civil law. The free media has a stronger duty than private individuals. This 
is because private individuals have more rights and freedoms than the media and the 
media has more ability to influence the general public. 
A close examination of the duty to uphold the presumption of innocence 
highlights the existence of the two different aspects. The duty changes not just 
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because of the normative role individuals play in society, or their particular role 
within government, but because of the setting in which the duty-bearer’s action 
occurs. This chapter shows that the duty is different depending on whether the duty-
bearer is acting inside or outside the trial setting, as well as whether the duty-bearer is 
a public authority. 
Outside of the trial context, the duty is general and everyone bears some 
responsibility to ensure the accused receives its protections. This duty is part of the 
non-procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence and has the purpose of not 
causing public opinion to turn against individuals. Thus, it ideally prevents 
extrajudicial punishment by either the government or the public. It requires the 
government to not treat individuals as guilty unless they have been convicted. Further, 
it prevents public authorities from treating individuals as under suspicion unless the 
relevant standard of proof has been met to warrant a different kind of treatment. 
Individuals cannot subject others to informal punishments that would normally be 
enacted by the government. The media and private individuals cannot express their 
suspicions as to another person’s guilt to such an extent as to violate laws regarding 
defamation. 
Within the trial setting there is another function to the duty arising from the 
presumption of innocence. This aspect of the duty is tied to the presumption of 
innocence being an actual legal presumption and is relevant to the fact-finder’s 
responsibilities. The presumption of innocence requires the fact-finder to presume 
innocence until and unless there is enough proof to overcome the required standard of 
proof. The purpose of this duty of the presumption of innocence is to prevent 
convictions of innocent people.  
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Chapter 7. The Relationship Between the Presumption of Innocence and Pre-
Determination Detention 
 
Today there are an estimated 3.3 million people worldwide being held in detention 
without a conviction, despite the fact that the presumption of innocence prevents 
punishment or treating people as guilty without a conviction.1 In many countries, the 
number of people detained prior to a final determination on their charges is growing 
and is a major contributor to prison overpopulation.2 Although human rights law is 
based on a principle of non-incarceration, pre-determination detention has become the 
norm in most criminal jurisdictions.3  
On its face, pre-determination detention appears to be directly at odds with the 
presumption of innocence. Pre-determination detention seems to treat individuals as if 
they are guilty without a conviction. Imprisoning someone pre-determination restricts 
their human rights and can act as pre-punishment. This is particularly true when an 
individual is being held in pre-determination detention in conditions that are the same 
or similar to those imposed on a person who has been convicted after trial. Although 
some scholars and courts who subscribe to a narrow reading of the presumption of 
innocence argue that the presumption of innocence does not apply to pre-
determination detention, they base this idea on the notion that the presumption of 
innocence only applies at trial and that other rights control whether or not pre-
determination detention is appropriate. If the presumption of innocence applies to pre-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Open Society Justice Initiative, ‘‘Presumption of Guilt: The global overuse of pretrial 
detention’ (2014) <www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/presumption-guilt-
09032014.pdf> accessed 16 April 2018, p 7. 
2 Fair Trials, ‘A Measure of Last Resort? The practice of pre-trial detention decision making 
the in EU’ (2017) <www.fairtrials.org/wp-content/uploads/A-Measure-of-Last-Resort-Full-
Version.pdf> accessed on 16 April 2018; Lonneke Stevens, ‘Pre-Trial Detention: The 
Presumption of Innocence and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
Cannot and Does not Limit its Increasing Use’ (2009) 17 Eur J Crim Cr L Cr J 165, 167. 
Commission of the European Communities, ‘Green Paper on Mutual Recognition of Non-
Custodial Pre-Trial Supervision Measures’ (17 August 1994) Doc No COM(2004) 562 final 
(2004),  3. 
3 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 Dec 1948, 217 A (III) 
(UDHR) art 9; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (ECHR) art 5; American Convention on 
Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) (ACHR) art 7; 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217 (African 
Charter) art 6; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 9. 
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determination processes, it appears that detaining someone who has not been 
convicted would necessarily interfere with the presumption of innocence. 
The earlier chapters of this study argue that the presumption of innocence applies 
to pre-trial processes and decisions. In fact, the non-procedural aspect of presumption 
of innocence applies to all facets of the criminal process and helps regulate the 
relationship between individuals and the government. Specifically, the presumption of 
innocence requires that individuals not be punished or be treated as guilty unless they 
are convicted of a crime. If the presumption of innocence is to help avoid arbitrary 
detention, it is easy to see that pre-determination detention is in tension with the 
presumption of innocence and its purpose of not punishing innocent people.  
Laws authorising pre-determination detention are not set out in the same articles 
or sections of criminal codes and statutes as the laws guaranteeing the presumption of 
innocence. As such, the legality of a pre-determination detention decision is often 
evaluated through the lens of the laws regarding pre-determination detention alone 
and not in conjunction with laws guaranteeing the presumption of innocence. 
However, an overwhelming number of cases that decide presumption of innocence 
issues are actually considering whether detaining someone prior to trial violates the 
presumption of innocence.4 This is usually involves an inquiry about the relationship 
between the presumption of innocence generally and the accused’s general pre-
determination detention status. Very few decisions evaluate whether the reasons 
behind the individual’s pre-determination detention violate the presumption of 
innocence. 
Accused persons are detained before the outcome of trial for a number of reasons 
and for varying lengths of time. This chapter evaluates whether the reasons given for 
pre-determination detention can comply with the presumption of innocence. As such, 
it will not discuss the general philosophical issues that surround pre-trial detention. To 
that end, it is assumed that situations may exist under which pre-trial detention is 
justified under law. Further, this chapter will not argue whether the reasons for pre-
trial detention are justifiable under any other legal provisions.  
There are three main reasons why a person may be incarcerated before the 
determination of the outcome of their case. They are: 1) the type of charges the person 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 W Schabas and Y McDermott, ‘Article 66: Presumption of Innocence’ in Otto Triffterer, 
Kai Ambos (eds), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (3rd edn, 
CH Beck 2016) 1648, para 32. 
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has been accused of; 2) crime prevention; and 3) to ensure that the accused person is 
present for trial. In addition to these reasons justifying pre-trial detention, there are 
additional special considerations that exist in international criminal law that may 
prevent an accused from being released from custody before the outcome of their trial 
is determined. Each of these reasons and special considerations for pre-determination 
detention will be evaluated with respect to the presumption of innocence in order to 
establish whether any of them are compatible with the presumption. The chapter 
concludes that it is not consistent with the presumption of innocence to hold someone 
in pre-determination detention based on the type of charges they have been accused of 
or to prevent the accused from committing future crimes. The presumption of 
innocence is only compatible with holding an accused before trial to ensure that he or 
she will appear for trial. This reason however, can only be valid if the decision to 
detain the accused before the trial’s outcome is considered outside of criminal 
procedure. Finally, the special circumstances discussed within international criminal 
law cannot be used as reasons or excuses to hold someone in detention before a 
conviction as they are clearly at odds with the presumption of innocence. 
A. What is Pre-Determination Detention?  
Pre-determination detention exists when an individual is held in custody 
during all or any part of the time between when he or she is arrested and the final 
outcome of the case.5 While commonly called pre-trial detention it is more aptly 
described as pre-determination detention, as it can occur both before and during trial.  
The period during which each accused is detained prior to a determination of the 
charges differs on a case-by-case basis, although many accused people are detained 
for some period of time prior to the entry of a verdict.   
Pre-determination detention can be linked with arbitrary detention. Arbitrary 
detention is detention that occurs without legitimate justification.6 It is either not 
connected to criminal charges brought against the accused or the detention occurs in 
the absence of the required level of proof to support an arrest or continued detention.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Jeff Thaler, ‘Punishing the Innocent: the need for due process and the presumption of 
innocence prior to trial’ [1978](2) Wisc L Rev 441, 450; Laurence H Tribe, ‘An Ounce of 
Detention: Preventative Justice in the World of John Mitchell’ (1970) 56(3) Va L Rev 371, 
384; Stevens, ‘Pre-Trial Detention’ (n 2). 
6 UDHR art 9; ECHR art 5; ACHR art 7; African Charter art 6; ICCPR art 9. 
7 See Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
‘Report on the Use of Pretrial Detention in the Americas’ (30 December 2013) 
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While this kind of detention occurs, and is widespread, it is specifically guarded 
against in the international and regional human rights instruments.8 Detention without 
justification violates a number of human rights including the right to liberty, the right 
to autonomy, the right to work, the right to family life, and the right to due process. 
Pre-determination detention differs from arbitrary detention because it has some 
justification under the law. However, pre-determination detention is related to 
arbitrary detention because pre-determination detention is often used as a justification 
for incarcerating someone for no legitimate reason. Sometimes this occurs when 
individuals are held in pre-determination detention but are not charged for an 
excessive amount of time, which national and regional courts have found can violate 
the presumption of innocence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that 
being detained for six years without justification violates the presumption of 
innocence.9 Likewise, individuals in Malawi are sometimes kept in detention without 
charges for months or even years, despite a Constitutional requirement to uphold the 
presumption of innocence in a pre-trial setting.10 
 Of the international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals, only 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International 
Criminal Court have released accused individuals from pre-determination detention 
before the accused was acquitted or served their full sentence.11 There was no 
provision for pre-determination release in the Charters of either the Nuremberg or 
Tokyo Tribunals.12 That trend continued in international criminal law until 1999 when 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia amended Rule 65 of its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence and began to release more accused individuals prior 
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8 UDHR art 9; ICCPR art 9(1); ECHR art 5; African Charter art 7(3).  
9 López Álvarez v Honduras (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C No 141 (1 February 2006) para 144. 
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to trial.13  Before the amendment, requests to be released under Rule 65 could only be 
granted in ‘exceptional circumstances’.14 The amendment eliminated the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ requirement and set out several new criteria to be satisfied before 
release would be granted.15 Despite this change, detention remained the norm.16 
Although some accused were released before trial commenced all defendants were 
imprisoned once trial began.17 With the exception of some long breaks in trial at the 
former Yugoslavia Tribunal, defendants before the ad hoc Tribunals remained in pre-
determination detention from the beginning of trial until the final decision was made.  
The International Criminal Court and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon seem 
to have shifted away from the trend of extended pre-determination incarceration and 
pre-determination release is more likely at both. The International Criminal Court and 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon require the Pre-Trial Chamber to release the accused 
unless pre-determination detention is necessary to guarantee the accused’s presence at 
trial, prevent the accused from obstructing justice, or to prevent the continuing 
commission of the crime for which the person is charged.18  This represents a 
significant change from the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals and 
the ad hoc Tribunals. This change prioritised release unless certain conditions are 
present, whereas at the ad hoc Tribunals preferred to continue to detain the accused 
unless very specific conditions were met. Although pre-determination detention is still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (as amended 8 July 2015) (ICTY RPE) r 65. 
14  Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
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requirement is included in all versions of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence until 1999. 
15 ICTY RPE r 65. 
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Prosecutor v Halilović (Decision on Request for Pre-Trial Provisional Release) IT-01-48-PT, 
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widely used at the International Criminal Court, this shift in attitude should allow for 
more pre-determination release and better justified pre-determination detention in the 
future. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon should follow a similar practice however, 
their suspects remain at large. 
If the accused is not released while trial is pending, it is possible for an 
accused individual to spend many years in pre-determination detention, depending on 
the circumstances of their case.19 During this time, the individual accused suffers the 
loss or constriction of many rights including: the right to liberty, freedom of 
movement, the right to privacy, the right to work, the right to enjoy family life, and 
due process rights. 20  Individuals held in pre-determination detention may also 
experience economic, social and psychological consequences during their time in 
detention.21 They often lose their jobs, are restricted in their ability to spend time with 
family and friends, lose control over their schedule, lose the freedom to act as they 
choose, have restricted visits with their legal counsel, have a limited ability to help 
with their defence, and may suffer other consequences and deprivations depending on 
the circumstances.22 In some domestic settings there is some suggestion that an 
individual held in pre-determination detention is more likely to be convicted after 
trial, or more likely to receive a custodial sentence upon conviction.23 Thus, a non-
convicted person held in pre-determination detention suffers many of the same social 
losses as a convicted person. In an effort to minimise these negative consequences, 
individuals being detained prior to a determination of the crimes against them are 
meant to be housed in areas of the jail or prison that are separate from convicted 
individuals to counter any suspicion that pre-determination detention is analogous to 
punishment.24 The conditions of their confinement are meant to be less restrictive, and 
if possible, more comfortable than what is experienced by individuals who have been 
convicted. Unfortunately, regardless of how nice the conditions may be the non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Davidson (n 11) 4. See also the Open Society (n 1) and Fair Trials (n 2) reports for more 
current and national statistics. 
20 Richard L Lippke, Taming the Presumption of Innocence (OUP 2016) 159; Davidson (n 11) 
13. 
21 Thaler (n 5) 451; Rinat Kitai, ‘Presuming Innocence’ (2002) 55(2) Okla L R 257, 286-287. 
22 Kitai (n 21) 285-286. 
23 Ibid 286. 
24 Munyagishari v the Prosecutor (Decision on Bernard Munyagishari’s Third and Fourth 
Motions for Admission of Additional Evidence and on the Appeals Against the Decision on 
Referral under Rule 11bis) ICTR-05-89-AR11bis, A Ch (3 May 2013); McDermott (n 11) 42-
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convicted accused being held in pre-determination detention will still suffer most of 
the same deprivations and restrictions of their other rights, as those people in 
detention for punishment, and may suffer other stigmas once they return to their 
communities. 
B. Does the presumption of innocence apply to pre-determination 
detention? 
	  
The presumption of innocence and pre-determination detention are 
contradictory concepts that exist in most, if not every, legal system. Pre-determination 
detention is in tension with the presumption of innocence because it involves 
incarcerating an individual, an act typically regarded as a form of punishment, prior to 
any decision of conviction that would determine that the accused must be subject to 
punishment. Where the presumption of innocence prevents individuals from being 
treated as if they are guilty without a conviction, pre-determination detention appears 
to place non-convicted people in the same or similar conditions as a person who has 
been convicted. There is quite a lot of controversy when determining whether the 
presumption of innocence is at all relevant to the issue of pre-determination detention, 
in part because there is no general consensus about the scope of the presumption of 
innocence.25 The fact that individuals are treated as guilty by being deprived of so 
many rights and freedoms, that are equivalent to the deprivations they would 
experience if convicted, should be a clear indication that the presumption of 
innocence is relevant to pre-determination detention. The similarity of between pre-
determination detention and punishment, in terms of the restriction of rights, shows 
that the presumption of innocence’s role of preventing people from being treating as 
guilty unless there is they have been convicted, is implicated as well.  
Imprisonment is the most severe sentence a convicted person can receive in 
most jurisdictions. Placing someone in pre-determination detention creates the 
appearance that he or she has been subjected to the worst possible punishment before 
they are even convicted.26 Human rights law strongly favours liberty over detention, 
and protects against arbitrary detention not just through the presumption of innocence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See discussion in Una Ni Raifeartaigh ‘Reconciling Bail Law with the Presumption of 
Innocence’ (1997) 17(1) OJLS 1, 4. 
26 Barreto Leiva v Venezuela (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C No 206 (17 November 2009) para 121; Lippke (n 20) 157. 
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but also through the application of other specific rules.27 The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights states ‘it shall not be the general rule that persons 
awaiting trial shall be detained in custody.’28 Further, the presumption of innocence 
dictates that people should not be treated as if they are guilty without first being 
convicted.29 
The debate over whether the presumption of innocence applies to pre-
determination detention is hindered by disagreements about the proper application of 
the presumption of innocence. There is a lack of standard as to what weight the 
presumption of innocence should be given with regard to determining whether pre-
determination detention is permissible.30 Lonneke Stevens argues that when it comes 
to pre-determination detention the presumption of innocence is ‘an important but 
abstract principle operating in the background.’31 This means that the presumption of 
innocence is relevant to pre-determination detention but does not clarify the ways in 
which it is relevant, what its weight should be when making the decision to hold 
someone in pre-determination detention, and whether the presumption of innocence 
can be used to help or criticise pre-determination detention practices.  
One could argue that the various intrusions and deprivations that are imposed 
on the accused during investigation, such as search and seizure, questioning and 
various types of monitoring, are not different from pre-determination detention. 
However, this does not seem justified because the deprivations and restrictions placed 
on the individual in detention are greater than the other types of restrictions placed on 
the accused. In addition, the purposes of pre-determination detention are different 
from the goals of different investigatory techniques. In particular, people are not 
placed in pre-determination detention for investigatory purposes, that is to gather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 ACHR art 7(5); ECHR art 5(3); African Charter arts 6, 7(1)(d), ICCPR art 9(3); UDHR art 
9. William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th edn, CUP 
2011) 285-286; Commission of European Communities (n 2) 3; Kate Doran ‘‘Provisional 
Release in International Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law’ (2011) 11(4) 
Int’l C L R 707, 724; Stefan Trechsel, ‘Rights in Criminal Proceedings Under the ECHR and 
ICTY Statute – a precarious comparison’ in Bert Swart, Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter 
(eds) The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (OUP 
2011) 149, 165-6; La Rosa (n 12) 642-643. 
28 ICCPR art 9(3). 
29 RA Duff, ‘Pre-Trial Detention and the Presumption of Innocence’ in Andrew Ashworth, 
Lucia Zedner, and Patrick Tomlin (eds), Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP 
2013); Shima Baradaran, ‘Restoring the Presumption of Innocence’ (2011) 72 Ohio St LJ 
723, 723; Raifeartaigh (n 25); Tribe (n 5); Kitai (n 21) 287. 
30 Stevens, ‘Pre-Trial Detention’ (n 2) 170-171. 
31 Ibid. 
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evidence. Rather pre-determination detention is imposed because of the seriousness of 
the particular charges brought against the accused, to prevent the accused from 
committing additional crimes, or to ensure that the accused appears for trial.  
Despite its resemblance to punishment without a conviction, some scholars, of 
the narrow, trial based, view of the presumption of innocence argue that the 
presumption of innocence is not implicated during the judicial decision to hold the 
accused in detention prior to a determination of the charges. For these commentators, 
pre-determination detention is fundamentally different from punishment because it 
lacks the necessary component of social disapproval or sanction.32 The idea is that 
there is no intent to punish the accused, but to merely restrain them while the 
investigation and trial processes are allowed to continue.33 This view is seen as being 
compatible with ‘actual investigation and trial’ because the accused is regarded as a 
‘suspect’ or ‘defendant’ rather than as ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’.34 Thus, because no 
judgment has been passed regarding the accused’s guilt, then the presumption of 
innocence is not implicated. 35  This position fails to account for the fact that the 
deprivations caused by pre-determination detention may be indistinguishable from 
punishment. Further, the accused who must endure time in prison without having 
been convicted, and the public, may not be able to discern the difference between pre-
determination detention and punishment.36  
Another argument suggests that it is unnecessary or irrelevant to conduct a 
presumption of innocence analysis when considering pre-determination detention. 
Under this line of thinking, other rights supply the protection that the presumption of 
innocence is meant to provide to the accused. This argument claims that presumption 
of innocence is unnecessary in this context because it is infringing on the domain of 
other rights, including the rights to liberty and personal autonomy, which provide the 
accused with adequate protection without resorting to the presumption of innocence.37 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See the discussion of this topic in Lippke (n 20) 158-159; See also Thaler (n 5) 450-451; 
Kitai (n 21) 287. For a general definition of punishment see HLA Hart, Punishment and 
Responsibility (OUP 1968) 4-5. 
33 Thaler (n 5) 451. 
34 Kitai (n 21) 277-278. 
35 Carlo Umberto Del Pozzo, La Liberta' Personale Nel Processo Penale Italiano (UTET 
1962) cited in Kitai (n 21) 277-278. 
36 Lippke (n 20) 156; Thaler (n 5) 451; Stefan Trechsel, ‘The Right to be Presumed Innocent’ 
in Stefan Trechsel and Sarah Summers (eds) Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (OUP 
2006) 180. 
37 Lippke (n 20) 157, 166-167. 
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However, while these other rights may protect the accused from unjustified restraint 
or imprisonment these rights do not specifically protect him or her from being 
punished prior to a conviction. Since pre-determination detention can be similar to 
punishment, the presumption of innocence is relevant.  
Stevens argues that while the presumption of innocence may be relevant to 
pre-trial detention in theory, this connection does not exist in practice. She suggests 
that because the European Court of Human Rights in part justifies pre-determination 
detention on crime prevention grounds it falls outside the scope of the presumption of 
innocence.38 Further because the presumption of innocence lacks specific rules or 
scope it can be manipulated to be more or less relevant to the question of whether pre-
determination detention is relevant.39 Thus, while the presumption of innocence is 
relevant to pre-determination detention on an abstract level it provides no practical 
guidance as to how pre-determination detention is to be applied and additionally 
cannot be a limiting factor on whether or when pre-determination detention is 
applicable.40 Rather, the presumption of innocence reminds the fact-finder that pre-
determination detention must have a specific justification.41 This argument limits the 
presumption of innocence’s role in determining whether pre-determination detention 
is applicable, however, it still argues that the presumption is relevant, albeit in a 
general and abstract manner. 
That the presumption of innocence and pre-determination detention exist 
within the same legal systems could be evidence that the presumption of innocence is 
not relevant to pre-determination detention if the co-existence of these two rules 
cannot be reconciled.42 Proponents use this argument to support their position that the 
presumption of innocence that is only pertinent during trial with little or no 
applicability in the pre-trial process. However, the presumption of innocence does 
apply outside of the trial context, and before trial has begun, thus the presumption of 
innocence could apply to pre-determination detention. This however, does require 
some reconciliation of the two legal concepts. 
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39  Stevens, ‘Pre-Trial Detention’ (n 2); Stevens, ‘The Meaning of the Presumption of 
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The debate about the applicability of the presumption of innocence to pre-
determination detention is also seen in the decisions of many international and 
regional courts, tribunals and other human rights bodies. The European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Commission both acknowledge that the presumption 
of innocence is relevant to whether someone can be held in pre-determination 
detention.43 However, both institutions have found that there is no human right to bail 
and that a denial of bail does not violate the presumption of innocence.44 At the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, President Cassese stated 
that the interests of security and order had to be balanced by the presumption of 
innocence when making decisions regarding detention.45 Further, Judge Robinson’s 
dissent for the provisional release decision in Prosecutor v Krajisnik et al. specifically 
links the notion of provisional release with the presumption of innocence.46 The 
International Criminal Court also acknowledges that the presumption of innocence is 
relevant to the decision of issuing an arrest warrant and detaining an accused person 
prior to a conviction.47 In contrast, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for 
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Bail) SCSL-04-14-AR65, A Ch (11 March 2005) para 32; William A Schabas, The 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd edn, OUP 2016) 
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46 Prosecutor v Krajišnik et al. (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Robinson to the Decision on 
Momčilo Krajišnik’s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release) IT-00-39 & 40PT, T Ch (8 
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decision of Trial Chamber III of 6 January 2012 entitled “Decision on the defence's 28 
December 2011 ‘Requête de Mise en liberté provisoire de M. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’”) 
ICC-01/05-01/08, A Ch (5 March 2012) para 40; Prosecutor v Gbagbo et al. (Decision on the 
“Requête de la Défense demandant la mise en liberté proviso ire du president Gbagbo”) ICC-
02/11-01/11 PT Ch I (13 July 2012)para 42; Prosecutor v Ntaganda (Judgment on the appeal 
of Mr Bosco Ntaganda against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 19 November 2013 
entitled “Decision on the Defence’s Application for Interim Release”) ICC-01/04-02/06, A 
Ch (5 March 2014), Prosecutor v Ntaganda (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka to 
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Sierra Leone explicitly decided that the presumption of innocence is not relevant to 
pre-determination detention.48 This is based on the perspective of some domestic 
courts that the presumption of innocence is only relevant as a counterpoint to the 
standard and burden of proof at trial and therefore has no place in the pre-
determination detention decision.49  
The tension between the presumption of innocence and pre-determination 
detention is real – pre-determination detention involves assigning non-convicted 
individuals the strictest punishment allowed in most criminal justice systems. Even if 
pre-determination detention does not fulfil the requirements of punishment, the 
deprivations and restrictions that the detained individuals experience are tangible and 
may be indistinguishable from those restrictions resulting from punishment. 50 
Ultimately, the disagreement between whether the presumption of innocence applies 
to pre-determination detention is an extension of the arguments of how broad or 
narrow the presumption of innocence is or should be.51 Those who believe in a 
broader interpretation of the presumption of innocence believe that it is relevant to the 
decision to detain someone before they are convicted. Those who argue a narrower 
approach think that the presumption of innocence has no place in the pre-
determination detention decision. To what extent pre-determination detention comes 
into conflict with the presumption of innocence depends on the reason stated for the 
pre-determination detention. 
C. Presumption of innocence and length of pre-determination detention 
When discussing pre-determination detention there are two considerations to 
which the presumption of innocence may be relevant: the decision to detain and the 
length of detention. The decision to detain someone is justified on numerous grounds, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
II of 19 November 2013 entitled “Decision on the Defence’s Application for Interim 
Release”) ICC-01/04-02/06, A Ch (5 March 2014) para 4. See also Schabas, ICC 
Commentary 1006; International Bar Association ‘Fairness at the International Criminal 
Court’ (August 2011) <www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=7D9DA777-
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48 Prosecutor v Norman et al. (Fofana - Appeal Against Decision Refusing Bail) SCSL-04-
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50 Lippke (n 20) 166. 
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which are discussed at length in the following sections. The length of detention 
however, is a different issue and raises the question of whether amount of time spent 
in detention could violate the presumption of innocence. This is a particularly 
important question in international criminal law where pre-trial and trial processes 
regularly occur over the course of a number of years. One of the most obvious 
examples can be found in Thomas Lubanga’s prosecution by the International 
Criminal Court. Lubanga was incarcerated for six years, including during two 
extended stays in proceedings, before a verdict was entered against him.52 The fact 
that he was ultimately convicted does not negate or lessen the infringements upon 
several of his rights and liberties that he suffered pre-conviction. 
Some courts try to minimize the impact of lengthy periods of pre-
determination detention by crediting the time served prior the verdict towards the 
sentence the accused receives following a conviction. While this may address the 
overall amount of time someone must be incarcerated it also gives the appearance that 
the period of time spent in pre-determination detention was part of the accused’s 
punishment.53 As a result, even if the stated reasons supporting the detention of the 
accused prior to trial are not meant as punishment the individual being held in pre-
determination detention may perceive them as such. This serves to blur the distinction 
between pre-determination detention and punishment and raises presumption of 
innocence concerns. 
 The argument that the length of detention can violate the presumption of 
innocence is based on the supposition that the longer the period of detention the more 
it appears to be pre-punishment. This is supported by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, which has held that an excessive length of pre-determination detention 
can violate the presumption of innocence, as it is ‘tantamount to anticipating a 
sentence’.54  It is true from the perspective of the accused that the longer he or she is 
detained, the more it appears that the accused person is being punished. Although the 
length of detention can create a greater appearance of punishment it does not cause 
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53 Lippke (n 20) 158-159. 
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the detention to be punishment itself. Thus, while the length of pre-determination 
detention may implicate fairness issues and other rights, the length of time that a 
person is in prison without a conviction is not a presumption of innocence issue on its 
own. The presumption of innocence only becomes relevant when determining 
whether someone is being treated as if they are guilty without a conviction. 
It has been suggested that the length of time someone is in pre-determination 
detention should be linked with, or proportionate to, the length of sentence they would 
receive if convicted of the alleged charges.55 This argument strengthens the link 
between pre-determination detention and pre-punishment, which furthers the belief 
than an improperly supported decision to detain someone prior to determining his or 
her guilt or innocence is violative of the presumption of innocence, whereas the 
length of detention by itself is not. The Human Rights Committee has commented that 
connecting whether someone should be held in detention, or the length of time 
someone is held in detention, to the sentence that the accused might receive, could 
violate the presumption of innocence.56 Further, the amount of time allowed in pre-
determination detention should not be linked to the offence charged, or the potential 
sentence upon conviction, but rather a legitimate interest, such as ensuring the 
accused’s presence at trial.57 The argument supporting the separation of the length of 
pre-determination detention from the charges or potential sentence further distances 
pre-determination detention from pre-punishment. This acts as evidence that the 
length of detention alone does not violate the presumption of innocence. Rather, it is 
the justification of the decision to hold an accused in pre-determination detention that 
could violate the presumption of innocence. 
What can violate the presumption of innocence is the reason supporting the 
decision to hold someone in pre-determination detention. If there is no longer 
adequate suspicion that the individual committed the alleged crime, but is still being 
detained, the presumption of innocence is violated. Likewise, if the original reason for 
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detaining the suspect was not properly justified, or it no longer exists, the presumption 
of innocence is violated due to a failure to properly respect the presumption as it 
works with the standard of proof. These issues are related to the length of detention 
because each day that someone is in pre-determination detention is an opportunity to 
review the reasons why they are being detained and whether those reasons are still 
warranted or justified. To not have periodic reviews of an individual’s detention could 
allow a situation where a once properly justified pre-determination detention has 
become arbitrary, thus violating the presumption of innocence. 
It is tempting to state that the length of pre-determination detention alone 
implicates the presumption of innocence, after all if treating someone as guilty 
implicates the presumption, the amount of time spent treating someone as guilty must 
also implicate the presumption of innocence. This however, is not the case. If the 
presumption of innocence is relevant to pre-determination detention, it is implicated 
in the decision-making process to detain or release someone rather than the amount of 
time an individual actually spends in pre-determination detention. While the length of 
pre-determination detention can be long, and the length can make it seem more like 
pre-punishment, the actual length of pre-determination detention is covered by other 
human rights principles such as fairness, proportionality, and due process.   
D. The justifications or reasons for pre-determination detention 
The conventions and statutes considered in this study are surprisingly quiet 
regarding the issue of why pre-determination detention is allowed. Upon examination 
of these statutes and conventions it can be determined that there are three main 
reasons for pre-determination detention: the type or seriousness of the alleged crime, 
prevention of future crimes, and ensuring that the accused is present for trial. The 
European Convention on Human Rights allows for ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a 
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority 
on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably 
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having 
done so’.58 This provision implies that a person can be held in pre-determination 
detention on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that they committed an offence, 
without requiring any other justification. It also allows for pre-determination 
detention in order to prevent future crimes or prevent the accused person from 
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absconding. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the American 
Convention on Human Rights state that the reasons for detention must be ‘previously 
laid down by law.’59 The African Charter further indicates that ‘[u]nless there is 
sufficient evidence that deems it necessary to prevent a person arrested on a criminal 
charge from fleeing, interfering with witnesses or posing a clear and serious risk to 
others, States must ensure that they are not kept in custody pending their trial. 
However, release may be subject to certain conditions or guarantees, including the 
payment of bail.’60 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia do not provide reasons for detention. Instead they state that 
‘[u]pon being transferred to the seat of the Tribunal, the accused shall be detained in 
facilities provided by the host country….’61 Further, Rule 65 provides that ‘[o]nce 
detained, an accused may not be released except upon an order of a Chamber.’62 An 
accused person may be released ‘only if [the Chamber] is satisfied that the accused 
will appear for trial and, if released, will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or 
other person.’63 Rule 65(c) stipulates that conditions may be imposed on an accused 
who is released from pre-determination detention including requiring a bail bond and 
‘such conditions as are necessary to ensure the presence of the accused for trial and 
the protection of others.’64 
The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court’s Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence also fail to identify the basis for holding an accused in pre-
determination detention. The reasons for arrest, however, are provided for in Article 
58 of the Statute. A person may be arrested if ‘[t]here are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and 
(b) arrest is necessary: (i) To ensure the person’s appearance at trial, (ii) To ensure 
that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court 
proceedings, or (iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the 
commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 African Charter art 6; ACHR art 7(2). 
60 The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, ‘Principles And Guidelines On 
The Right To A Fair Trial And Legal Assistance In Africa’ DOC/OS(XXX) (2003), M.1.(e) 
Provisions Applicable to Arrest and Detention. 
61 ICTY RPE r 64. 
62 Ibid r 65(a). 
63 Ibid r 65(b). 
64 Ibid r 65(c). 
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Court and which arises out of the same circumstances.’65 If none of these conditions 
exist the Prosecutor may issue as summons for the suspect to appear ‘with or without 
conditions restricting liberty (other than detention)’.66 Because of the non-custodial 
alternative of a summons to appear, it seems that the reasons for arrest would also be 
the reasons for continued pre-determination detention for part or all of the pre-trial 
and trial periods. This is supported by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which do 
not provide reasons for arrest or detention but do allow for periodic review of the 
accused’s pre-determination detention in order to determine whether release is 
appropriate.67 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not identify the circumstances 
that must exist for pre-determination detention to be terminated, but rather state that 
review of the decision to hold a person in pre-determination detention must occur at 
certain intervals.68 In fact, this is supported by the decisions of the Court, which allow 
for pre-determination detention for the reasons of ensuring the accused’s appearance, 
preventing obstruction of the court’s proceedings, or preventing the commission of 
crimes.69 The lack of specific provisions regarding the reasons for pre-determination 
detention in the Rome Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence imply an 
assumption that if a person is arrested before the International Criminal Court that 
they will remain in detention subject to the periodic reviews provided for in Rule 118. 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon are 
very clear on what will allow for the release of an accused person held in pre-
determination detention. At this Tribunal, the accused individuals must be released 
unless detention is necessary to ensure appearance at trial, prevent obstruction or 
endangering the court’s activities, or ‘prevent criminal conduct of the kind which he 
is suspected.’70 This Rule seems to express a preference for release, as it imposes a 
requirement on the Tribunal to release individuals with pending cases unless one of 
those requirements are met. Unfortunately, because none of the suspects have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 ICC Statute art 58. 
66 ICC Statute art 58(7); for possible restrictions see Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
International Criminal Court (as amended 2013) (ICC RPE) r 119. 
67 ICC RPE r 118. 
68 Ibid. 
69 See for example Prosecutor v Gbagbo et al. (Public redacted version Judgment on the 
appeal of Mr Laurent Koudou Gbagbo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 13 July 
2012 entitled “Decision on the ‘Requête de la Défense demandant la mise en liberté 
provisoire du président Gbagbo’”) ICC-02/11-01/11, A Ch (26 October 2012). 
70 STL RPE r 102(A). 
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arrested or appeared before the Tribunal, this rule has not been interpreted by the case 
law. 
There is agreement amongst international and regional statutes and 
conventions that pre-determination detention is justified depending on the type of 
crime alleged, whether detention will prevent future crimes and when it is used to 
ensure that the accused will appear for trial. What is at issue is whether detaining an 
accused for any of these reasons complies with the presumption of innocence. This 
chapter concludes that incarcerating an accused person before a verdict is reached to 
prevent the commission of future crimes or because of the seriousness of the crimes 
alleged is not in compliance with the presumption of innocence.  
1. Type of Crime 
 
 One reason used to justify pre-determination detention is the type of the crime 
of which the individual has been accused.71 There is a common belief that when a 
person is accused of a particularly serious or complex crime it suggests that he or she 
is unusually dangerous and that it is necessary to keep the accused imprisoned to 
protect the community at large.72 However, this reasoning violates the presumption of 
innocence because it is prejudging the case, pre-punishing the accused, and can lead 
to arbitrary detention.  
When evaluating whether the presumption of innocence is violated by a 
particular justification for pre-determination detention it is essential to first evaluate 
whether the decision to keep the accused in pre-determination detention is criminal in 
nature. This establishes whether the presumption of innocence is relevant to the 
decision to hold someone in pre-determination custody. The decision to detain people 
based on the type of crime they are accused of plays a role in the decision to bring 
charges against the accused because the type and severity of the crime is the reason 
for the detention. The two decisions go hand-in-hand; because someone is charged 
with X crime they will, or are more likely to, be detained pre-determination. Since the 
decision to detain someone pre-determination because of the type of crime that they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See eg ICTY RPE r 65; ICC Statute art 60(2), STL RPE r 102. For some discussion of how 
this is permitted in Mexico see Ana Aguilar-García, ‘Presumption of Innocence and Public 
Safety: A Possible Dialogue’  (2014) 3(1) Stability: Int’l J of Sec & Dev 1, 3. 
72 See discussion in Stevens, ‘Pre-Trial Detention’ (n 2) 178-179; Stevens, ‘The Meaning of 
the Presumption of Innocence’ (n 38) 242. 
	   184	  
are accused of is a decision within the realm of criminal law, the presumption of 
innocence applies and must be taken into consideration.  
It could be argued that the type of crime alleged should mandate or even 
create a presumption in favour of detaining the accused prior to the entry of a verdict. 
For example, people accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
could be automatically held in pre-determination detention because to do otherwise 
would communicate that these crimes are no more serious than other crimes and 
allowing their alleged perpetrators to remain free would trivialize the harms and 
human rights violations suffered by the victims.73 This argument involves some 
prejudgment of the guilt of the accused before their conviction.74 The danger of 
requiring pre-determination detention to allay fears that the crimes charged, and 
harms suffered, are not trivial necessarily implies that the accused committed those 
crimes. Taken to its extreme, basing pre-determination detention on the severity or 
type of crime means that no one accused of these crimes could be acquitted because a 
presumption of guilt has been created through their detention. There are other ways of 
demonstrating that grave crimes are being taken seriously without violating the 
presumption of innocence. 75 One concrete suggestion is that more severe sentencing 
upon conviction would communicate that convictions for these charges are being 
taken seriously.76 
Further, detaining people merely because the type of crime of which they are 
accused is grave or serious means that individuals charged for international crimes 
would never be released pre-determination. This is because one of the purposes of 
international criminal trials is to end impunity for atrocity crimes.77 If someone is 
charged with a crime at the international level, particularly at the International 
Criminal Court, then the crime itself is already very grave.78 The decision to exert 
jurisdiction over the crime would mean that everyone accused would need to be held 
in pre-determination detention. 
 Choosing to detain people accused of certain crimes during the pre-
determination period because of the type of crime they are alleged to have committed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Davidson (n 11) 13. 
74 Trechsel ‘Rights in Criminal Proceedings’ (n 27) 165-6. 
75 Davidson (n 11) 13. 
76 Ibid. 
77 See ICC Statute Preamble. 
78 See ICC Statute art 17(d) requiring a gravity threshold for cases to be admissible before the 
court  
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is clearly not in keeping with the purpose of the presumption of innocence because 
seeks to punish the accused without a conviction.79 This is particularly true if the 
likely sentence to be given after conviction is part of the reason that the type of crime 
is considered in the pre-determination detention decision. The European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have held that pre-
determination detention cannot be used to ‘anticipate the sentence’.80  
Despite the clear prohibition on pre-punishment it has been found that some 
judges do use pre-determination detention as a form of punishment. Lonneke Stevens 
found, in an interesting empirical study of courts in the Netherlands, that some judges 
pre-punish the accused by detaining the accused prior to a determination based on 
what the final sentencing decision might be.81 Put a different way, the judges were 
more likely to impose pre-determination detention in order to get the punishment 
started when they anticipated that a prison sentence would be imposed following a 
conviction.82 However, at the time a pre-determination detention decision is made the 
individual is merely accused of the crimes alleged and can still be either convicted or 
acquitted. It is possible that at some point during the trial process it will become clear 
that the individual should not have been a suspect in the first place. With regard to the 
presumption of innocence, at the time of accusation, no one has fully assessed the 
proofs against the accused, and so the accused must still be treated as innocent. Yet an 
accused held in pre-determination detention for the reason that they were accused of a 
particular crime must suffer all the deprivations that come with pre-determination 
detention merely on the basis of an accusation rather than conviction. This amounts to 
pre-punishment. 
Pre-determination detention justified on the basis of the severity of the charges 
has also been examined at the European Court of Human Rights and the ad hoc 
Tribunals. These courts allow for the severity of the charges to have some bearing on 
the decision to hold an accused person in pre-determination detention.83 Although this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Trechsel ‘Rights in Criminal Proceedings’ (n 27) 165-6. 
80 Smirnova v Russia 2003-IX 241; Tomasi v France (1992) Series A no 241-A; Letellier v 
France (1991) Series A no 207, 21, para 51 (1991). See also Davidson (n 11) 15-16.  
81 Stevens, ‘The Meaning of the Presumption of Innocence’ (n 38) 243. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Tomasi v France (1992) Series A no 241-A, para 89; Ilijkov v Bulgaria App. No 33977/96 
(ECtHR, 28 July 2001), para 82; Prosecutor v Perišić (Decision on Mr Perišić’s Motion for 
Provisional Release during the Court’s Winter Recess Case) IT-04-81-T, T Ch I (17 
December 2008), para 10; Prosecutor v Stanišić et al. (Decision on Provisional Release, IT-
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consideration has more weight at the ad hoc Tribunals than the European Court, 
neither allows for the severity of the charges to be the sole reason for pre-
determination detention.84 The European Court of Human Rights has specifically held 
that the type of crimes charged against the accused cannot result in automatic 
detention.85 
Pre-determination detention has also been based on the perceived complexity 
of the case at issue. The European Court of Human Rights has found that case 
complexity is a valid reason for holding an accused prior to a final determination on 
the charges, particularly in terrorism cases. It was held in Sagat et al. v Turkey, that 
because terrorism cases are very complex and serious, the suspects could be held in 
detention for a year and a half.86 This is an interesting pretext for justifying pre-
determination detention because in that particular case the suspects were accused of 
arson for throwing a Molotov cocktail at three cars.87 The European Court appears to 
be considering complexity as a justification for pre-determination detention because 
of the type of crime as a category, rather than the factual complexity of the particular 
case before the court.  
Another method of considering the severity of the charges against an accused 
individual is to examine the amount or type of evidence against the accused in order 
to determine whether pre-determination detention is justified. Focusing on the 
evidence rather than the specific charge allows for pre-determination detention based 
on severity for almost any crime. In a jurisdiction where a charge of murder may be 
severe enough on its face to allow for pre-determination detention, a crime of theft, 
which normally would not be severe enough, but which is accompanied by seemingly 
particularly strong evidence against the accused, could also justify pre-determination 
detention. Considering the amount or type of evidence against the accused also 
involves prejudgment of the case’s outcome. Here, the connection between the 
justification and the outcome is perhaps even more clear, as a decision to hold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
03-69-PT, T Ch III (26 May 2008), para 46; Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al. (Decision on 
Ramush Haradinaj’s Motion for Provisional Release) IT-04-84-PT, T Ch II, (6 June 2005), 
para 24; Prosecutor v Stanišić et al. (Decision on Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on 
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84 Doran (n 27) 717. 
85 Caballero v United Kingdom ECHR 2000-II 45. 
86 Sagat et al v Turkey App No 8036/02 (ECtHR, 6 March 2007). 
87 Ibid; see also Sahin v Turkey App No 29874/96 (ECtHR, 17 October 2000), and discussion 
in Stevens, ‘Pre-Trial Detention’ (n 2) 179. 
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someone in pre-determination detention made on the amount or type of evidence 
against them necessarily requires some assessment of the evidence and a decision of 
whether that evidence indicates some guilt on the part of the accused. This decision 
then mandates that the accused be held in a jail under conditions very much like 
punishment, despite the fact that not all the evidence has been assessed.  
Courts are divided on the issue of whether the strength of the evidence can 
justify pre-determination detention. The American and Canadian perspective takes 
into account the weight of the evidence or the strength of the prosecutor’s case when 
determining whether pre-determination detention is appropriate.88 At the European 
Court of Human Rights on the other hand, the strength of the case against the accused 
is not relevant to a decision regarding pre-determination detention.89 This is supported 
by the accused’s argument in the Pavković case at the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia that the weakening of the prosecutor’s case should warrant 
his release from detention.90 In this case, the Tribunal held that it was not appropriate 
to consider the weight of the evidence against the accused until trial.91  
Some scholars argue that the weight or amount of evidence against the 
accused should be considered when deciding to detain an accused person before a 
final determination is reached, but that when doing so it must be demonstrated to a 
higher standard of proof than that required for arrest.92 This would limit the number of 
individuals detained pre-determination and help ensure that those individuals that are 
detained before a verdict is reached are more likely to be found guilty. Requiring 
more proofs against the accused however, is merely showing that there are more 
pieces of proof, it does not demonstrate the reliability of the evidence. If the reliability 
of the evidence is questioned or tested during a hearing on the decision for pre-
determination detention, it is likely that this would turn into a mini-trial encouraging 
even more prejudgment on the part of the fact-finder. 
 This reason for pre-determination detention can lead to arbitrary detention, 
which by its very nature violates the presumption of innocence. Prosecutors often 
have some discretion as to what crimes they can charge in each particular case. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 United States Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 18 USC 3142(g)(2); R v Hall [2002] 3 
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89 Davidson (n 11) 17-18. 
90 Prosecutor v Šainović et al. (Decision on Pavković Motion for Temporary Provisional 
Release Case) IT-05-87-T, T Ch (7 December 2007), para 2. 
91Ibid. 
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Suppose a particular type of crime requires pre-determination detention but a lesser-
included offence does not. A prosecutor may be able to use discretion to charge only 
the lesser offence in some instances to purposely keep particular accused individuals 
out of pre-determination detention. More frighteningly, a prosecutor could choose to 
charge the highest possible crime, even if conviction is relatively unlikely, in order to 
detain an accused person without a conviction.  
Deciding to hold someone in pre-determination detention because of the type 
of charge should violate the presumption of innocence because it involves pre-
punishment, pre-judgment, and arbitrary detention. Pre-determination detention under 
these circumstances treats the accused as guilty although he or she has not been 
convicted.  Using the severity of the charges brought against the accused as a reason 
for pre-determination detention violates the presumption of innocence in other ways 
as well. It assumes that there is some truth to the charge before a full evaluation of the 
evidence and conviction. It may cause instances of arbitrary detention, where similar 
behaviour could be charged differently in order to make the difference between 
detention and release pending trial. As such, it is incompatible the presumption of 
innocence. 
2. Crime prevention 
	  
 A second justification for pre-determination detention is crime prevention. 
This justification exists when a person accused of a crime is detained before the 
outcome of their case because the fact-finder thinks they may commit other crimes if 
they are released.93 Judges engage in this kind of pre-determination detention when 
they consider whether the accused is a recidivist, or is likely to: commit further 
crimes; be a danger to the community; tamper with witnesses of the alleged crime; or 
obstruct justice.94 This type of pre-determination detention is the same as preventative 
detention.95 It weighs the interests of the community in being protected from future 
crimes against the interest of the accused in maintaining their liberty.96 It is not 
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consistent with the presumption of innocence as it prevents crimes that may not ever 
occur and therefore also assumes the accused’s guilt for crimes that have not 
occurred. 
This is different from detention for ‘mere dangerousness’, which is considered 
purely preventative, and is rarely, if ever, justified.97 Most commentators agree that 
something more than ‘dangerousness’ is required to keep someone in pre-
determination detention.98 If someone is detained just because they are believed to be 
dangerous, this would allow detention for people who have been acquitted of crimes, 
completed the sentence for a previous crime, or were never even accused of crimes.99 
It would permit a whole host of people to be detained with little proof that they are 
dangerous. This clearly violates the presumption of innocence as it treats people as 
guilty of crimes of which they have not yet been, and may never be, accused. It 
assumes guilt in both the crimes for which they stand accused and crimes they may 
commit in the future. 
In general, preventative detention without a charge is not permissible given an 
individual’s right to liberty.100 The European Court of Human Rights has held that it 
can only be permissible during an international armed conflict ‘where the taking of 
prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a threat to security are 
accepted features of international humanitarian law.’101 Otherwise, derogation from 
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights would be required.102 With 
respect to those already accused of a crime however, pre-determination detention 
justified by an argument that the accused is likely to commit crimes if released, is 
permissible under the statutes and conventions studied here. 
At the International Criminal Court, the risk of committing future crimes 
could be considered as a ground for pre-determination detention under Article 58(1) 
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of the Statute. In Prosecutor v Gbagbo, the Appeals Chamber held that when 
considering the issue of future crimes being committed by an accused person, the type 
of future crimes that might be committed did not need to be stated, it is the mere risk 
that future crimes might be committed that is enough to secure an accused person in 
pre-determination detention.103 To decide this, the Appeals Chamber assumed that the 
risk was that Gbagbo might commit crimes in the future that are similar to those 
crimes of which Gbagbo stood accused.104 The Appeals Chamber also asserted that 
the presumption of innocence has not been violated because Gbagbo still ‘enjoys the 
presumption of innocence in the determination of the charges against him’ and the 
Pre-Trial Chamber was permitted to take into account any risk that the accused would 
commit future crimes if released.105 While the Appeals Chamber is correct that the 
accused has the right to the procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence 
regardless of whether the accused is held in pre-determination detention, the Appeals 
Chamber ignores the non-procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence requiring 
that an accused not be treated as guilty prior to a conviction. Further, this decision 
highlights the lack of standards regarding the level and type of proof required for the 
pre-determination detention decision. The Statute of the International Criminal Court 
does provide for pre-determination detention on the basis of the risk that future crimes 
might be committed by the accused, however, this decision underlines that there is 
apparently no particular standard of proof required to show that the accused is a risk. 
Rather, the Appeals Chamber found that ‘in the specific circumstances and in light of 
the information before the Chamber, there is a risk that he may commit further crimes 
if released’.106 This is a relatively vague statement, especially when considered in 
light of the Appeals Chamber’s previous holdings that ‘the question revolves around 
the possibility, not the inevitability of a future occurrence’ and the notion that the Pre-
Trial Chamber did not have to specify what types of crimes they thought might be 
committed by Gbagbo if he were released from detention. 107 
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The presumption of innocence is relevant to the determination of whether 
someone will commit future crimes while awaiting trial because the underlying 
determination is necessarily criminal in nature. The narrow view of the presumption 
of innocence argues that requiring pre-determination detention on the basis of 
prevention of future crimes does not violate, or even implicate, the presumption of 
innocence so long as the detention decision is not based on a pre-judgment of the 
underlying charges.108 However, even at this early juncture it can be seen that holding 
individuals in pre-determination detention because of a risk of future crimes being 
committed is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. One should not be held 
in detention without the burden of proof for arrest being met. In this case, there has 
been no burden of proof met for the not-yet-committed criminal acts. In fact, the 
individual is being held in prison for crimes they may never commit. 
The fear that pre-determination release would lead an accused person to either 
engage in future crimes or to exert pressure on witnesses assumes that they are guilty 
of the accusations against them.109 This is an obvious form of impermissible pre-
judging that violates the presumption of innocence.  It also acts upon the inference 
that the accused is likely to commit crimes of a similar nature if given the 
opportunity.  However, at the level of international crime, it has been shown that once 
the conflict in which the alleged crimes were committed has ended, the risk of 
reoffending or continued participation in atrocity crimes is extremely low.110 Further, 
incarcerating people for crimes that have not yet been committed means they are 
being detained without first meeting the evidentiary standard for arrest for those 
crimes. This is not particularly different from requiring people too be detained for 
merely being ‘dangerous.’111 This brings the detention into the range of preventative 
detention. Richard Lippke counters this argument by stating that if pre-determination 
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detention is used in a selective way in cases where there is strong evidence to show 
that the accused committed the alleged crime and ‘substantial evidence that they pose 
a threat to others’ then detention on the basis of preventing future crimes could be 
justified so long as there are no other reasonable means to prevent those future 
crimes.112 While this brings the public safety argument to the fore, it fails to properly 
respect the accused’s right to liberty, particularly when there is no reliable evidence to 
believe that the accused will commit crimes in the future.  
 Pre-determination detention justified on crime prevention grounds necessarily 
does not consider the accused legally innocent of future crimes. Even if the accused is 
almost certainly going to be convicted of the currently alleged crimes, this does not 
mean that they are necessarily dangerous or will commit crimes while awaiting 
trial.113 It is extremely difficult to predict future criminal behaviour and whether an 
individual is likely to engage in it.114 In this situation the government is judging 
whether the individual will do something they have not yet done and may never do. 
Predictions about whether an individual will commit future crimes are not particularly 
reliable.  
 Some argue that evidence showing that an individual committed a serious 
violent crime demonstrates a predisposition on his or her part to commit other similar 
crimes in the future.115 This argument is especially strong when it is made about 
accused individuals with a history of recidivism.116 Justifying detention on this basis 
requires more proof than a mere suspicion that an individual is likely to commit 
further crimes.117 It necessitates evidence that the accused committed the initial crime 
and considers whether the individual’s ‘dangerous dispositions or impulses’ have 
been activated, meaning whether they are likely to commit more offences.118 Despite 
requiring some proof, this argument fails on multiple grounds. First, it pre-judges the 
allegations against the accused by implying that the accusation against them 
demonstrates a predisposition to commit crimes in the future.119 Second, it serves to 
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punish the accused twice for crimes already committed: once following the conviction 
for the first crime, and again through pre-determination detention for the second 
crime. Further, considering previous convictions under these circumstances can lead 
those who are formerly convicted to be treated as scapegoats and targets of false 
accusations in the future.  
As an example, suppose that it is illegal to possess a certain drug and that an 
individual is charged with possession of said drug. Now suppose that individual is 
actually addicted to the drug and has a number of prior convictions for possession of 
that same drug. Because of their addiction, it is extremely likely, perhaps almost 
certain, that this person will use (and therefore possess) this drug again while awaiting 
trial for their current charges. This might seem like a good case for pre-determination 
detention to prevent future crime; the likelihood of recidivism before the current trial 
takes place is extremely high and would almost certainly be prevented during the pre-
trial period by keeping the accused in jail. However, it is possible for people who are 
addicted to drugs to stop using them, and therefore it is possible that this person will 
not possess drugs while waiting for trial. If they are not going to possess the drug, 
then holding them in jail to prevent future crimes is just as arbitrary as holding 
someone in jail who has never been accused of committing a crime. The problem is 
that it is impossible to predict with accuracy. The presumption of innocence requires 
that people are not treated in the same manner as legally guilty people they have not 
been convicted of a crime, and in this particular situation detaining the individual in 
question would be to detain them for something that has not even happened. 
The European Court of Human Rights does not support this position. 
Upholding decisions by the European Commission on Human Rights and national 
courts, the European Court of Human Rights found that in a case involving fraud, 
several previous convictions for fraud could cause the national courts to fear that the 
accused will reoffend while awaiting trial. 120  When reaching its decision, the 
European Court failed to consider that detention under these circumstances runs 
counter to the presumption of innocence.  Presupposing that the accused will commit 
more crimes while charges are pending not only assumes they are guilty of the current 
charges, but that they will also be guilty of crimes that have not been committed.  
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It is difficult to see how pre-determination detention solely for the prevention 
of future crimes is different from pre-punishment.121 Ordering individuals into pre-
determination detention for crimes they may never commit is the equivalent of 
arbitrary detention, which in turn, is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. 
The accused is only susceptible to pre-determination detention as a result of the 
outstanding, unproven allegations against them. Holding individuals in prison for 
potential, future crimes pre-judges both the case before the court and assumes that the 
accused will commit crimes on remand. Finally, it pre-punishes the accused for both 
the crime they are alleged to have committed and crimes they may never commit.  
These sorts of prejudgment must be avoided if the presumption of innocence is to 
have any meaning at all.  
3. Prevent Absconding/ Ensuring Presence at Trial 
 
 The third type of pre-determination detention is designed to ensure that the 
accused will be present at trial. Whether this kind of detention is necessary depends 
on the perceived likelihood that the accused will abscond before trial. Unlike the other 
reasons for pre-determination detention, this justification can comport with the 
presumption of innocence because the decision to hold someone in detention for this 
reason is outside of the criminal process and therefore the presumption of innocence 
does not apply.  
 Detaining someone prior to a final determination of the case in order to ensure 
that the accused is present for trial is an attempt to prevent the accused from thwarting 
the criminal process. The accused’s presence is important for trial, and at most 
international and internationalised courts and tribunals the accused’s presence is 
required for trial to commence.122 If the accused is not present at the outset of trial in 
courts that do not allow for trial in absentia, then the trial process cannot begin until 
the accused is located and brought before the court. Ensuring that the accused is 
present for trial is necessary to allow the trial process to continue and for justice to be 
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done.123 This is a different kind justification for pre-determination detention because 
it is motivated by the need to ensure that trial takes place in the interests of justice. 
Requiring pre-determination detention to ensure presence at trial is therefore less like 
punishment or pre-punishment and more akin to an administrative decision to prevent 
the accused from interruption the criminal process. 124 Ensuring that trial takes place, 
in recognition of the needs of the victims and society as a whole, is a legitimate 
purpose that might justify detaining the accused pre-trial because all parties have an 
interest in ensuring trials are fair and just, including the state, court, prosecutor, 
defendant and victims.125 
 Using pre-determination detention to ensure that an accused person is present 
for trial requires the judge to predict the accused’s future behaviour. Richard Lippke 
does not separate ensuring the presence of the accused at trial from crime prevention 
as a reason for pre-determination detention.126 He feels that both are based on 
predicting the behaviour of the accused leading to decisions derived from similar 
logic.127 However, these are recognised as separate reasons for pre-determination 
within criminal law systems. Here it is argued that, although both justifications 
require the fact-finder to predict behaviour, they are separate because the purposes are 
somewhat different and because unlike a justification of crime prevention, fear of 
absconding as a justification for pre-determination detention can be a decision that is 
not criminal in nature, and thus, does not necessarily invoke the presumption of 
innocence. 
Failure to appear for court is not necessarily a crime. Some jurisdictions have 
criminalized failures to appear and if it is being considered as a crime, then the 
evaluation of whether pre-determination detention is allowable under the presumption 
of innocence would be considered under either the type of crime or crime prevention 
justifications.  However, in jurisdictions where failure to appear is not criminalized, 
the decision to detain someone prior to the entry of a verdict in order to ensure that 
they appear for trial is not within the criminal process. Detention to ensure the 
appearance of the accused is warranted by the public’s interest in justice being done 
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when a person is accused of a crime.128 The accused also has an interest in going 
through the trial process and receiving a decision about the charges against them. 
These issues remove the decision to detain someone to ensure their presence at trial 
from the sphere of criminal law and places them amongst other public and personal 
interests. Therefore, because the consideration is not criminal, the presumption of 
innocence is not relevant to this type of pre-determination detention. 
Additionally, individuals may fail to appear for trial for many reasons. Anyone 
can abscond regardless of whether they are guilty. It is commonly believed that 
individuals facing more serious charges and/or a higher potential sentence upon 
conviction are more likely to abscond from trial, particularly if the likelihood of 
conviction seems high.129 To determine whether the likelihood of conviction is high 
the fact-finder necessarily must review some of the evidence including the number of 
witnesses and documents against the accused. 130  In fact, if pre-determination 
detention is requested after some or all of the prosecution’s evidence has been 
presented at trial, the court may have a tendency to find that the accused is even more 
of a flight risk as the accused now knows what evidence the prosecution has against 
them.131 This should be avoided, as it implicates the presumption of innocence and 
criminal procedure, and there are other non-criminal indicators to help determine 
whether someone is a flight-risk. For example, the court could look to the strength of 
the ties that the accused has to the community, whether the individual has reliably 
come to court dates before, and whether they voluntarily surrendered to the court’s 
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jurisdiction or evaded arrest.132 A person who does business, lives, and has family in 
the area of the court is more likely to come to court than someone who is not tied to 
the community. If factors not related to the evidence are considered, then the decision 
to hold someone in pre-determination detention in order to prevent him or her from 
absconding could be deemed a decision outside of the criminal process. If that is the 
case, then the presumption of innocence does not apply to this decision. 
There should be specific, articulable proofs demonstrating the tendency or 
likelihood that the accused could abscond when justifying pre-determination detention 
on this basis.133 It is not enough to find that someone is likely to abscond because they 
are facing serious or grave charges. That mischaracterises this reason for pre-
determination detention as it is actually concerned with the type of crime charged 
rather than appearance at trial. Further, those charged with very serious crimes would 
never be able to be released. If on the domestic level, it were determined that someone 
should be held in detention because they are likely to abscond if they have a murder 
charge, then no one would be able to be released if they were facing crimes against 
humanity or war crimes. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia created an 
interesting hybrid of this type of pre-determination detention. Before 1999 all accused 
individuals were held in detention until their cases were determined unless they had 
‘exceptional circumstances’ that required their release.134 After 1999 exceptional 
circumstances were no longer required and it became easier for individuals to be 
released pre-determination.135 However, the accused still needed to prove that they 
were not a flight risk.136 Interestingly, however, the accused was always detained 
during the actual trial, even if they had been released during the pre-determination 
process. This ensured that the trial could continue and that the accused would be 
present for trial.137 A Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia announced that ‘generally it would be inappropriate to grant 
provisional release during trial because, inter alia, release could disrupt the remaining 
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course of the trial.’138 This approach demonstrates that there may be a substantive 
difference between basing pre-determination detention decisions on whether the 
accused will appear and all other justifications for holding an accused before a verdict 
is reached.    
Even when determining whether someone will abscond, pre-determination 
detention may not always be appropriate with respect to the presumption of innocence 
and other human rights implicated by detention. First, it should be used in a limited 
way and only against those who are legitimately likely to abscond. Second, an 
evidentiary standard must be set demonstrating that the absconding accused are likely 
to not return for trial or subsequent court hearings. Finally, it should be questioned 
whether pre-determination detention is ever appropriate if there is little or no 
possibility of a custodial sentence for the alleged crimes.139 It is inexcusable to hold 
individuals in pre-determination detention if ultimately there is no custodial sentence 
at stake. However, it may still be appropriate to hold those individuals thought likely 
to abscond in recognition of those factors that are separate from the rest of the 
criminal process. While this type of pre-determination detention still resembles 
punishment, and may be related to the criminal charges, the fact that it is justified on 
non-criminal law grounds means it does not violate or indeed, involve, the 
presumption of innocence. That is not to say that this type of pre-determination 
decision is always justified or permissible, but merely that it does not involve the 
presumption of innocence. 
4. Special considerations for international courts and tribunals/ 
convenience 
 
 There are some pre-determination detention issues that are unique to 
international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals.  These include: a 
lack of agreement about where the accused will be able to live while awaiting trial; a 
lack of agreement about who pays for housing and transportation needs; and a lack of 
security within the accused’s home state. 140  In practical terms, any of these 
considerations can cause a person to be held in pre-determination detention even if the 
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judges would like to release the accused. However, continuing to hold an individual 
when pre-determination detention is not justified violates the presumption of 
innocence. 
 Often an individual who is accused of international crimes, particularly at the 
International Criminal Court, cannot return to their home country. Their home country 
may be unstable, at war, or otherwise insecure.141 At times, the accused’s political 
rivals are in charge of the country, and would be hostile to the accused if they 
returned.142 Further, requiring a released individual to go back to their home country 
could look like impunity to both the victims of the alleged crimes and the public as a 
whole.143 The pre-trial process at the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc 
tribunals can last for years and it may appear that the accused is not actually being 
tried at all. Anger and resentment in the community and a public perception of the 
accused’s guilt could result in street justice or reprisals taking place against the 
accused. 
 Suspects before the International Criminal Court who are not welcome in their 
home nation often find it difficult to relocate to other countries. In order to live in 
another country they must either already be a citizen of that state, have some other 
legal right to live there, or gain admittance pursuant to an agreement between the 
International Criminal Court and the new country.144 This can be challenging because 
countries do not want to be seen as sympathetic to people who have committed grave 
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international crimes. Refusing to admit suspects because of the sort of crimes he or 
she is alleged to have committed is a form of pre-judgment that implicates the 
presumption of innocence. Further, it often forces suspects to remain in pre-
determination detention even after a judge has found such measures to be unnecessary 
because there is nowhere for the suspect to go.  
The International Criminal Court’s failure to conclude agreements with states 
parties about relocating those accused that have been released from custody is a gap 
in the law regarding state party cooperation. The Rome Statute requires states parties 
to cooperate with investigations and prosecutions of the Court, however this does not 
extend to cooperating with the defendant.145 This lack of a cooperation requirement is 
emphasized in Article 57(3)(b), which limits the Court to requesting cooperation on 
the defence’s behalf only to the extent ‘necessary to assist the person in the 
preparation of his or her defence.’146 States parties have interpreted the act of 
facilitating an accused’s release as a voluntary, rather than a necessary, measure, and 
therefore not one that falls under Article 57(3)(b).147  This has made it difficult for the 
Court to grant pre-determination release because no country will accept the accused 
person. 
This is not a problem unique to the International Criminal Court.  Before 
granting the pre-determination release of an accused the rules of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia require that ‘the host country and the 
State to which the accused seeks to be released’ has ‘the opportunity to be heard’ 
when a decision is to be made regarding pre-determination release.148 This was a 
major stumbling block for individuals seeking release in the early years of the 
Tribunal because judges did not give much credence to the guarantees of the country 
that would receive the accused individual.149 This was the result of a lack of 
cooperation between the countries that made up the former Yugoslavia and the 
Tribunal, as well as the Tribunal’s own inability to ensure the accused appearance at 
trial. However, as time went on, and the region became more stable and cooperative, 
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the court began to accept the guarantees. The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda also had this rule requiring guarantees by the country that would host the 
accused.150 This rule prevented pre-determination release at the Rwandan Tribunal 
because no country, including Rwanda, would guarantee the appearance of the 
accused.151 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone also required guarantees prior to release.152 
It was held that these guarantees and conditions for release must be ‘meaningful’ 
because of the Court’s lack of police force and enforcement powers, which meant 
there was a danger of not being able to re-arrest the accused if an accused individual 
were to abscond.153 Despite the Agreement between Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations, which requires the government to ‘comply without undue delay with any 
request for assistance by the Special Court or an order issued by the Chambers’, it 
was found that the domestic police did not have the capacity to sufficiently monitor 
accused individuals who had been released.154 The lack of an adequate police force 
became the primary justification in favour of continuing to imprison the accused 
before the entry of a verdict at the Special Court.155 
As the home of several international and internationalised courts and tribunals, 
the issue of releasing an accused into a country other than their home nation is of 
particular relevance in the Netherlands. The agreement allowing the trials and pre-
determination detention to take place in the Netherlands states that the accused is in 
the custody of the court rather than within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands.156 This 
is to prevent accused people from claiming asylum or residency rights within the 
Netherlands. Originally, the Netherlands took the position that an accused could be 
released into the country but would need a residence permit.157  However, that 
position has now changed and an accused person released on remand is required to 
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leave the Netherlands.158 This forces the courts and tribunals to arbitrarily detain those 
suspects who could be granted release but for a lack of a place to live.    
It could be argued that these considerations are not particularly important 
because the conditions of the detention centre in The Hague are much nicer than the 
conditions the accused would face in another type of prison.159 The United Nations 
Detention Unit in The Hague is notorious for its comfortable accommodations, having 
at times been referred to as the ‘Hague Hilton’.160 However, no matter how nice the 
conditions, it does not negate the fact that individuals housed there are still suffering 
deprivations and restricted human rights that would not be permitted were the 
individual not imprisoned. Further, some of these deprivations are exacerbated by the 
detention centre’s distance from the accused’s home and family and the typical length 
of the trials at the International Criminal Court.161 
 The willingness of a state to accept the accused is not the only consideration in 
deciding whether the accused can be released while awaiting trial. There are a number 
of logistical issues about how the individual will get to and from the court, whether 
they will work or otherwise be supported, and who will pay for their housing and 
living expenses.162 In addition, the court may require some assurances that the country 
will be responsible for helping get the accused to court, making sure they do not 
abscond, or providing a police force and resources in the event that they do abscond. 
These situations do not necessarily implicate criminal law, making it unclear whether 
the presumption of innocence applies. On one hand, these are circumstances that have 
nothing to do with the accused individual. On the other hand, a refusal to enter into 
agreements about which nation will house the accused while trial is pending, and who 
will pay for housing and transportation for the individual, can be convenient excuses 
for countries who do not want to be responsible for housing people accused of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. These excuses are contrary to the 
presumption of innocence as they involve a prejudgment that the accused is guilty. 
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Governments should generally adhere to the presumption of innocence when passing 
laws and entering into agreements which have to do with criminal law. Thus, these 
types of agreements should be decided upon when international and internationalised 
courts and tribunals are established so as to have a minimal impact on the 
presumption of innocence.  
A final consideration unique to international and internationalised courts and 
tribunals is that these courts do not have a dedicated police force or other enforcement 
mechanism to investigate the accused’s whereabouts or effectuate a re-arrest were the 
person to abscond.163 The courts and tribunals rely on national police forces and the 
cooperation of states parties and international organizations to arrest suspects.164 It 
can be a lengthy and expensive process and one no court or tribunal would wish to go 
through more than once should an accused abscond. Further, there is no guarantee that 
countries will cooperate with a renewed arrest procedure or that the individual will be 
found. If they cannot find the absconded individual and cannot continue the trial in 
absentia, it will give the appearance that impunity has prevailed. This is impractical 
and will have negative implications for the court. In addition, the lack of enforcement 
provisions would lead to an inability to monitor released individuals.   
 To allow an individual, who has been deemed worthy of remand while 
awaiting the outcome of their case, to be unnecessarily held in prison violates the non-
procedural presumption of innocence because it treats individuals as if they are guilty 
without first securing a conviction. Even those accused of war crimes and heinous 
human rights violations have the same human rights as everyone else accused of a 
crime.165 International and internationalised courts and tribunals, as well as national 
governments, must not be allowed to deprive the accused of these rights simply in the 
name of convenience or because of lack of agreement between states.  
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E. Conclusion 
 The presumption of innocence and pre-determination detention exist and 
conflict in every criminal law system. That both are permitted is incongruous, as pre-
determination detention appears to violate the presumption of innocence by treating 
individuals as guilty without the accused having been convicted of a crime. In 
practice, particularly because incarceration is the most severe form of punishment 
available in most jurisdictions, pre-determination detention can be indistinguishable 
from punishment and results in the restriction of human rights of those individuals 
accused of crimes. Further, even if the accused are not ultimately convicted of a 
crime, pre-determination detention can have long-lasting consequences for the 
accused.  
 There are three overarching reasons used to justify pre-determination 
detention: 1) the type of crime of which the person is accused; 2) preventing the 
accused from committing additional crimes; and 3) ensuring the accused’s appearance 
at trial. Only the third justification can be compatible with the presumption of 
innocence. The first two justifications both involve making decisions within the area 
of criminal law, meaning the presumption of innocence must be involved in the 
decision making process. Both fail to comply with the presumption of innocence 
because they act as pre-punishment, an assumption that the accused is guilty, and 
constitute impermissible preventative detention.  
 Pre-determination detention for the purpose of ensuring that the individual 
will be present for trial is the only justification that can be compatible with the 
presumption of innocence. It is an administrative decision rather than one informed by 
criminal law, and therefore the presumption of innocence does not apply. That said in 
order to avoid the overuse of pre-determination detention there should be a strict set 
of rules and standards to prove that the accused person has some propensity to 
abscond. The seriousness of the charges is not in and of itself an adequate 
justification. Instead, the fact-finder should look to extrinsic proof such as ties to the 
community, and whether the accused has absconded previously, when making his or 
her decision about whether to detain the accused at any time prior to reaching a 
verdict. 
 While some of these justifications for pre-determination detention may violate 
the presumption of innocence, the length of the detention is not one of them. 
Although the length of detention may make it seem more like punishment, pre-
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determination detention resembles punishment regardless of the length of detention. 
The length may exacerbate the issue, but if pre-determination detention can be 
justified on some grounds, and is not just imposed to pre-punish the suspect, then the 
length of the detention does not change the determination of whether the detention 
violates the presumption of innocence. 
 In addition to the justifications for the pre-determination detention, the 
international criminal law system has specific challenges that may affect whether the 
accused can be released from detention before a verdict is reached. These include: the 
lack of police force that could monitor the accused or re-apprehend them if they 
abscond; the fact that not every accused can return to their home-state due to 
instability or retribution; and that third states are unlikely to accept individuals 
accused of such serious international crimes. These issues must be resolved. Not 
releasing an individual from detention, even though he or she has the right to be free, 
violates the presumption of innocence because it serves to punish an individual prior 
to conviction. 
 Because of the inherent contradiction between pre-determination detention 
and the presumption of innocence greater safeguards should be in place to help ensure 
that the two ideas can co-exist. There should be clear standards of proof required to 
show that a person is likely to commit future crimes or abscond from the court. The 
justifications about the type of crime or the special considerations that occur in the 
international sphere can never be reconciled with the presumption of innocence.  
	   206	  
Chapter 8. Conclusion 
The presumption of innocence is a modern right that is rooted in ancient 
history. The first recorded use of the presumption of innocence is thought to be in 
Hammurabi’s Code. Over time, the presumption of innocence was included in most 
national jurisdictions, international and regional human rights agreements, and is a 
fundamental right applied at the international and internationalised criminal courts 
and tribunals. Despite this long history and development, there is no consensus as to 
what the presumption of innocence is, when it applies, or what protection it provides.  
Everyone may enjoy the presumption of innocence. There is no human who 
cannot benefit from this right. There is, however, a limiting condition on when a 
person may enjoy the protections of the presumption and that is that the right to the 
presumption of innocence only applies within criminal proceedings. The presumption 
of innocence is relevant within the context of criminal proceedings because criminal 
proceedings are where an individual’s ‘guilt’ and ‘innocence’ are at issue. The 
presumption of innocence is concerned with the legal definitions of guilt and 
innocence. In essence guilt means that all of the elements of a criminal offence are 
proven against a person to the required standard of proof. Innocence, in the legal 
sense, means that the requirements for guilt are unfulfilled. Legal innocence then, is 
the same as ‘not guilty’ and results in a person not being convicted. When discussing 
the purpose of the presumption of innocence, to prevent people from being treated as 
if they are guilty without a conviction, what is meant is not that individuals must be 
treated as if they are innocent in the sense of being completely irrelevant or unrelated 
to a particular crime that has occurred. That definition of innocence would mean that 
no one could be the subject of investigation, and that individuals could not be held 
responsible for their criminal activities. Instead the presumption of innocence requires 
that people who have not been convicted be treated as not guilty. They can be subject 
to investigation and criminal procedure so long as it is warranted and not the same as 
the treatment that an individual who has been found guilty would receive.   
Factual innocence exists when the person accused actually committed the 
crime, regardless of what may be proven against them, and is relevant to the 
presumption of innocence because it is related to our sense of justice. Ideally, only 
those who are both legally and factually guilty would be convicted and those who are 
factually innocent would never be found legally guilty of crime. An injustice occurs 
when a factually innocent person is found legally guilty. The presumption of 
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innocence is meant limit the number of factually innocent people who are convicted 
of crimes by forcing a burden and standard of proof on the prosecutor rather than 
requiring the accused person to prove his or her own innocence. Further, the 
presumption of innocence helps prevent injustices by instructing the fact-finder as to 
the conditions under which a conviction can be found. Finally the presumption of 
innocence prevents shortcuts from being taken within criminal justice by requiring 
both proof of guilt and for that proof to reach a particular standard before a conviction 
can be entered against the accused. It is only after there is sufficient proof of guilt 
against the accused, that the accused person may be convicted of a crime. Conviction, 
or a legal finding of guilt, is required before anyone may be punished or otherwise be 
treated as if they are guilty. In this sense, the idea of factual innocence and factual 
guilt can provide assurances about whether the criminal justice system is working 
properly. 
 When the right becomes applicable depends on which aspect of the right is at 
issue. There are two aspects to the presumption of innocence. The procedural aspect is 
a mandatory rebuttable presumption of law that provides instructions to the fact-finder 
during trial. It is an instruction to the fact-finder as to under what conditions the 
accused may be found guilty of the charges against him or her and what to do if those 
conditions are not met. Thus, the presumption of innocence has a relationship with the 
standard of proof required for conviction. While generally, this standard is quite high, 
the presumption of innocence merely requires enough proof to be provided to reach 
whatever standard the particular jurisdiction or criminal code requires. Providing 
enough evidence of guilt to meet the standard of proof rebuts or overcomes the 
presumption of innocence. Only then may the fact-finder find the accused guilty. The 
procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence also necessarily directs the burden 
or onus of proof away from the accused. This is because if the fact-finder is observing 
the presumption of innocence, the accused will be found innocent unless someone 
else provides sufficient proof of guilt. Thus, the accused has nothing to prove because 
the default outcome is that the accused has, from the outset, won the case. It is only 
after proof of guilt is provided, to the required standard, that the accused will be 
convicted. It is not in the accused’s interest to provide that proof, and thus, the 
responsibility falls to another party, usually the prosecutor.  
The procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence may be waived by the 
accused. Waiver of the presumption of innocence only occurs when the accused 
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enters a guilty plea to the charges of which they have been accused.  This is different 
from a confession because a confession is a piece of proof that still needs to be tested 
for veracity, reliability, and relevance. The process of entering a guilty plea asks the 
fact-finder to enter a finding of guilt against the accused while the accused concedes 
that the standard of proof could be met at the end of a full trial. This waives the 
procedural aspect of the presumption of innocence by the accused agreeing that the 
presumption would be overcome at trial and asking the fact-finder to enter a guilty 
verdict. 
The second aspect of the presumption of innocence is non-procedural and 
applies in a wider context. This aspect extends beyond trial to the point when 
someone is ‘charged’ with a criminal offence. The non-procedural aspect is primarily 
concerned with ensuring that people are not treated as if they are guilty without a 
conviction first being found against them. The secondary concern is to prevent things 
that occur outside of the trial from affecting the fairness of the trial proceedings. The 
main activities that it prohibits are public authorities making statements affirming the 
guilt of individuals who have not been convicted of a crime, the media excessively 
portraying a non-convicted person as guilty of a crime, and activities that generally 
make a person appear guilty unless they have been convicted. Not treating people as if 
they are guilty prohibits punishment and punishment-like activities including but not 
limited to imprisonment, making accused people appear in shackles unnecessarily, 
and making people who are accused of crimes appear in public in clothing that 
implies they have been convicted. While these are the types of treatment most dealt 
with by courts, it seems that this list cannot be exhaustive, and signals an area in 
which the law could further develop if other types of activity were to be questioned as 
a violation of the presumption of innocence. This aspect of the presumption of 
innocence helps uphold the rule of law and justice by forcing criminal procedure 
before a person may be treated the same as a person who has been found legally 
guilty. To do otherwise, could render criminal justice obsolete.  
While anyone may enjoy the presumption of innocence, the practical 
application implies that the duty to uphold the presumption of innocence is narrower. 
The case law suggests that the closer the actor is to the case against the accused, the 
stronger the duty is. Thus, fact-finders have the strongest duty. They must take an 
active role in upholding both the procedural and non-procedural aspects of the 
presumption of innocence, and may also need to take steps to ensure that others are 
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upholding the presumption. Prosecutors and police working on the particular case in 
question have a somewhat less strong duty. They must uphold the non-procedural 
aspect of the presumption of innocence, but there are instances where they may refer 
to the accused as guilty, such as when a prosecutor is making an argument in court. 
The duty to uphold the non-procedural aspect exists for all other public authorities. 
Whether a public authority’s actions against the accused will be interpreted as a 
violation of the accused person’s presumption of innocence will depend on the overall 
context as evaluated by the relevant court. Private entities may also have a duty to 
uphold the presumption of innocence but this is a considerably weaker duty than that 
held by public authorities. For private entities any duty to uphold the presumption of 
innocence must be balanced against their own rights and freedoms. 
Thus, it the presumption of innocence not a blanket right that has constant 
applicability and does not control our everyday lives, it only applies within the 
general context of criminal law and procedure. When during the criminal process the 
right to the presumption of innocence becomes operative is open to debate but there is 
a general consensus that, at the very latest, it attaches once an individual is ‘charged’. 
Particular jurisdictions may provide for an earlier activation of the right, but that is 
not part of the general rule. Courts and jurisdictions may choose to provide the 
presumption of innocence in any other areas of law. Indeed, businesses and 
individuals may extend a presumption of innocence to individuals in a private setting. 
However, providing the presumption of innocence outside of criminal law might not 
make sense, because legal guilt and legal innocence are not at issue in other types of 
legal proceedings. Further, because these other settings are outside of criminal law, 
the outcome of the determination cannot be criminal guilt. Criminal guilt is a 
determination that can only be made within the confines of the criminal process, and 
thus, perhaps the presumption of innocence should remain with that determination. 
While institutions, jurisdictions and individuals could choose to apply the 
presumption of innocence outside of criminal law, it is not a requirement. The only 
time the presumption of innocence is required is during criminal law processes. 
What happens after criminal proceedings depends on the outcome of those 
proceedings and the aspect of the presumption of innocence that is implicated. The 
only time the first aspect is overcome is when there is a finding of guilt after trial or 
waiver via guilty plea. However, because this aspect is a legal presumption it is not 
applicable outside of the trial setting. What happens to the second aspect after a 
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criminal process depends on the outcome of the case. If the charges are discontinued 
or there is an acquittal, then the second aspect of the presumption of innocence 
remains in tact. If the outcome is a conviction, then the second aspect of the 
presumption of innocence is overcome and the convicted individual may be punished 
and may incur whatever sanctions or treatment are appropriate for a conviction within 
the particular jurisdiction. Thus, while the second aspect is relevant to events that 
occur beyond trial, it too is overcome by a conviction. 
The presumption of innocence’s role in preventing non-convicted people from 
being treated as if they are guilty comes into conflict with laws allowing for pre-
determination detention. It is paradoxical that both the presumption of innocence and 
pre-determination detention are permitted within most criminal justice systems. These 
two ideas may be reconciled if the decision to hold a person in pre-determination 
detention can be taken outside of the context of criminal law and procedure as that 
would make the presumption of innocence not relevant to the decision. When 
examining the main statutory reasons allowing for pre-determination detention – type 
of crime accused, crime prevention, and ensuring the accused will be present for trial 
– it can be seen that only one of these justifications may be reconciled with the 
presumption of innocence.  
The only justification for pre-determination detention that can be reconciled 
with the presumption of innocence is detention to ensure that the accused is present 
for trial. This is the only reason that can be removed from criminal law because it 
does not have to do with either the underlying crime or future crimes. Rather, 
ensuring that an accused person appears for trial helps ensure that justice can be done 
for all parties because it allows the criminal process to continue and come to a 
resolution. Although using pre-determination detention to ensure the accused’s 
presence at trial may be reconciled with the presumption of innocence, it does not 
mean that all accused people should be detained for this purpose. Rather, there should 
be clear rules and factors to consider when determining whether this type of pre-
determination detention is appropriate.  
By requiring a conviction before a punishment or sanction can be enacted, the 
presumption of innocence helps promote the rule of law and supports justice. 
Allowing people who have not been convicted to be treated the same as people who 
have been convicted would circumvent the criminal justice process and would 
potentially lead to many more injustices. It is much easier, efficient and less 
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expensive to punish people without going through criminal procedure and requiring 
proof of guilt to a particular standard. If the non-convicted could be treated the same 
as those with a conviction, then there would be no need for rigorous investigation or 
criminal procedure. Doing so however, would allow more factually innocent people to 
be punished.  
Throughout this study there has been an on-going discussion about how broad 
or narrow the presumption of innocence should be. This discussion has largely been 
driven by the various normative theories. While these theories describe what the 
presumption of innocence should, ideally be, the presumption is in practice may be 
quite different. In practice, the presumption of innocence is both broad and narrow. It 
is broad in that it is found in a wide range of jurisdictions, national, regional, and 
international, but it is narrow because it only applies within criminal law and 
procedure. Everyone is entitled to the presumption of innocence, but an individual can 
only benefit from its protections once they are ‘charged’ with a criminal offence. 
Everyone could have some duty to uphold the presumption but the highest duties are 
limited to public officials and fact-finders. It prevents public authorities from making 
public statements of guilt about an accused person, but it is not a general protection 
from defamatory comments implying a person’s guilt. The presumption of innocence 
is relevant to pre-determination detention, but cannot be reconciled with most of the 
common reasons for that detention. It finds relevance beyond the bounds of trial, but 
remedy for incidents that occur outside of the court setting are only found if criminal 
proceedings are ever launched against the affected individual.  
Thus, in practice, the presumption of innocence is somewhere between the 
broad and narrow normative theories. It is broader than Laudan and Lippke argue 
because it has application beyond trial. The presumption of innocence is also 
narrower than Ho posits because it is not an overarching right, while the presumption 
is related to a large number of due process rights its use is limited to a specific 
purpose. Duff’s theoretical civic presumption of innocence is not supported by the 
practical application, but his idea that there could be more than one presumption of 
innocence finds some support in the application of the presumption’s two different 
aspects. As Weigend argues, the presumption of innocence does have a purpose 
related to controlling the relationship between individuals and government power, but 
the power concerned is limited to the power to punish or sanction or otherwise treat 
non-convicted people as if they are legally guilty of a crime. While the normative 
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theories do not provide a solution to defining what the presumption of innocence is, 
they provide what they think the presumption of innocence should be. Discussing 
what the presumption of innocence should be is important as the theory can help 
guide practice or can provide frameworks and lenses to help determine if the way that 
the presumption of innocence is developing in practice can, or should, be altered. 
The presumption of innocence is a human right that applies within criminal 
proceedings. Its two aspects work together and independently to ensure that innocent 
people are not treated in the same manner as people who have been convicted of a 
crime.  To do otherwise would obviate the need for criminal law and procedure and 
fundamentally change the rule of law. 
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